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Synopsis 
This dissertation examines order placement strategies across different trading 
platforms. The research provides empirical evidence on an important issue, given the 
growing diversity of market structures and the development of order placement 
strategies to adapt to these trading environments. Each chapter addresses a unique 
research question with scarce or conflicting prior research findings. The empirical 
evidence presented in this dissertation can be used by researchers, investors, and 
regulators to understand and manage developments in order placement strategies 
across financial markets. 
This first issue examined in this dissertation investigates the impact of an 
increase in the minimum tick size on market quality using the 3-Year Treasury bond 
futures (“3Y T-bond”) on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl 
futures (“5Y Bob1”) on the Eurex. On May 11, 2009, the SFE increased the minimum 
tick size from 0.5 to 1 basis-point for the 3Y T-bond contract. The increase in tick size 
from 0.5 to 1 basis-point for the 5Y Bob1 contract occurred on June 15, 2009. To 
examine the impact of the increase in minimum tick on market quality, two 
subsamples three months before and after the change are examined. For the 3Y T-
bond, the pre-period is 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008 and the post-period is May 
13, 2009 to August 13, 2009. For the 5Y Bob1, the pre-event sample period extends 
from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008 and the post-event sample period extends 
from June 17, 2009 to September 17, 2009. Changes in liquidity before and after the 
increase in minimum tick may reflect changes in market conditions as opposed to the 
change in tick size. To control for this possibility, the 10Y T-bond and 10Y Bund 
8 
 
contracts are used as control contracts. Results provide mixed evidence of the effect 
of the tick size change on market quality. The tick size increase is associated with an 
increase in depth at the best quotes and throughout the limit order-book for both 3Y 
T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts, which is consistent with prior studies. Bid-ask spreads 
(bid-ask spreads per minimum tick) for both 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts increase 
(decrease) after the change. However, the results for the control contracts imply that 
changes in the both 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts may not be due to the increase 
in tick size. Execution costs for both event contracts increase after the change, though 
the results for the control contracts suggest that this cannot be attributed to the tick 
size increase.   
The second issue investigates the relation between algorithmic trading volume 
and future market quality. An internal database is directly sourced from the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX). The dataset consists of trade by trade data for the top 100 
capitalised stocks listed on the ASX from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The unique 
feature of this dataset is that it consists of a field that identifies the source of each 
trade. Using this identifier, this study determines which trades are associated with 
human traders or computer based systems. To analyze the relation between 
algorithmic trading and subsequent market quality, the trading day is partitioned into 
multiple time intervals. The variables examined include the bid-ask spread, market 
depth, and short-term volatility. These variables are regressed on lagged algorithmic 
traded volume and a number of control factors. Over the whole sample period, results 
provide no evidence that algorithmic trading volume has an impact on market quality. 
However, when the sample is split into increasing and decreasing stock returns, results 
show that AT is negatively associated with future market quality when prices are 
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falling and has no relation when prices are rising. Finally, algorithmic trading’s negative 
association with future market quality can be explained by algorithmic traders 
engaging in positive feedback trading, where they systematically decrease their 
purchases of stocks during periods of falling prices, while increasing their level of 
selling. 
The third issue examined measures the magnitude of execution costs of 
outright options and options which constitute strategies (“strategy-linked options”) 
and examines if any differences in trade prices between these two groups is 
attributable to differences in market making costs on the Australian Options Markets 
(AOM). The data are obtained from an internal database from the AOM. The sample 
consists of trade by trade data for all equity options listed on the AOM. The sample 
period extends from January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2007. The difference in the 
percentage effective spread between option strategy trades and outright options is 
regressed on a range of option characteristics and hedging and adverse selection 
costs. Results reveal that execution costs for standard and tailor-made strategy-linked 
options are greater than outright options. Multivariate analysis shows that after 
controlling for a number of liquidity determinants, only tailor-made strategy-linked 
trades incur higher execution costs than outright options trades. Results also indicate 
that the difference in execution costs between tailor-made strategy-linked options 
and outright options is driven by the initial costs in delta hedging of option positions 
and not a result of higher adverse selection costs. 
The fourth issue examines intraday variations in quoted depth on the Nasdaq, 
a competitive dealer market. The sample contains stocks listed on the Nasdaq-100 
index and covers the period November 30, 2008 to April 23, 2009. The trading day is 
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partitioned into 30-minute intervals, these one-minute intervals are averaged into 14 
separate 30-minute trading intervals, from 09:30 hours to 16:00 hours (i.e. from the 
open to the close of trading). The variables examined include the bid-ask spread, 
quoted depth, volume and volatility. Consistent with prior literature, results reveal a 
negative relationship between the intraday patterns in quoted depth and bid-ask 
spreads. At the open of trading, quoted depth is relatively low and bid-ask spreads are 
relatively wide. Near the close of trading, quoted depth increases and bid-asks spread 
narrow. The pattern in spreads and depth at the close of trading on the Nasdaq is the 
opposite of that reported on specialist and order-driven markets. Results also show 
that after controlling for volume and volatility, the patterns in quoted depth and bid-
ask spreads are qualitatively similar. The difference in the intraday pattern in quoted 
depth and bid-ask spreads on the Nasdaq relative to specialist and order-driven 
markets is attributed to Nasdaq dealers using both the price and the quantity of 
quotes to manage inventory levels at the close of trading and that this is associated 
with an increase in liquidity.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The provision and availability of liquidity is a crucial determinant of the success of 
financial markets and a key issue in the market microstructure literature. Liquidity is 
of important concern, given the impact it has on a diverse range of stakeholders. From 
the perspective of market participants, a liquid market lowers transaction costs and 
increases price efficiency. For exchanges, liquidity affects the ability of exchanges to 
attract order flow from traders and to compete for order flow with other trading 
venues. For firms, liquidity affects both a firm’s cost of capital and optimal capital 
structure. A higher level of liquidity attracts more investors to a stock and that order 
arrival reduces the trading costs of investors because they are more likely to find 
counterparties willing to trade.  
Liquidity and trading costs on a financial market depend not only on the 
characteristics of the traded security, but also on the structure of the market and the 
order placement strategies of market participants. Market design affects the 
profitability of various trading strategies and hence affects price formation and 
implicit execution costs. Order placement relates to the effective timing of trades 
using appropriate order attributes. The way market design impacts order placement 
strategies and consequently liquidity is therefore a fundamental issue. Market 
structure defines the rules of trading that affect how market participants formulate 
their trading strategies (O’Hara, 1995). This dissertation focuses on two market types, 
namely order submission strategies in (1) limit order markets where market makers 
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are not present and (2) markets that employ designated market makers. Limit order 
markets do not depend on a designated market maker to provide liquidity, with the 
limit order book matching submitted orders at a particular price and quantity by 
investors. For instance, an investor submits a limit order to buy or sell a security at a 
particular price, whereas another investor creates a market order that matches 
against an existing limit order in the book. Conversely, designated market makers have 
an affirmative obligation to maintain a regular presence across the trading day 
supplying liquidity and is separately compensated to do so. Market makers derive 
profits through trading that provides “immediacy” to investors. For example, an 
investor who is keen to sell utilises a market maker’s standing ability to buy the asset 
for itself, immediately.  
Understanding the determinants of liquidity in limit order markets is important 
as liquidity may not be endogenously created at all times. That is, limit order markets 
face the problem of asynchronous order flow. For example, uncertain market 
conditions may reduce the likelihood of investors submitting limit orders due to the 
risk that the limit order will be mispriced. The probability of there being sufficient 
liquidity during the trading day depends on the order submission strategies of 
investors, such as whether an investor submits a market or limit order and cancels or 
amends an existing order. The literature on order placement strategies identifies a 
number of important factors affecting an investor’s order submission decision. These 
include the state of the order book at the time of order submission, level of liquidity 
supplier competition, expected time to and probability of execution, adverse selection 
costs and stock return volatility (Parlour, 1998, Foucault, 1999, Foucault, Kadan, and 
Kandel, 2005, Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan, 2005, 2009, Roşu, 2009). These factors 
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influence a trader’s ability to execute a desired quantity at favourable prices. An 
exchange’s trading platform affects these determinants and hence a trader’s order 
submission strategy. Consequently, an understanding of market design and their 
impact on order submission strategies provides insight into the factors influencing the 
provision of liquidity in limit order markets.  
This dissertation examines two elements of market design for limit order 
markets and their associated impact on market quality; the minimum price increment 
and algorithmic trading. One common feature in limit order markets is the presence 
of a minimum price increment, which is the minimum price difference in the bid-ask 
spread. As exchanges specify the minimum tick size, they can directly impact on 
available liquidity and the transaction costs imposed on investors. The overall impact 
of a tick size change is an empirical question. A larger tick size can encourage traders 
to post more limit orders, as the value for supplying liquidity is greater and the risk of 
front-running, that is those who move inside the bid-ask spread by submitting a limit 
order at a better price, is lower. Conversely, a larger tick size can come at a cost to 
liquidity demanders as the bid-ask spread is wider. Consequently, exchanges face a 
difficult task in balancing the competing interests of liquidity suppliers and investors 
(Harris, 1996). In addition to this difficulty, there is little experience to draw on in 
determining an optimal minimum tick size as exchanges rarely adjust their minimum 
price increment (Bollen et al., 2003). Research on the impact of changes in the 
minimum tick size provides important insight into its impact on market quality.  
In contrast to previous research examining the impact of a reduction on the 
minimum price increment, the first chapter contributes to the literature by being the 
first to investigate the impact of an increase in minimum tick size on market quality 
14 
 
for limit order markets. In response to the Global Financial Crisis that resulted in lower 
trading volumes on both exchanges, the Sydney Futures Exchange and the Eurex 
increased the minimum price increment for their medium term bonds in 2009. The 
increase in the tick size was designed to encourage greater liquidity in the futures 
markets. The literature suggests that a reduction in the minimum tick benefits small 
trades and liquid securities, as a lower bid-ask spread is likely to be more beneficial 
than reduced quoted depth (Bollen and Whaley, 1998). Futures markets offer another 
avenue to test this idea, as futures markets differ from equity markets in several 
important ways. Futures markets are more liquid than equity markets and are also 
dominated by institutional investors (Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley, 1996; Frino and 
Oetomo, 2005). Analysing the increase in the tick size provides a unique opportunity 
to test whether an increase in the tick size can improve market quality for markets 
with high liquidity. 
Another important aspect of limit order markets is the use of high frequency 
trading (HFT) practices, where traders use algorithms to make trades at high speeds. 
The impact that HFTs can have on liquidity provision is potentially significant, with the 
Tabb Forum estimating that over 60 per cent of trading activity in the US was 
conducted by HFTs in 2012. Algorithmic traders may generate earnings from trading 
strategies through doing a large number of small-size, small-profit trades. Due to the 
use of computer algorithms, HFTs can detect and act upon trading opportunities at 
higher speeds than their human counterparts. As HFTs are not regulated, they are able 
to pursue all profit maximizing short-term investment opportunities.  
A number of studies suggest that HFTs act as pseudo market makers through 
earning profits supplying liquidity (Menkveld, 2012). One concern is that because they 
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are not designated market makers, HFTs may destabilise markets during periods of 
heightened uncertainty as they rapidly withdraw and/or consume liquidity. For 
example, Golub and Keane (2011) suggest that HFTs that engage in market making 
activities quickly remove their inventory holdings when there is a significant stock 
price movement against their stock position. The flash crash of May 6, 2010, in which 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell by 600 points within minutes, is often cited 
as evidence that algorithmic trading can be harmful for financial markets. The cause 
of the crash, according to the joint SEC/CFTC report, was a sell order initiated by a 
large fundamental trader at 2.32pm on the E-Mini S&P 500 futures contracts. This sell 
order was executed rapidly over the next twenty minutes. The report noted that 
computerized trading was a contributing factor of the Flash Crash, with HFTs being net 
sellers as prices declined, accentuating the fall in prices. No research examines how 
the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality during market declines, of which 
the flash crash was an extreme event, differs from that during market upturns. 
Addressing this gap in the literature allows for a better understanding of risks to the 
provision of liquidity in limit order markets.  
The second chapter addresses this gap in the literature by examining whether 
the relation between algorithmic trading and subsequent market quality differs across 
up and down markets on the Australian Stock Exchange. Analysing algorithmic trading 
on the ASX provides an opportunity to test this relationship as unlike the data used in 
other studies, this dataset identifies each specific type of participant involved in a 
trade. That is, each trade consists of an identifier which allows categorisation as either 
a computer automated or human-based trade. It further categorises each computer 
automated trade as either a general algorithmic trader or Broker Engines. 
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This thesis also examines the order submission strategies of designated market 
makers. As market makers have an obligation to supply liquidity, market makers adjust 
the bid-ask spread to offset three kinds of market making costs that have been 
identified in the literature of market microstructure; order-processing costs, 
inventory-holding costs and adverse selection costs (Stoll, 1978). In addition to 
adjusting the bid-ask spread, market makers also adjust their liquidity by changing the 
quantity dimension, the level of quoted depth (Harris, 1990). This thesis looks at the 
determinants for market makers adjusting bid-ask spreads and quoted depth, 
providing a better understanding of the factors affecting liquidity provision by market 
makers and its associated impact on market quality.  
If an investor has private information about the fundamental value of a 
security (i.e. they are an informed trader), these investors will only trade when they 
know they will earn a return. This can include information about the timing of a news 
announcement and its potential impact on stock prices and returns. When trading 
against and informed trader, the market maker will earn a return below the market 
return. Therefore, market makers will moderate the size of the bid-ask spread based 
on the number of informed traders in the market. There is conflicting evidence on the 
extent to which market makers adjust bid-ask spread as a result of adverse selection 
costs (Vijh, 1990; Neal, 1992; Ahn et al.; 2008, Bartram et al., 2008). The options 
market provides an avenue to examine whether adverse selection costs are an 
important component when market makers determine bid-ask spreads. This is 
because the bid-ask spread is unlikely to vary as a result of inventory holding costs as 
these can be hedge in the underlying market.  The literature suggests that informed 
traders may be more likely to act on their private information in the options market 
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as the leverage implicit in an options contract can generate significant returns (Biais 
and Hillion, 1994; Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas, 1998). Relative to outright options, 
options strategy trades are likely to contain information about future realized volatility 
(Fahlenbrach and Sandas, 2010). Analysing the determinants of execution costs for 
option strategy trades can shed insight how market makers adjust bid-ask spreads and 
whether this is driven by informed trading. Therefore, the third chapter contributes to 
the literature by examining the relationship between the execution costs of option 
strategies and the determinants of market making costs on the Australian Options 
Market, which is a quasi-limit order book market where liquidity is supplied by public 
limit orders and designated market makers. 
In contrast to adverse selection costs, there is evidence that market makers 
adjust bid-ask spreads in relation to inventory costs. Inventory-based models of the 
bid-ask spread concentrate on the risk faced by market makers stemming from holding 
an undiversified portfolio (Tinic, 1972). Spreads exist to compensate market makers 
for the risk of holding unwanted inventory. This cost is equivalent to the expected 
difference in revenue from holding a well-diversified portfolio (Stoll, 1978). The cost 
of holding unwanted inventory has implications for how spreads change in response 
to changes in inventory holdings. Inventory-based models suggest that risk-averse 
market makers want to end the trading day with the desired level of inventory and 
thus may actively seek order flow before the close in an attempt to resolve any 
inventory imbalances accumulated during the day (Amihud and Mendelson, 1982). 
Analysis of intraday patterns in competitive dealer markets (markets where liquidity 
is predominantly supplied by market makers) show that market makers compete for 
order flow with other market makers by narrowing the bid-ask spread. A market 
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maker resolve inventory balances by both narrowing the bid-ask spread and increasing 
quoted depth (Harris, 1990). The combination of the spread and depth is needed to 
infer overall changes in liquidity (Lee et al., 1993). Consequently, an examination of 
both spreads and depth at the close of trading is needed to conclude that market 
makers adjust for inventory imbalances and that this results in an overall improvement 
in liquidity. This study examines the close of trading on the Nasdaq, a competitive 
dealer market, to examine whether quoted depth increases, in line with inventory-
based models of market makers. A dealer market like the Nasdaq is used as liquidity 
is predominantly supplied by market makers. Other markets such as the Australian 
Options Market is a hybrid market where liquidity is also supplied through limit orders. 
An examination of intraday patterns in those markets would mask the effect of market 
maker behaviour on liquidity. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Market microstructure is how market structure influences the economics of liquidity 
provision. Liquidity is important as it reduces transaction costs to investors as they are 
more likely to find a counter-party to trade (Menkveld and Wang, 2009). The two types 
of literature examining liquidity provision in markets are those examining order 
submission strategies in electronic limit order markets and those examining liquidity 
provision through designated market makers. In a limit order market, liquidity is 
submitted by buyers and sellers without any obligation to trade. Liquidity in these 
markets arise endogenously and as long as there is a sufficient number of buyers and 
sellers, there is no need for a market maker. A number of studies examine how orders 
are submitted in this type of market.  
Conversely, other studies examine markets with designated market makers. 
Market makers exist under the assumption that liquidity provision is unlikely to arise 
at all times. Liquidity may in fact disappear under certain market conditions, such as 
high levels of volatility or asymmetric information. Consequently, market makers have 
an obligation to provide liquidity in these circumstances. This literature review looks 
at order submission strategies for these two market structures and their impact on 
market quality. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 examines the 
literature concerned with order submission strategies on limit order markets, 
particularly relating to the minimum price increment and algorithmic trading. Section 
2.2 concentrates on the literature addressing the order submission strategies of 
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market makers, particularly in relation to the options market and intraday patterns in 
liquidity. Section 2.3 summarises and concludes the chapter.  
 
 
2.1 Order placement Strategies in Limit Order Markets 
 
When a trader decides to submit an order on an order-driven market, a trader faces a 
trade-off between submitting a limit order or a market order. An order that is 
submitted as a limit bid order is a quote to buy at that given price. Conversely, a limit 
ask order is quote to sell at that given price. The trader pays (receives) less (more) than 
the mid-point of the prevailing bid and ask prices using a limit bid (ask) order. Though 
the limit order can allow the trader to obtain a better price for the order, the cost 
involved with submitting a limit order is execution risk, as the time to execution is 
uncertain and the limit order may not execute at all. A market order has the advantage 
of providing the trader with immediacy as it does not face the risk of non-execution if 
the size of the order is less than or equal to the prevailing depth of the limit-order 
book. However, to obtain this immediacy the trader pays (receives) more (less) than 
the mid-point of the prevailing bid and ask prices. As a result of these trade-off, 
investors formulate optimal order submission strategies in order-driven markets to 
minimise costs of execution.  
Determining optimal order submission strategies in the use of limit and market 
orders is difficult to develop as a limit order executes against a future market order, 
competes with existing limit orders and limit orders that may be submitted in the 
future. Thus, in seeking to determine the price and quantities to submit for one or 
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more limit orders and the quantities for market orders, traders must condition on all 
factors that may affect the future trading process (Parlour and Seppi, 2007).  Cohen et 
al. (1981) provide the first theoretical model examining the choice between limit and 
market orders.  They suggest that a limit order has a ‘graviational pull’ property, where 
after a limit order is submitted, a market participant has a higher incentive to post a 
market order than to place another limit order near the price of the existing limit order 
due to the risk of non-execution.  
Handa and Schwartz (1996) provide empirical evidence for the assertion of 
Cohen et al. (1981). They find that limit orders are associated with higher returns as 
the limit orders occur due in part to liquidity driven price changes which quickly revert 
back to the mean. However, the authors assert that the reason market orders are still 
used is due to the risk of non-execution. They find that limit orders subject to non-
execution have negative market-adjusted returns. Further evidence is provided by 
Hollifield et al. (2002) who report, using a sample of stocks on the Vancouver Stock 
Exchange that traders with higher valuations of a stock are more likely to submit 
market orders.  
In response to the static model of Cohen et al. (1981), Parlour (1998) and 
Foucault (1999) develop dynamic equilibrium of models of the choice between limit 
and market orders. The model of Parlour (1998) assumes traders arrive randomly in 
the market with different valuations for an asset. The execution probability of a limit 
order depends on the state of the limit order book at the time of order submission 
and how many market orders will arrive in the future.  After a buy (sell) market order, 
a limit order at the ask (bid) has a higher probability of execution. As the return from 
submitting a limit order increases with the probability of execution, a trader who 
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wants to sell (buy) is more likely to submit a sell (buy) limit order than a corresponding 
market order. Consequently, there is a ‘crowding out’ of market buy (sell) orders after 
observing market sell (buy) orders. Buy (sell) market orders are less frequent after sell 
(buy) market orders than after buy (sell) market orders. Consistent with Parlour 
(1998), Handa et al. (2003) also show that the greater the excess market depth of the 
buy (sell) side relative to the market depth of the sell (buy) side, the higher the 
execution risk to buyers (sellers). Therefore, the larger the imbalance between the buy 
(sell) side relative to the sell (buy) side, the more likely buyers (sellers) are to use 
market orders rather than limit orders. 
Foucault (1999) suggests that the decision to submit a limit order is driven 
through price volatility. The author develops a model of price formation and order 
placement within a limit order market. Within this model, traders can post either limit 
or market orders. Limit orders enable the trader to obtain a potentially better price, 
but face the risk that the trade fails to execute. Foucault (1999) finds that the mix 
between market and limit orders are determined by the degree of price volatility. In 
periods of high market volatility, the probability of trading against an informed trader 
increases. This causes limit buy (sell) order traders to post lower (higher) bid (ask) 
prices and/or reduce their order sizes to compensate for the risk of being picked off 
by informed traders. This leads to a direct relationship between price volatility and the 
bid-ask spread and an inverse relationship between price volatility and quoted depth. 
The model of Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2009) also suggests that speculators are less 
likely to supply liquidity when volatility is high.  
Extending the models of Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999), other models 
examine the impact of waiting costs and adverse selection costs. Foucault et al. (2005) 
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and Roşu (2009) suggest that traders incorporate the expected time to execution for 
limit orders when formulating whether to use a limit or market order, with traders 
categorised as patient and impatient traders. Impatient traders have a larger waiting 
cost per unit of time and the expected total waiting cost is determined by the product 
of the delay between order submission and execution, and the waiting cost per unit 
of time. Foucault et al. (2005) suggest that dynamics of the limit order book is 
determined by the mix of patient and impatient traders and the rate of order arrival. 
Their model has a number of predictions: impatient traders are more likely to submit 
a market order than a limit order; traders become more impatient at the market close, 
increasing the arrival rate of market orders; when the proportion of patient traders is 
large then traders are more likely to submit aggressive limit orders (improve upon 
quoted spread).  
Bias et al. (1995) suggest that order placements are concentrated at the best 
bid and ask quotes. Examining a dataset of 40 stocks on the CAC Index, the authors 
report that a large proportion of trades improve upon the existing best bid and ask 
price, indicating that traders are trying to compete for time-priority to maximise their 
probability of execution. Reflecting the risk of non-execution, traders place more 
market orders when the spread is narrow and limit orders when the spread is wide. 
Al-Suhaibani and Krynowski (2000) show that the decision to place a limit or market 
order depends on the state of the limit order book. Examining stocks listed on the 
Saudi stock market, they find that market orders are more likely to be submitted when 
the spread (depth) is narrow (wide). Griffiths et al. (2000) reach a similar conclusion 
looking at 5 classifications of order aggressiveness on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
They find that orders are less aggressiveness when the bid-ask spread is wide, and that 
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greater depth on the same side of the order book encourages more aggressive orders 
to gain priority over other orders. Similarly, Ranaldo (2004) finds patient investors are 
more likely to submit aggressive orders when the same side of the book is thicker.  
Cao, Hansch and Wang (2008) reveal how the state of the full limit order book 
affects order submission strategies as well as cancellation and amendment strategies 
on the Australian Stock Exchange. Consistent with Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999), 
the authors show that a large inside spread discourages market orders, whereas depth 
at the top price step encourages more market orders. The rest of the limit order book 
doesn’t affect order submission but does affect cancellations and amendments. The 
driver of this outcome is the level of order imbalance in the book; when there are a 
large number of limit orders on one side of the book, a trader is likely to be crowded 
out the other orders and is likely to improve the price of their limit order to obtain 
price-priority or cancel their order.  
Research on the effect of volatility on order aggressiveness is less conclusive. 
In line with the model of Foucault (1999), Ahn et al. (2001) find that an increase in 
transitory volatility results in a greater placement of limit orders, as higher volatility 
lowers execution risk and thereby encourages limit order submissions. Beber and 
Caglio (2005) and document a similar relation positive relation between the 
placement of limit orders and volatility, as predicted by Foucault (1999). In contrast, 
Aitken, Brown and Wee (2007) find that limit order usage declines when volatility 
increases. Bloomfield et al. (2005) suggest that this is because volatility provides an 
information advantage to informed investors, allowing them to pick off uninformed 
investors.   
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In the market microstructure literature, investors can be segregated into 
informed and uninformed traders. Informed traders are those that possess 
information about the true value of a security that has not been impounded into the 
share price. Kyle (1985) suggests that traders try to maximise returns based on this 
information, through buying below fundamental value and waiting for the price to rise 
or vice versa they are short-selling. Uninformed traders are those who trade for 
reasons other than information. This could be because of liquidity reasons to access 
cash flow (Harris, 2003). Alternatively, they could be trading on noise as if it were 
information (Black, 1986). Black (1986) suggests that these ‘noise’ traders are an 
important source of liquidity, as uninformed traders will trade against informed 
traders believing they are in fact trading on ‘information’.  
Foster and Viswanathan (1994) develop a dynamic model that analyses 
strategic trading between two asymmetrically informed investors. The first informed 
trader knows the information seen by both informed traders and the second informed 
trader knows only his/her information. In this model, the lesser informed trader learns 
about the better informed trader’s information through an analysis of the order flow. 
The behaviour on the part of the lesser informed trader leads the better informed 
trader to strategically respond by trading intensely on information common to both 
parties at the start of the trading day, and to trade on his own private information 
later in the day once the common information has dissipated through trading. This 
leads to the prediction that the start of the trading day is characterised by high 
volume, variances and spreads. 
Glosten (1994) and Seppi (1997) contend that informed investors are more 
likely to submit market orders as they are impatient and want to capitalise on their 
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information quickly. Conversely, uninformed investors are more likely to wait to 
reduce the likelihood of trading with informed investors. In contrast, the model of 
Chakravarty and Holden (1995) suggest that informed investors prefer to submit limit 
orders. This is because information about the future value of a security is not 
necessarily short-lived, reducing the likelihood of non-execution risk. 
Kaniel and Liu (2006) suggest that the decision for an informed trader to use a 
market order is dependent upon the expected horizon of the informed trader’s private 
information. The risk to using a limit order is that the order might not execute. As the 
expected horizon of private information increases, the probability that the limit order 
will be hit also increases, reducing the risk of the uncertain execution. Consequently, 
limit orders become more attractive to informed traders the longer the information 
horizon. As a test of this hypothesis, the authors find that limit orders on the NYSE 
convey more information than market orders about future prices, implying that 
informed traders prefer to submit limit orders on average.  
This result is supported by Keim and Madhavan (1995), who find that 
institutional (informed) investors do submit limit orders. Similarly, Doung et al. (2009) 
find that the order submission strategy differs between individual and institutional 
investors. In line with Foucault (2009), both institutional and individual investors 
submit less aggressive orders when spreads are high for large cap stocks. For small cap 
stocks however individual investors are more likely to use market orders even when 
spreads are wide.  For both institutional and individual investors, order aggressiveness 
declines for mid cap stocks when volatility increases. However, for large cap stocks, 
institutional investors increase their order aggressiveness in seeking to profit from 
‘picking-off’ stale limit orders. Finally, institutional investors are more likely to place 
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aggressive orders at the start of the trading day to take to exploit potential private 
information, whereas individual investors become more aggressive as the trading day 
progresses.  
Beber and Caglio (2005) find that informed traders strategically place limit 
orders. Focusing on specific situations characterized by higher probability of 
information-based trading, they find that orders are less aggressive, suggesting 
strategic behaviour of informed traders. Analysing the Moscow Interbank Currency 
Exchange, Menkhoff et al. (2010) find that in response to increasing volatility, 
informed traders place more aggressively priced limit orders, whereas uninformed 
traders are insensitive to changing order book conditions. Supporting Menkhoff et al. 
(2010), Chung et al. (1999) and Bae et al. (2003) find that NYSE traders are more likely 
to place limit orders relative to market orders when the spread is large. 
 
2.1.1 Minimum tick size and Order Submission Strategies 
 
The imposition of a minimum tick influences the order submission strategies of 
traders. This is because it sets the minimum difference between bid and ask prices, 
the ‘bid-ask spread’. A widening of the bid-ask spread resulting from the 
establishment of a minimum tick size changes the relative attractiveness of supplying 
and demanding liquidity, which may lead to an increase or decrease in overall 
execution costs. Whether market quality is improved by a tick size change thus 
becomes an empirical issue (Bessembinder, 2000). 
The bid-ask spread is considered a trading cost to liquidity demanders, and is 
a premium received by liquidity suppliers (Harris, 2003). A wider bid-ask spread 
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increases the marginal profitability of supplying liquidity. Traders who in the absence 
of a minimum tick size would have demanded liquidity using a market order may 
decide to supply liquidity through submitting a limit order to take advantage of this 
higher premium. Chung et al. (1999) examine the intraday variation in spreads 
established by limit-order traders and show that more investors enter limit orders 
when the spread is wide. Arnold and Lipson (1997) confirm that the proportion of limit 
order submission increases substantially after stock splits because stock splits alter 
pricing grids. 
A widening of the bid-ask spread also reduces the likelihood of a limit order 
becoming stale, increasing the incentive to submit a limit order relative to a market 
order. A stale limit order refers to an order that no longer reflects the true value of a 
security, as new information has changed the security’s value. These stale limit orders 
can be taken advantage of by traders who place a market order at the price offered 
by the limit order, profiting from the difference between the security’s updated value 
and the existing price of the limit order. This is referred to as picking-off risk (Liu, 2009; 
Fong and Liu, 2010). For example, suppose that all traders currently agree on a 
security’s true value. Trading only occurs in this instance as a result of liquidity 
reasons, with liquidity suppliers hoping an impatient trader will trade against them. 
Suppose now that information is released leading to the security’s value being revised 
upwards. Some sell limit orders will now be at a price below the security’s true market 
value, allowing traders to submit market orders against all limit orders up to the new 
valuation of the security, causing liquidity suppliers to lose money. The higher the risk 
that a limit order will become stale reduces the likelihood that traders will post limit 
orders. Whether a limit order become ‘stale’ prior to being executed is partially 
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dependent on the size of the bid-ask spread. A wider bid-ask spread reduces the 
likelihood that a limit order will become stale. A wider bid-ask spread means the value 
of the security needs to change by a larger amount to exceed the limit order price.  
A minimum tick may reduce the incidence of front running, increasing the 
incentive of traders to supply liquidity to the market (Harris, 1994). Front running 
refers to trading in front of an order in the queue, by submitting a limit order at a 
better price. For example, suppose that a trader place a limit order to purchase a stock 
at 1.00 and the order is displayed in the limit order book. Posting the limit order is 
costly as the trader faces the risk that the order doesn’t execute. If another trader 
arrives offering to also post a limit order to buy at 1.00 then the new trader’s order 
has a lower priority, with a market sell order executing against the former trader’s 
order first. This maximises the former trader’s probability of execution at the given 
price. If however the latter trader could post a bid a 1.000001 then the trader can 
move to the front of the queue without having to meaningfully improve upon the bid 
price.  
Bacidore et al. (2003) suggest that the risk of front running may mean that if 
uninformed investors are disadvantaged often enough, this might result in them 
reducing the use of limit orders and increasing the use of market orders. Instituting a 
minimum tick induces a trader to meaningfully improve upon the bid by an 
economically significant amount in order to go the front of the queue. This increases 
the relative attractiveness of posting limit orders as a limit order has a greater 
probability of executing at a given price.  
In response to the risk of front running, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2003) and 
Bacidore et al. (2003) report that a reduction in the minimum price increment reduces 
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the average size of limit orders while increasing the cancellation rate of limit orders, 
in order to reduce the value of the trading option to other traders. High cancellation 
rates also helps to frustrate quote matchers as it increases the difficulty to identify a 
trader’s intentions.  
A minimum price increment can also influence the level of informed trading in 
the market. The transaction cost hypothesis suggests that the security with lowest 
transaction costs will attract informed trading. Because lower transaction costs could 
lead to higher profits, informed traders have more incentives to trade in the market 
with lower transaction costs (Booth et al, 1999). 
Given the conflicting impact that the minimum tick has on liquidity demanders 
and suppliers, exchanges face a difficult task in balancing the competing interests of 
liquidity suppliers and investors (Harris, 1996). In addition to this difficulty, there is 
little experience to draw on in determining an optimal minimum tick size as exchanges 
rarely adjust their minimum price increment (Bollen et al., 2003). Research on the 
impact of changes in the minimum tick size provides important insight into its impact 
on market quality. Section 2.1.2 examines the literature assessing the impact of a tick 
size change on market quality.  
 
2.1.2  Theoretical Impact of the Tick Size on Market Quality 
 
Harris (1994) develops a cross-sectional model of the discrete bid-ask spread subject 
to a minimum price constraint. The minimum tick size places a lower bound limit on 
the size of the bid-ask spread. Harris (1994) predicts that if the minimum tick acts as a 
binding constraint for stocks, then a reduction in the tick size will result in a 
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corresponding fall in the bid-ask spread. He forecasts that this will be particularly 
pronounced for lower priced stocks, as the tick size will have greater economic 
significance. The benefits of a tick size reduction should also be greatest for stocks 
with high trading activity, as high turnover decreases per trade fixed costs. Predictions 
are also given for market depth. If the minimum price variation is greater than the 
spreads dealers would otherwise quote, the profits to supplying liquidity are artificially 
increased. A decrease in the tick size under this scenario would lead to a decrease in 
quoted depth. Minimum price variation rules may also increase quoted depth if the 
exchange operates on a price-time priority, as the tick size may stop other traders 
from taking advantage of the information provided by an order by placing a quote at 
a better price.  
In line with the predictions of Harris (1994), Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(1995) suggest quoted bid ask spreads should decline with a reduction in the minimum 
tick. Looking at payment for order flow between NYSE market makers and non-NYSE 
market makers, when non-NYSE market makers can pay for order flow in the presence 
of a finite tick size, orders do not flow to the lowest cost provider of market making 
services. This is because there is a significant incentive for brokers to move orders off 
the NYSE to obtain payments offered by the non-NYSE market makers, who can offer 
the best quoted price without being the lowest cost provider, as the tick size acts as 
constraint on the spread. This suggests that lowering the tick size should lower market 
maker rents and improve quoted bid-ask spreads. 
In the theoretical model of Cordella and Foucault (1999), the price increment 
which minimizes the cost of immediacy is not zero. They show that an increase in the 
size of the minimum tick can improve liquidity. For instance, if the current tick size is 
32 
 
too fine, an increase in the minimum tick will increase the propensity of investors to 
post at the competitive spread. Second, even considering that a higher minimum tick 
increases the cost of immediacy, this may be offset by significant growth in limit 
orders, leading to an overall improvement in market quality. Seppi (1997) finds a 
similar result. Creating a market microstructure model of liquidity, Seppi (1997) shows 
that large institutional investors have a larger optimal tick size relative to retail traders, 
though both prefer a tick size greater than zero. 
Developing a model of an order-driven market populated by discretionary 
liquidity traders, Foucault et al. (2005) finds that imposing a minimum tick size can 
improve the resiliency of the limit order market. A market is resilient if price changes 
that result from high order volumes quickly attract new limit orders which, in turn, 
pull the price back again. The authors state that actors which induce traders to post 
more aggressive limit orders make the market more resilient. A minimum tick size can 
induce traders to post more aggressive limit orders, improving the resiliency of the 
market.  
 
2.1.2  Empirical Tests of the Impact of Tick Size Changes on Market Quality  
 
Ahn, Cao and Choe (1996) is the first study to directly test the impact of reducing the 
tick size on transaction costs and trading activity. The event examined is the reduction 
in tick size from $1/8 to $1/16 on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) effective 3 
September, 1992. The authors find a significant reduction in both quoted and effective 
spreads of approximately 19% for stocks priced between $1 and $5 dollars. This is a 
result of an increase in one-sixteenth quotations and a decrease in one-eighth 
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quotations. Traded volume and market depth remain unchanged after the tick 
reduction. Stocks with greater trading activity, lower prices and stronger competition 
from the regional exchanges experienced the greatest reductions in spreads. Van 
Ness, Van Ness and Pruitt (2000) however find mixed evidence on the impact of a tick 
size change on quoted depth. Analysing the impact of the move to sixteenths on the 
AMEX, Nasdaq and NYSE, Van Ness, Van Ness and Pruitt (2000) show that the number 
of quotes increases significantly after the change, though the effect on quoted depth 
is mixed, decreasing on the AMEX and NYSE and increasing on Nasdaq. 
In contrast to Ahn, Cao and Choe (1996), Bacidore (1997) and Porter and 
Weaver (1997) show that a decline in the tick size leads to a reduction in quoted depth, 
in line with the predictions of Harris (1994).  They examine the effect of decimalisation 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) on investor welfare. In 1996, the minimum tick 
size was reduced from 12.5 cents to 5 cents for stocks priced over $5 and was reduced 
from 5 cents to 1 cent for stocks priced between $3 and $5. Stocks trading below $3 
were unaffected. Following decimalization bid-ask spreads should fall and traded 
volume should increase. Market depth may fall if liquidity supplier profits decline 
because the increase in traded volume does not offset the decline in bid-ask spreads. 
Bacidore (1997) shows a significant decline in bid-ask spreads and quoted depth, 
particularly for high priced stocks. Bessembinder (2003a) also find that quotation sizes 
decreased 65% and 24% for the NYSE and Nasdaq respectively resulting from the 
change to decimalization in 2001. 
Explaining the change in quote behaviour after a change in tick size, Chung and 
Chuwonganant (2002) authors conjecture that price discreteness has a larger effect 
on spread than depth revisions, as the tick size is more likely to be a binding constraint 
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on spreads than depth. In line with this hypothesis, quote revisions involving spreads 
increase significantly after the change. The proportion of quote revisions involving 
changes in the spread is smaller for low-price, high-volume stocks both before and 
after the change. Furthermore, the authors find that the number of quote revisions 
involving changes in spread (depth) was largest (smallest) during the first hour of 
trading even after the change in the tick size. These results suggest that the tick size 
acts as a binding constraint on the bid-ask spread even after the reduction in tick size. 
A change in the tick size might not just affect spreads and depth but also 
whether a trader exposes their order. Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2005) analyse the 
reduction in tick size on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) for stocks priced above 
$10 and below $A0.50 in 1995. Stocks priced between $A0.50 and $A10 are used as a 
control sample as they experienced no change in tick size. Liquidity is measured using 
the time-weighted absolute and relative bid-ask spread, depth at the best bid and ask 
prices and a weighted order book measure developed by Aitken and Comerton-Forde 
(2003) to determine the overall impact of the tick size change on market liquidity. 
Order exposure behaviour is also examined, where investors can decide to hide their 
order volume for order sizes above $A25 000. Liquidity for the control group is found 
to be unchanged before and after the event date. Stocks priced under $A0.50 
experience a significant decrease is bid-ask spreads and depth. Using the liquidity 
proxy, overall liquidity improves, though order exposure is unaffected. For stocks 
priced above $10, liquidity for high volume stocks increased significantly, yet liquidity 
for low volume stocks decreased.  
Porter and Weaver (1997) show that a reduced tick size primarily benefits small 
traders as narrower bid-ask spreads are accompanied by reduced quoted depth, which 
35 
 
can result in higher overall transaction costs for large traders. Bacidore (1997) 
however shows that adverse selection costs declines and trading volume experiences 
no change, indicating a reduction in liquidity supplier rents. In contrast, Porter and 
Weaver (1997) show that internalization on the TSE is found to be unaffected. 
Member profits remain unchanged while revenue from commissions increases.  
In line Porter and Weaver (1997), Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) also find that 
a reduction in the tick size has a differential impact on small and large traders. 
Subsequent to the minimum price increment from an eighth to a sixteenth on the 
NYSE, quoted spreads and depth fell by 14.3% and 48%, respectively. More 
importantly, cumulative depth declines and NYSE floor members decreased the 
amount of liquidity they display. The combined effect has resulted in smaller traders 
to be better off and larger traders to be worse off. Studying the same event as 
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Johnson and Lipson (2001) argue than an analysis of 
the change in quoted and effective spreads for institutional trades are not a sufficient 
measure of the change in market quality. This is because institutions execute a large 
position over multiple trades, and orders may suffer from information leakage prior 
to execution. Examining realised execution costs for institutional orders after the 
reduction in tick size, the authors find that the cost of orders below 1000 shares 
declines, while the cost of medium sized orders remains unchanged. Similar to 
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), large orders above 10,000 shares experience an 
increase of up to one-third in execution costs. The authors conclude that for the 
institutional orders examined, the reduction in tick size has generally lead to an 
increase in execution costs.  
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Chakravarty, Panchapagesan, and Wood (2005) examine the conclusions 
drawn by Johnson and Lipson (2001) by analyzing the trading costs of 34 large buy-
side institutions trading NYSE stocks before and after the move to decimalisation in 
2001. Confirming the results of Johnson and Lipson (2001), they present mixed 
evidence on the effect of decimalisation on execution costs. The authors show that 
the move lead to higher costs for orders that aggressively sought liquidity (those that 
transacted the whole order within one trading day). Partitioning trades into bid-ask 
spread quartiles, trading costs declined in the smallest spread quartile as the pre-
decimal tick size acted as a binding constraint, while the largest spread quartile 
experienced an increase in trading costs, suggesting that liquidity fell for stocks not 
constrained by the minimum tick. The authors conclude that despite this mixed effect 
on different groups of investors, the change to decimalisation resulted in a significant 
decline in trading costs overall.  
The decline in both bid-ask spreads and quoted depth as a result of the decline 
in the tick size means the overall impact on execution costs is uncertain. Bollen and 
Whaley (1998) find that that the volume-weighted quoted bid/ask spread declines by 
13 percent, while quoted depth fell by 38% resulting from the NYSE’s decision to 
change stock price quotations from 1/8ths to 1/16ths. To determine which offsetting 
effect dominates, they create a measure called the Market Quality Index (MQI), which 
is a ratio of the average share depth at the prevailing bid and ask quotes to the 
percentage quoted spread. The MQI suggests that the tick size change has little 
impact, increasing by a modest 1.44 percent. The largest gains from the tick decrease 
are for low priced stocks and small trades. 
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A reduction in the tick size might not always be optimal if bid-ask spreads are 
already narrow. Examining a change in the pricing grid on the Paris Bourse which 
raised the tick size for certain stocks and lowered it for others, Bourghelle and Declerck 
(2004) reveal the reduction (increase) in the tick size is associated with a decrease 
(increase) in quoted depth, while investors use more (less) hidden orders after the 
decrease (increase) in tick size. The results document no change in relative quoted and 
effective spreads under both an increase and decrease in tick size, suggesting a convex 
relationship between the tick size and bid-ask spread. They conclude that reducing the 
tick size is not always optimal as a coarse pricing grid may not lead to excessively large 
spreads, increases quoted depth and encourages liquidity providers to expose their 
trading interest.   
In addition to potentially reducing transaction costs, a reduction in the 
minimum tick size may lead to improved price discovery, because stocks are traded 
closer to their intrinsic value, attracting greater levels of informed trading. Bacidore 
(2001) analyses the impact that the move to decimalization on the TSE has on traders’ 
information acquisition. A fall in bid-ask spreads following a reduction in the minimum 
tick is consistent with the argument that liquidity suppliers were earning non-
competitive rents before the change. The author notes that the components of the 
spread consist of order-processing, inventory and adverse selection costs, and the 
decline in the bid-ask spread may instead come from one of these components. 
Developing a model similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Bacidore (2001) shows 
that the imposition of a minimum tick increases the precision of a trader’s information. 
This is because a minimum tick increases the cost of inaccurate information. In support 
of the model, the author finds a positive relationship between the restrictiveness of 
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the pre-decimalisation minimum tick regime and the decline in the adverse selection 
component of the spread. Similarly, Chen and Gau (2009) find that the information 
share of the stock market increases following the reduction in tick size Taiwan Stock 
Exchange (TSEC), suggesting that price discovery improves following a tightening in 
bid-ask spreads and a decline in transaction costs.  
Hau (2006) examines the effect of the tick size on price volatility. The minimum 
tick size on the Paris Bourse increases for stocks priced above French Francs (FF) 500 
from FF 0.1 to FF 1, providing a natural experiment to examine the effect of an increase 
in the tick size on volatility. Higher transaction costs may lower volatility by privileging 
trading based on fundamental information and discouraging destabilizing short-term 
speculators. Similar to other studies, the higher tick size acts as a binding constraint 
with effective spreads 20 percent higher for stocks priced above FF 500. Daily realised 
volatility is 27 percent higher for stocks trading above FF 500. Controlling for market 
wide volatility, the volatility differential between the two tick regimes increases on 
days of low index volatility. The authors conclude that an increase in tick size 
contributes to higher volatility. 
Studies also examine the impact of a reduction on the minimum tick in a 
futures market setting, which largely align with the literature in equities markets. ap-
Gwilym, McManus, and Thomas (2005) is the first study to investigate the impact of a 
reduction in the minimum tick in a futures market setting. The reduction in tick size 
occurred on the UK Long Gilt Futures on LIFFE, which experienced a change in 
quotation from fractions to decimal quotes in 1998. The results reported by the 
authors are largely consistent with the evidence for equity markets. Price clustering 
increases, with zero being the most frequently used digit after the change to decimal 
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pricing. Quoted and effective spreads measured as a proportion of ticks increases 
following the reduction in tick size, however the monetary value of the spread 
declines. Trade size decreases as quoted depth declines after the change. However, 
results show a significant increase in daily traded volume, with the authors concluding 
that the benefits of narrower spreads offsets the negative impact of reduced depth.   
 
2.1.3 Order Submission Strategies of Algorithmic Traders 
 
Algorithmic trading refers to trades conducted by computer algorithms, with little or 
no human intervention. Algorithmic trading refers to the use of algorithms to conduct 
and manage trades. These programs are used to trade under both agency and 
proprietary contexts. These uses extend to minimizing execution costs by splitting 
larger orders into smaller packages, or finding price patterns for minute arbitrage 
opportunities, referred to as high frequency trades. Initial studies concerning 
algorithmic trading focus on the effect it can have on an investor’s transaction costs. 
Kisell and Malamut (2006) argue that an important use of algorithmic trading models 
is to aim at achieving or beating a specified benchmark for their executions. Bertsimas 
and Lo (1998) find that the optimal strategy for traders with large positions trying to 
minimize execution costs is to break the order into smaller pieces. Konishi (2002) 
develops an optimal slicing strategy for VWAP trades. Although these execution 
strategies predate the rise of algorithmic trading, such strategies are suited for 
Algorithmic Traders (ATs). Domowitz and Yegerman (2005) show algorithmic trading 
is less expensive than alternative means based on a measure of implementation 
shortfall. However, these algorithms underperform human execution for order sizes 
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greater than 10 % of average daily volume. VWAP algorithms have an 
underperformance of 2bps relative to the VWAP benchmark, but the authors suggest 
that this can be compensated by the lower fees attached to computer algorithms 
relative to human brokers.  
Algorithmic traders may generate earnings from trading strategies through 
doing a large number of small-size, small-profit trades. Due to the use of computer 
algorithms, HFTs can detect and act upon trading opportunities at higher speeds than 
their human counterparts. As HFTs are not regulated, they are able to pursue all profit 
maximizing short-term investment opportunities. These high-frequency trading 
opportunities may roughly be divided into liquidity-providing trading strategies and 
liquidity-consuming trading strategies. 
Liquidity-consuming trading strategies consists of placing market orders to 
take advantage of directional movements in prices. When HFTs use trade and order 
flow information to determine where prices may go in the future, they consume part 
of the available limit orders that other investors might have used to trade. One such 
liquidity consuming strategy (Hirschey, 2013) is to anticipate and trade ahead of the 
order flow of other investors. For example, a trader may anticipate the trades of an 
institutional investor if the investor splits their large order into numerous smaller 
orders and their initial trades reveal information about their future trading intentions. 
The algorithmic trader can profit from this by trading ahead of the institutional 
investor, profiting from the price impact of the investor’s subsequent trades. This 
strategy can be complemented through the practice of quote-stuffing, where traders 
generate a large amount of message traffic which other investor’s must process, 
allowing the algorithmic trader to trade ahead of them (Brogaard, 2011). 
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Brogaard et al. (2014) reveal that HFTs engage in both directional and 
contrarian trading strategies. Using a subset of HFTs operating on the NASDAQ for a 
sample of stocks, the authors decompose stock price movements into permanent and 
temporary components. Permanent price movements reflect new information that 
changes the fundamental value of the security, whereas the temporary component is 
interpreted as pricing errors. The authors find that HFTs trade in the direction of 
permanent price movements and in the opposite direction of transitory pricing errors 
using market orders. Foucault et al. (2016) suggest that their ability to do this arises 
from their ability to process information slightly ahead of the rest of the market. 
Consequently, Brogaard et al. (2014) show that HFTs can predict price changes over 
horizons of less than 3 to 4 seconds.  
Another strategy is the use of statistical arbitrage or pairs trading, where a long 
position and an offsetting short-position is taken in two highly correlated instruments. 
When the correlation between the two stocks temporarily diverges, an arbitrage 
position is taken where a short position is taken in the outperforming instrument and 
a long position is taken in the underperforming instrument. The profitability from the 
trade occurs from the spread between the two instruments converging. Brogaard 
(2011) examines the propensity for algorithmic traders to either provide or take 
liquidity around news events. Algorithmic traders during stock-specific news events 
increase their frequency in providing liquidity and reduce the frequency of taking 
liquidity. The opposite result is found for macro-economic announcements. As stock-
specific news relates only to the stock, the information released from the 
announcement allows trader’s to trade the stock’s correlated pairs. As macro-
economic announcements affect all stocks, the pairs trading strategy is less effective.  
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Algorithmic traders can also engage in market-making, posting bid and ask 
quotes that allows them to earn a liquidity premium through the bid-ask spread. 
Employing two proprietary datasets from Chi-X and Euronext that contain anonymized 
broker IDs for trades in Dutch index stocks, Menkveld (2012) examines the entry of a 
large high frequency trader to Chi-X in September 2007. The trader has an upper 
bound latency of 1.67 milliseconds, engages in proprietary trading, generates a high 
number of trades, and finishes the trading day with a net zero inventory position. The 
authors key finding is that 78 per cent of the of the trader’s quotes are passive market 
maker quotes. He concludes that HFTs provide liquidity and are the new market 
makers. Whereas traditional market making occurs in a single stock, Gerig and 
Michayluk (2010) show that automated market makers can also make money by 
trading in similar stocks in a way that traditional market makers do in a single stock. 
They consider a model whereby an automated market maker is confronted by two 
traders in different but similar stocks. If one trader is selling and the other buying at 
the same time, the HFT can provide liquidity by taking the opposite side of each order. 
This lowers the losses automated market makers incur to informed traders because 
the opposite direction of the trades makes it more likely one or both of the investors 
are uninformed. 
One of the issues with HFTs acting as market makers is that as they don’t have 
affirmative obligations to provide liquidity, HFTs may not provide liquidity during 
periods of market stress. A Designated Primary Market Maker (DPM) is a specialized 
market maker approved by an exchange to guarantee that he or she will take the 
position in a particular assigned. These designated market makers have affirmative 
obligations to provide liquidity to market participants, through providing quotes on 
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both sides of the market, contributing to the depth of the market and maintaining 
market activity. These obligations can take the form of maximum spread width, 
minimum quoted volume, location of the market makers spread width relative to the 
best bid and offer, minimum percentage of the day the market maker must quote and 
minimum time in force for market maker quotes. Alternatively, HFTs make money 
through providing liquidity by turning over shares quickly while minimising exposure 
to adverse price movements during these brief holding periods. If the likelihood of 
adverse price movements increase, HFTs can respond through reducing their liquidity 
provision or withdraw from the market altogether as they have no obligation to make 
markets.  
Though not specifically related to HFTs, Anand and Venkataraman (2013) study 
the trades of Endogenous Liquidity Providers (ELPs), who supply liquidity because it is 
a profitable activity, and those of Designated Market Makers (DMMs), who have 
exchange-assigned obligations to maintain markets on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
The authors find that during market conditions reflecting high inventory risk, such as 
periods with low volume or one-sided order flow (more buy orders than sell orders 
and vice versa), DMMs participate in undesirable trades, especially for less active stock 
where they are the only reliable counterparties to available to investors. The authors 
suggest that the obligations of DMMs oblige them to supply liquidity during periods of 
high inventory risk. Conversely, ELPs exercise the option to withdraw from the market 
during these times. These results suggest that HFTs are likely to withdraw their supply 
of liquidity during periods when liquidity is already weak.  
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) provides 
evidence supporting the contention that HFTs reduce the supply of liquidity and 
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increase their liquidity demand during periods of high volatility. ASIC (2012) considers 
the impact of high frequency trading on the quality and integrity of Australia’s financial 
markets over the period of January to September 2012. ASIC (2012) finds that high 
frequency trading is concentrated in the most liquid securities, the S&P/ASX 200 (the 
largest 200 stocks on the exchange). In the S&P/ASX 50, HFTs buy and sell more during 
times when prices are around the daily average and reduced their participation when 
prices diverged from the daily average. For the S&P/ASX 150-200 (the least liquid 
proportion), HFTs reduced their participation in the market when prices fell of 
increased by around 1.8 to 2 standard deviations from the average price.  
Korajczyk and Murphy (2014) also report that HFTs reduce their supply of 
liquidity during stressful periods. The authors find that HFTs provide significantly more 
liquidity than designated market makers to large institutional trades. Utilising a unique 
data set that provides all orders, trades and trader identities, the authors are able to 
identify designated market makers and HFTs on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In line 
with the findings of ASIC (2012), the authors find that despite HFTs providing more 
liquidity than market makers to larger trades, liquidity provision changes significantly 
when the large trade is considered stressful. When the trading volume of a large trade 
as a proportion of total trading volume is in the upper quintile, the proportion of 
liquidity supplied by HFTs decline significantly. Further, HFTs reduce liquidity provision 
on days in which the stock price is particularly stressful.  
Hu (2013) examines the factors that influence liquidity provision by high 
frequency traders. The author suggests that interactions between HFTs are one reason 
for why HFTs supply less liquidity when markets are volatile. Specifically, the author 
provides evidence that information asymmetry induced by the liquidity consuming 
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strategies undertaken by certain HFTs induces HFTs that engage in market-making 
activities to supply less liquidity.  For example, if a liquidity-providing HFT and a 
liquidity-taking HFT have the same reaction speed on average, then the liquidity-
providing HFT will be faster 50 per cent of the time and vice versa. Half the time, the 
liquidity-taking HFT submits a market-order before the liquidity-providing HFT has had 
a chance to adjust their quotes. At these times, the liquidity-providing HFT has been 
adversely selected. If the liquidity-providing HFT takes this issue into account, the 
trader provide less liquidity on average and will supply even less liquidity as the level 
of information asymmetry increases. Using the NASDAQ-100 Exchange Traded Fund, 
the author finds that information asymmetry increases as volatility increases, resulting 
in HFTs supplying less liquidity.  
Golub et al. (2012) suggest that HFTs that engage in market making activities 
quickly remove their inventory holdings when there is a significant stock price 
movement against their stock position. The authors examine mini flash crashes using 
six years of U.S. stock market data. Mini flash crashes are abrupt and severe flash 
crashes that occur in an extremely short period. The authors use the example of a flash 
crash that occurred on 16th April 2010 in the stock of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 
where a -1.9% price change occurred in less than 50 milliseconds. Their analysis of the 
speed and magnitude of the flash crashes suggested that these are caused by HFT 
activity. Their hypothesis is that when a stock price has a distinct price movement, 
market makers receive a significant increase in orders that increase their inventory 
risk. For example, if there is a distinct decline in the stock price, a market maker will 
receive an increase in sell orders, forcing market makers to be the buyers. If the stock 
price continues to decline, the inventory exposure of market makes continues to 
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increase. When the market maker’s risk management limits are breached, comprised 
of the size of the inventory and the unrealised profit and loss, the market maker has 
to stop providing liquidity and aggressively take liquidity by selling back the shares 
purchased previously. For HFTs without affirmative obligations who trade in short 
increments, they do no wait for prices to revert to favourable levels and therefore 
remove their accumulated inventory as quickly as possible. The authors state that this 
action is likely to cause a sharp movement in the stock price.  
The literature examining the order submission strategies on algorithmic 
traders suggest that they engage in both liquidity supplying and consuming strategies. 
The overall impact of these strategies on market quality is uncertain, which is 
examined in the next section.  
 
2.1.4 Theoretical impact of Algorithmic Trading on Market Quality 
 
Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) build the first theoretical model to address how HFTrs 
affect market conditions through their order submission strategies. They model an 
electronic market populated by low frequency traders (humans) and add a high 
frequency trader (machine). This machine is assumed to be uninformed, similar to a 
market maker. The advantage of the machine relative to a human trader is its higher 
speed in submitting and cancelling orders. The authors find that the presence of HFTs 
yield transaction prices that differ from the HFT-free price; when a HFTr is present, the 
distribution of transaction prices will have thinner tails and are concentrated near the 
mean. Their second finding is that as humans increase their order submissions, 
intertrade duration decreases and trading volume increases in proportion to higher 
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human order arrival rates. The implication is that the presence of HFTs results in an 
increase in liquidity. Alternatively, Gsell (2008) creates a simulated environment which 
examines the impact that implemented algorithmic trading concepts have on market 
outcomes, which the paper limits to market prices and volatility. The outcome of the 
simulation shows that an increase in high frequency trading had a negative impact on 
market prices, though it significantly reduced volatility.  
Gerig and Michayluk (2010) develop a theoretical model that seeks to explain 
the increasing dominance of algorithmic trading and to understand its effect on the 
market. Their model shows that automated liquidity providers are able to price 
securities more accurately than human market makers. This is because they can trade 
almost instantaneously and can accurately model complex relationships between 
securities. Consequently, automated liquidity providers come to transact the majority 
of trades at prices that are more efficient than provided by human market makers. 
This has a number of positive market effects: informed investors make less profits and 
uninformed investors have smaller losses. This can lead to a situation where 
uninformed investors increase their trading activity, increasing total traded volume 
and lowering overall transaction costs.  
A distinguishing feature of algorithmic trading is that trades are conducted at 
much higher speed and higher frequency relative to other traders on the market. The 
investment time horizon of ATs is therefore a lot shorter. Outside the algorithmic 
trading literature, other work has examined the impact of different investment time 
horizons on market quality. Froot et al. (1992) show that short term speculators 
decrease the informational quality of asset prices. In standard models of informed 
trading, informational externalities are negative; returns to acquiring information falls 
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as other traders possess this information. In contrast, the authors show that a market 
with short-term speculators creates positive informational externalities; as more 
speculators study a piece of information, the information is disseminated into the 
market, impacting the price. Therefore, profits from that information are inversely 
related to how early it is learnt. This leads to a situation where traders ignore some 
fundamental information, which fails to get impounded into the price, leading to a fall 
in price discovery. In contrast to the theoretical predictions of Froot et al. (1992), Vives 
(1995) show that short term speculators can increase or decrease the informational 
efficiency of prices depending on the temporal pattern of information arrival. In the 
model of Vives (1995), short-term trading intensity is a function of the pattern of 
information arrival, with short-term traders reducing price informativeness with 
concentrated arrival of information, and enhances it with diffuse arrival of 
information.  
 
2.1.5 Empirical Tests of the Impact of Algorithmic Trading on Market Quality 
 
The brief literature modelling the potential effect of algorithmic traders on market 
quality provide conflicting outcomes as to whether the effect is positive or negative. 
Consequently, academic research has begun to empirically examine the potential 
impact of algorithmic trading on market dynamics. Despite the growing academic 
interest in this area, the empirical literature concerning algorithmic trading is still brief. 
This is primarily due to data constraints, which are unable to clearly identify trades 
belonging to an algorithmic trader. The studies that do look at the impact of 
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algorithmic trading on market characteristics employ traditional proxies of market 
quality, including bid-ask spreads, market depth, stock volatility and price discovery.  
Employing a unique dataset from Nasdaq OMX that distinguishes between 
high frequency and non-high frequency trades, Brogaard (2010) finds that HFTs have 
a positive impact on market quality, as they improve the price discovery process 
without affecting volatility. Similarly, Castura et al. (2010) show that market quality 
has improved for a broad range of stocks on the Russel 1000 and Russell 200 index, 
coinciding with automation on exchanges. Governed by the theory that an efficient 
stock price should exhibit no serial autocorrelation, the authors report that prices are 
more efficient, finding a reduction in the mean reversion of mid-market quotes. 
However, Castura et al. (2010) don’t show causality between algorithmic trading and 
market quality. Using the implementation of auto-quoting on the NYSE is treated as 
an exogenous instrument for algorithmic trading, Hendershottet et al. (2011) show 
that algorithmic trading improves quoted and effective spreads, but reduces market 
depth. The degree of price discovery that is correlated with trading is shown to 
decrease after the introduction of autoquote, indicating that algorithms respond 
quickly to order flow information and reduce adverse selection in the market. The 
authors interpret these results as indicating that algorithmic trading causally improves 
liquidity.  
Conflicting evidence is presented on the impact of algorithmic trading on 
volatility. Chaboud et al. (2009) find that the correlation between algorithmic trades 
is higher relative to non-algorithmic trades on the foreign exchange market. However, 
the evidence suggests that despite this higher correlation of trades, algorithmic 
trading does not contribute to higher volatility, though it does contribute to improve 
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price discovery. Similarly, Hendershott and Riordan (2011) find that algorithmic 
traders on the Deutchse Bourse closely monitor changes in liquidity and time their 
trades to demand liquidity when it is cheap and supply liquidity when it is expensive, 
moderating movements in prices.  
However, Smith (2010) reveals the increase in algorithmic trading on U.S 
markets has resulted in a marked change in the correlation structure of stock trading, 
leading to an increase in short-term volatility. Smith (2010) examines the Hurst 
exponent of traded value over short time scales (15 minutes or less). The Hurst 
exponent measures the long term memory of a time series, i.e the autocorrelations of 
a time series and the rate at which these decrease as the distance between two values 
increases. The author shows that the increase in the Hurst exponent of U.S stocks 
occurs prominently after the implementation of Order Protection Rule (Rule 611). This 
rule mandates that trades are to automatically trade at the best price offered across 
all exchange venues, and lead to a substantial growth in algorithmic trading. A Hurst 
Exponent greater than 0.5 points towards increasing volatility on the U.S market, as 
more participants in the market generate more volatility, not more predictable 
behaviour.  
HFTs may have a negative impact on liquidity as they may increase the level of 
information asymmetry in the market. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) develop a 
theoretical model of algorithmic traders as market makers in electronic limit order 
markets, and assess the effect this role has on investor welfare. In limit-order markets 
without middlemen, newly placed limit orders are either matched with existing limit 
orders or are added to the order book. The placement of a limit order faces the risk 
that the order becomes stale due to the arrival of new information, creating a trading 
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option that may be picked off by a later investor. Traders in limit order markets 
therefore face adverse selection costs, which hampers trading activity. As algorithmic 
trading is the use of computer algorithms to analyse market data and make trades, 
the introduction of ATs to a limit order market may reduce information friction if the 
information between two investor arrivals is hard, machine-processable information. 
Alternatively, ATs may reduce investor welfare if the there is no information friction 
between the early and late investor with respect to hard information. Jovanovic and 
Menkveld (2011) assess the validity of this model using the natural experiment 
provided by the introduction of Chi-X to compete with Euronext. The features of Chi-
X make it attractive to ATs, as it provides a subsidy to a quote that leads to execution, 
relative to Euronext, who charge a fee for price quote changes. The authors find that 
entry of an HFT to the market was accompanied by a 23% reduction in adverse 
selection costs and a 17% increase in trade frequency.   
One issue with determining the effect of HFTs on liquidity is how often they 
demand and supply liquidity in the market. Employing two proprietary datasets from 
Chi-X and Euronext that contain anonymized broker IDs for trades in Dutch index 
stocks, Menkveld (2012) examines the impact of a HFT on these two markets. The 
author identifies a trader that enters both markets simultaneously, who fits the profile 
of an HFT. Menkveld (2012) notes that the entry of the HFT coincided with a 50% fall 
in the bid-ask spread and that the HFT contributed to liquidity across both markets, 
supplying liquidity 80% of the time.  
Even if HFTs act as a market maker on average, one key difference between 
them and designated market makers is that they are under no obligation to supply 
liquidity to the market at all times. Consequently, they may exacerbates volatility and 
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destabilizes financial markets during periods of heightened volatility. The author tests 
whether volatility causes HFTs to increase or decrease their trading activity. Using 
macro and stock-specific news as exogenous sources of volatility, HFTs tend to 
decrease their liquidity demand during stock specific news periods and tend to take 
more liquidity during macro news periods. Finally, using the natural experiment 
afforded by the removal of a fraction of HFT participants after the short sale ban of 
2008, Brogaard (2011) documents that HFTs reduces intraday volatility.  
Examining the Flash Crash of 6 May, 2009 Kirilenko et al. (2011) hypothesize 
that the Flash Crash occurred as a result of a large sell order that was executed rapidly 
on the E-Mini Index. HFTs contributed to the price decline as they were initial buyers 
of the sell order, but quickly became aggressive net sellers to balance their inventory 
positions. The results show that HFTs exhibit a number of characteristics that can have 
a negative impact on market stability. They exhibit trading patterns inconsistent with 
traditional market makers, trading aggressively in the direction of price changes and 
do not accumulate significant inventory positions. Thus, HFTs do not supply liquidity 
when prices move against their trading position. Furthermore, they can exacerbate 
price movements by competing for liquidity as they try to rebalance their inventory 
positions. 
 
2.1.6 Empirical Tests of Latency and Market Quality  
 
Latency refers to the amount of time it takes to submit and receive feedback about an 
order. Financial markets have witnessed a significant reduction in latency over the last 
couple of decades, driven by exchange co-location services, improved market 
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infrastructure and trade automation. Not surprisingly, algorithmic trading and latency 
are strongly related, with reductions in latency contributing to the growth of 
algorithmic trading. The arguments put forth for and against reduced latency are 
similar to the arguments governing algorithmic trading; increased latency allows 
better monitoring of the market and gives investors the ability to more easily 
rebalance their portfolio to changes in fundamental information, though it can also be 
used to take advantage of the option granted by limit order traders, discouraging 
liquidity provision. Given the relationship between algorithmic trading and latency, 
understanding the effect that reductions in latency have on market quality can provide 
further insight into algorithmic trading.  
A number of studies have examined the effect of trading speed on market 
quality. Riordan and Storkenmaier (2011) use the natural experiment provided by the 
reduction in latency on the Deutchse Bourse in 2002 to test the effect of speed on 
liquidity and price discovery. The authors findings show a decrease in both quoted and 
effective spreads in the post-event period. This decrease was driven primarily by a 
reduction in the adverse selection component of the spread. Similar to the results 
presented by Hendershott et al. (2011), the decline in the adverse selection 
component was partially offset by an increase in the realised spread, suggesting that 
liquidity suppliers were able to increase their revenues after the change. Drawing the 
same conclusion as Hendershott et al. (2011), liquidity suppliers are interpreted as 
being able to increase their revenues due to a reduction in the competition between 
liquidity suppliers. Price efficiency shows a significant improvement in the post-event 
period, with the contribution of quotes to price discovery doubling to 90%. The results 
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of the paper are similar to the empirical literature on algorithmic trading, showing 
reduced latency leads to improvements in market quality.  
The studies reviewed above examine reductions in latency during a period 
where ATs were becoming prominent in the market. Other studies have analysed the 
effect a reduction in latency has on market quality in earlier time periods. Easley et al. 
(2009) examine the impact on stock prices of an upgrade to NYSE’s infrastructure in 
1980. The upgrade consisted of two phases; phase 1 introduced on 14 July, 1980 
improved dissemination of quotes and the reporting of floor transactions to off-floor 
traders and phase 2 introduced a technology upgrade that reduced latency from 2 
minutes pre-upgrade to 20 seconds post-upgrade. The upgrades reduced the trading 
option granted by limit order traders to the specialist on-floor traders. The authors 
hypothesise that because limit order traders require compensation for adverse 
selection, the upgrades should be associated with positive abnormal stock returns. For 
phase 2, the results indicate that the total return over the next 20 days was 4 percent, 
and this excess return result is robust to Fama French, momentum and industry 
factors. A reduction in latency is therefore associated with a reduction in adverse 
selection risk and an improvement in market quality. Analysing trading activity in the 
millisecond environment using Nasdaq order-level data, Hasbrouck and Saar (2012) 
also find that a decline in latency is associated with tighter quoted spreads, increased 
depth, reduced price impact and lower volatility.  
In contrast, Hendershott and Moulton (2011) find that the reduction in latency 
on the NYSE had mixed effects on market quality.  On 24 June, 2007, the NYSE 
converted to a hybrid market system, where trades could take place on the trading 
floor or electronically. The introduction of the Hybrid market reduced the execution 
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time of market orders from 10 seconds to less than a second. Hendershott and 
Moulton (2011) find that the reduction in latency on the NYSE had mixed effects on 
market quality. On average, from the month prior to the stock’s activation date to the 
month after, quoted spreads increase from 7.9 basis points to 8.3 basis points, and 
effective spreads increase from 5.6 basis points to 5.9 basis points. Decomposing the 
spread, the authors report an increase in the adverse selection component of the 
spread. However, the authors also note that price noise dropped after the 
introduction of the Hybrid system, indicating an improvement in price efficiency.  
 
2.2 Order Submission Strategies of Market Makers 
 
Bloomfield et al. (2005) suggests there is no need for a market maker as market 
participants provide liquidity in limit order markets. However, a fundamental issue in 
trading is the asynchronous arrival of buyers and sellers. A mismatch of buyers and 
sellers leads to uncertainty in both the time it takes to complete a trade and the price 
the trade will transact at (Demsetz, 1968). This uncertainty can be mitigated by the 
presence of liquidity suppliers who serve as counterparties to the trade, providing 
immediacy of execution (Venkataraman and Waisburd, 2007). Market makers play an 
integral part in the provision of liquidity in various financial markets, including 
derivative markets. Market making primarily involves the submission of non-
marketable resting orders that provide liquidity to the marketplace at specified prices. 
A market maker’s trading strategy involves quoting both a buy and a sell price for a 
financial instrument or commodity, seeking to profit from the difference between the 
two prices, known as the bid-ask spread. An important component of this strategy is 
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to always quote competitive buy and sell prices, with the intention of buying and 
selling equal components of the financial instrument being traded.  
The market maker’s profits from the bid-ask spread is to offset three kinds of 
market making costs that have been identified in the literature of market 
microstructure; order-processing costs, inventory-holding costs and adverse selection 
costs (Stoll, 1978). Order processing costs involve the fixed cost of market making 
(Demetz, 1968). Demsetz (1968) argues that the bid-ask spread partly compensates 
market makers for the operating costs incurred in providing immediacy. Inventory-
holding costs arise from the market maker managing his/her inventory positions 
(Tinic, 1972, Stoll, 1978, Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, 1982, Ho and Stoll, 1981). 
Adverse selection costs occur as market makers, in supplying liquidity, may trade with 
individuals who are better informed about the true value of the underlying security 
(Bagehot, 1971, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, Kyle, 1985, Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986, Easley and O’Hara, 1987, Glosten and Harris, 1988, and Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1988). The market maker minimises the costs of inventory and adverse selection costs 
through adjusting their quoted bid and ask prices.  
Inventory-based models of the bid-ask spread concentrate on the risk faced by 
market makers stemming from holding an undiversified portfolio (Tinic, 1972). 
Spreads exist to compensate market makers for the risk of holding unwanted 
inventory (Stoll, 1978, Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, 1982, and Ho and Stoll, 1981, 
1983). This cost is equivalent to the expected difference in revenue from holding a 
well-diversified portfolio (Stoll, 1978). The cost of holding unwanted inventory has 
implications for how spreads change in response to changes in inventory holdings. In 
the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1980), transaction prices result from the 
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execution of randomly arriving sell and buy orders at the market-maker’s bid and ask 
prices. These prices are set so as to move the specialist to a desired inventory position. 
At this desired inventory position, the bid-ask spread is minimized. The authors 
demonstrate that as long as the specialist is managing his inventory, a monopolistic 
specialist will widen spreads from this preferred position as inventory imbalances 
accrue. 
Alternatively, Ho and Stoll (1983) develop an inventory model of a competitive 
dealer market, made up of competing market makers who differ only in their 
inventory positions and risk preferences. According to Ho and Stoll (1983), the 
reservation fee of a market maker depends on his/her risk aversion and inventory 
level. Controlling for risk aversion, a market maker’s quotes become a monotone 
function of his/her inventory level, where market makers with long (short) positions 
post competitive ask (bid) prices. In other words, when an order imbalance occurs that 
moves the market maker away from his/her desired inventory positions, he/she 
adjusts the bid-ask spread to move back to the desired inventory position. 
A number of studies support the inventory-holding models of bid-ask spreads. 
Hansch et al. (1998) undertake an empirical test of Ho and Stoll’s (1983) inventory 
model of competitive dealership markets on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The 
authors provide empirical evidence supporting the model of Ho and Stoll (1983), 
revealing that a market maker’s inventory position is significantly related to the ability 
of the market maker to execute large trades, changes in quotes are strongly correlated 
to changes in inventories and inventory positions are mean reverting with the strength 
of mean reversion increasing as a function of his/her inventory level.  
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Order-flow imbalances give rise to the inventory holding cost component of 
the bid-ask spread (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981). The process of equilibrating order 
imbalances may cause the market maker’s inventory position to deviate from optimal 
levels, resulting in an increase in inventory holding costs. Chordia et al. (2003) examine 
the effect of order imbalances on liquidity and market returns on the NYSE. Employing 
the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to designate transactions as buyer-initiated or 
seller-initiated, the authors calculate the daily aggregate order imbalance for each 
stock (buy orders less sell orders). The authors find that after an event resulting in a 
large order imbalance, specialists alter the quotes to motivate investors to take the 
other side of the trade, consistent with inventory models of the spread (Stoll, 1978).  
Harris (1990) points out that liquidity has both a price and quantity dimension, 
meaning overall changes in liquidity cannot be determined by analysing one 
dimension alone. Harris (1990) argues that a market maker can adjust his/her liquidity 
by changing both the price dimension (the bid-ask spread) and the quantity dimension 
(the quoted depth). Ye (1995) examines the function of quoted depth in mitigating the 
risk of adverse selection on the part of the market maker. He develops a framework 
for analysing a specialist’s optimal quotation strategy. The author finds that when the 
probability that the specialist is providing liquidity to an informed trader increases, the 
specialist will both widen the spread and reduce depth to protect themselves from 
losses. Similarly, Kavajecz (1999) reveals that a market maker responds to information 
events by adjusting the quoted depth in addition to quoted prices. 
Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) show that designated market makers actively 
monitor their inventory positions, being more likely to be sellers when holding long 
inventory positions and vice versa. Consequently, market makers do not just adjust 
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bid-ask spreads to control their inventory positions, they also selectively time the size 
and direction of their trades. However, Panayides (2007) states that designated 
market makers are most likely to engage in inventory rebalancing when they are not 
constrained by their market making obligations.  
Information-based models are concerned with adverse selection costs faced 
by liquidity providers in the presence of information asymmetry. As liquidity providers 
have less information about the true value of a security relative to informed traders, 
liquidity suppliers can expect to lose money when transacting against informed 
traders (see Bagehot, 1971, Copeland and Galai, 1983, Easley and O'Hara, 1987, and 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Market makers widen spreads to offset the expected cost 
of transacting with informed traders. Copeland and Gelai (1983) argue that the 
dealer's bid-ask spread is a trade-off between expected losses to informed traders and 
expected gains from liquidity traders. The pricing strategy of the dealer is equivalent 
to offering an out-of-the-money option straddle for a fixed number of shares during a 
fixed time interval. The exercise prices of the straddle determine the bid-ask spread, 
with the profit maximizing spread occurring at the point where the expected total 
revenues from liquidity trading balance the expected total losses from informed 
trading. Similar to Copeland and Gelai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
demonstrate that adverse selection gives rise to bid-ask spreads when all other 
transaction costs are zero and dealers are risk neutral and perfectly competitive.  
Easley and O’Hara (1987) provide an alternative explanation to the inventory 
hypothesis of why dealers adjust prices in response to a large incoming order. Under 
the inventory model, large trades force the dealer away from his/her desired 
inventory position, with bid-ask spreads being compensation for bearing this 
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inventory risk. The authors show that as informed traders want to trade, they will 
trade larger amounts at any given price. Large trades are transacted at less favourable 
prices, as market makers try to offset losses when transacting with informed traders. 
 
2.2.1 Market Makers in Option Markets  
 
In the option market, there are unique factors that affect the cost of liquidity provision 
relative to the equity market for market makers. In the options market, managing 
inventory levels are a much bigger problem for market makers relative to the equity 
market. In the model of Biais and Hillion (1994), the reservation buying and selling 
prices depends on the volatility of the underlying security. As a result of the implicit 
leverage of the options market, the volatility of an option position is much larger than 
an equal dollar position in the equities market, causing higher inventory holding costs. 
As discussed by Jamesone and Wilhelm (1992), not only is option volatility larger 
relative to stock volatility, but is dependent upon the underlying stock price. Over a 
particular time period for a stock, if the volatility is constant then the risk per dollar of 
investment is nonstochastic. For options however, the volatility changes with changes 
in the price of the underlying stock, making the risk stochastic. This results in higher 
inventory costs for option market makers.  
The evidence by Lakonishock et al. (2007) suggest that option market makers 
face less control over their inventory positions relative to equity market makers. The 
authors provide detailed descriptive statistics on purchased and written open interest 
and open buy and sell volumes across a number of investor types. For both calls and 
puts, written option positions are more common than purchased positions, leading to 
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an imbalance in order flow that moves the market maker away from his/her optimal 
inventory position. Battalio and Schultz (2011) suggest that other factors impede the 
market maker in managing inventory levels, including options being split over 
numerous strike prices and expiration dates, order flow differing for options at, in or 
out of the money and the option’s time to maturity.  
Market makers in the options market are also likely to face greater adverse 
selection costs relative to equity market makers. If informed investors regard options 
as a superior investment vehicle relative to the underlying stock, then the implied 
stock prices from options are likely to reveal information about the future equilibrium 
value of the observed stock price. Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that both stock 
prices and volumes lead option prices and volumes. The authors claim that the findings 
of Manaster and Rendleman (1982) and Anthony (1998) are seriously undermined 
from the use of closing prices, as the option market closes ten minutes after the stock 
market. The information lead of options may be a result of information that was 
disseminated between the closing times of the two markets. Stephan and Whaley 
(1990) overcome these issues by employing intraday transaction data and examines 
the direct lead/lag relationship between option and stock prices and volumes. The 
authors find that options do not contain information, with stock prices and volumes 
leading option prices and volumes.  
However, a number of studies find that options are informative. Manaster and 
Rendleman (1982) test whether options provide information on future stock values by 
forming portfolios based on the differences between the implied stock price of an 
option and the observed price, and compare the returns earned on the different 
portfolios. The results show that closing option prices contained information that was 
62 
 
not contained in stock prices for a period of up to 24 hours. Similarly, Anthony (1998) 
finds that option volume on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) is 
informative, with option volume leads stock trading volume by a one day lag. 
Back’s (1993) model of informed option trading predicts that a component of 
option returns that are independent of the underlying stock return, will exist due to 
the presence of informed trading. Sheikh and Ronn (1994) conjecture that strategic 
behaviour by informed traders will lead to similar patterns in the return series of 
stocks and options. Supporting this hypothesis, Sheikh and Ronn (1994) find a strong 
similarity in both the means of day end stock returns and adjusted option returns, and 
the variances of intraday stock and option returns.  
Easley et al. (1998) investigate the informational role of transaction volumes 
in the options market. In line with the findings of Stephan and Whaley (1990), stock 
price changes lead option volumes whereas option volumes do not lead stock price 
changes. However, when aggregating option trades into positive and negative news 
trades, option trades are shown to be informative, with option volumes leading stock 
price changes. Building on Easley et al. (1998), Chan et al. (2002) suggest that the 
inferred information content of option trades may originate from stock trades, which 
Easley et al. (1998) do not examine. Their results show that stock net trade volume is 
informative for stock and option quote revisions, suggesting informed traders initiate 
trades in the stock market only.  
Charkravarty et al. (2004) provide evidence that option trading contributes to 
the price discovery process in the underlying market. Previous studies examining the 
lead-lag relationship between option and stock prices combine permanent and 
temporary price changes, whereas permanent price changes is the only component 
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that represents information. Employing the price discovery methodology of 
Hasbrouck (1995), the evidence indicates that 17 to 18% of price discovery occurs in 
the options market. Furthermore, price discovery is greater when the ratio of option 
volume to stock volume is high and the option bid-ask spread is narrow relative to 
stock bid-ask spreads.  
The above evidence suggests that market makers in the options market face 
greater inventory and adverse selection costs relative to market makers in equity 
markets. This means that market makers will quote greater spreads in option markets 
relative to equity markets and that changes in quoted prices will also be greater (Cho 
and Engle, 1998, Kaul et al. 2004). 
 
2.2.3 Determinants of Bid-Ask Spreads in Options Market 
 
Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) discuss how market makers face risks that are unique to 
options. These risks include the inability of option market makers to continuously 
rebalance their inventory position and the uncertainty about the return volatility of 
the underlying stock. Employing the inventory model specification of Ho and Stoll 
(1983), the authors find that after controlling for variation in spreads produced by 
costs generally associated with market making, discrete hedge rebalancing (gamma 
risks) and stochastic stock return volatility (vega risks) are not fully diversifiable and 
account for 8% and 4.5% of the option bid-ask spread, respectively. These costs, 
unique to the option market, are given as the reason why option bid-ask spreads are 
greater relative to stocks. George and Longstaff (1993) provide supporting evidence 
for this conclusion, examine the cross-sectional distribution of bid-ask spreads on the 
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S&P 100 index options market. The authors find that the determinants of market 
making costs explain 70 percent of the variation in bid-ask spreads. Specifically, bid-
ask spreads are negatively related to the option’s delta and level of trading activity 
and positively related to the option’s price and time to maturity. Wei and Zheng (2010) 
examine the effect of trading activities on the liquidity of US equity options and come 
to similar conclusions. Several liquidity determinants are found to affect the 
proportional spread, including time to maturity, moneyness, stock return volatility, 
option return volatility, option trading volume and option price. This supports the 
inventory model of option bid-ask spreads, with changes in these liquidity 
determinants altering the market makers inventory risk. 
 In addition to vega and gamma risks, time to maturity will also effect bid-ask 
spread. An option’s term-to-maturity has two opposing effects on its bid-ask spread. 
Market makers face higher gamma and theta risks trading in option contracts with a 
shorter time-to-maturity. However, market makers face higher credit risks holding 
longer term options, which may cause them to widen spreads as compensation for the 
higher credit risk exposure. Chong et al. (2003) show option bid-ask spreads to be 
negatively related to their term-to-maturity. This result holds after controlling for 
competition, trading activity and price. The results suggest a market risk effect in 
trading shorter term contracts, as market makers are exposed to greater theta and 
gamma risks. 
Cho and Engle (1999) proposed a new theory called “derivative hedge theory” 
in which bid-ask spreads in the option market are determined by option activity and 
activity in the underlying stock. If market makers in derivative markets can perfectly 
hedge their position using the underlying security, then spreads in the option market 
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will be determined by spreads in the underlying market. Examining S&P 100 index 
options, the authors find that option market spreads are positively related to spreads 
in the underlying market, supporting their derivative hedge theory. Option market 
duration does not affect bid-ask spreads, with slow and fast markets leading to wider 
spreads. As inventory costs predicts wide spreads in slow markets and information 
asymmetry predicts wider spreads in slow markets, neither outcome would occur if 
the underlying market provided a perfect hedge. The authors conclude that the 
market maker is only able to imperfectly hedge his/her position in the underlying 
securities market.  
However, Kaul et al. (2004) argue that the derivative hedge theory of Cho and 
Engle (1999) accounted for the initial hedging cost only. That is, the percentage delta 
is related to the cost of setting up the hedge position, but this does not account for 
rebalancing costs. The authors calculate rebalancing costs as proportional to vega 
multiplied by the spread of the underlying stock. Their results imply a large proportion 
of the bid-ask spread is attributable to inventory management costs; 50% attributable 
to setting up a delta neutral position and 6.93% associated with discrete rebalancing. 
Similar results are found by Patrella (2006), who develops a model of the option bid-
ask spread that incorporates a reservation bid-ask spread applied by market makers 
to protect themselves from scalpers. In line with Kaul et al. (2004), the model includes 
the main determinants of option market making costs, including initial hedging, 
rebalancing and order-processing costs. Examining a sample of covered warrants on 
the Italian Stock Exchange, the model explains 64% of the total variation in bid-ask 
spreads, and that the inclusion of the reservation spread increases the explanatory 
power of the model from 20 to 54 percentage points. Engle and Neri (2010) however 
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state that the cost of rebalancing the hedging position is proportional both to gamma 
and to the volatility of the underlying stock. Employing a significantly greater dataset 
than both prior studies by examining the whole US options market, the authors find 
that these three costs account for a significant proportion of the bid-ask spread. 
In addition to hedging costs, spreads may also be affected by informed trading. 
The literature provides conflicting evidence on the adverse selection component on 
the bid-ask spread. Vijh (1990) is the first to examine the relationship between 
information asymmetry and bid-ask spreads on the CBOE. He argues that the greater 
implicit leverage of options relative to equities attracts both informed and noise 
traders. Results show price effects are absent surrounding large option trades, 
providing evidence against informed option trading. Examining the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread, results show information asymmetry to be an 
insignificant determinant of option spreads. Similar results are found by Neal (1992), 
who calculates the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread using the 
method of Glosten and Harris (1988). He finds that adverse selection is an insignificant 
determinant of the bid-ask spread, accounting for 3% of the average spread.  
Conversely, Ahn et al. (2008) test the level of informed trading on the KOPSI 
200 Index options traded on the Korean Exchange using the spread decomposition 
model developed by Madhaven et al. (1997). Estimating the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread, the authors find that information asymmetry 
accounts for 34.99% of the bid-ask spread for call options and 39.14% of the bid-ask 
spread for put options. The authors find that adverse selection costs are positively 
related with option delta.   
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Bartram et al. (2008) also show that informed traders are attracted to the 
options market, by assessing the impact of adverse selection on option bid-ask spreads 
by examining two markets with different levels of information asymmetry. The 
authors compare the EuRex, a traditional derivatives exchange, with EuWax which 
specializes in bank-issued options. The level of adverse selection is lower on the 
EuWax as market makers know the identity of the investors with whom they trade. In 
contrast to Vijh (1990) and Neal (1992), the results from comparing similar option 
contracts across both markets show that bid-ask spreads on the EuWax are tighter 
(4.2%) compared to bid-ask spreads on the EuRex (8.8%). The authors also reveal that 
inventory costs are a significant determinant of bid-ask spreads. Ask prices on EuWax 
are systematically higher than on EuRex, which is consistent with the idea that market 
makers are unable to control their inventory and incur hedging costs to cover their net 
short positions.   
Extending the results of Vijh (1990) and Neal (1992), Lee and Yi (2001) suggest 
that informed trading may only be important for some trade types. They find that 
informed trading in the options market is primarily driven by small investors, with the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread on the CBOE greater than on the 
NYSE, with the opposite result found for large trades. This suggests that there are 
some investors who prefer to trade in options relative to stocks, with option markets 
playing an important role in the price discovery process. The authors also show that 
adverse selection costs are negatively related to the option’s delta, implying that 
options with greater leverage attract greater levels of informed trading.  
 
68 
 
2.2.4 Option Trading Strategies 
 
Option strategies involve the purchase and/or sale of different call options at the same 
time. Despite the significant market microstructure literature covering option 
markets, there are a scant number of studies examining option strategies. This is 
surprising, given the importance of strategy trades in option markets. Chaput and 
Ederington (2003) document the use of option strategies by traders for options on 
Eurodollar Futures. The authors find that spread and combination trading collectively 
account for over 55% of large trades in the Eurodollar options market and almost 75% 
of the trading volume due to large trades. The four most heavily traded combinations 
are straddles, ratio spreads, vertical spreads and strangles, representing about two 
thirds of all strategy trades. The authors find that effective bid-ask spreads are higher 
on orders exceeding 500 contracts and on combinations that short volatility.  
Fahlenbrach and Sandas (2010) study trading in option strategies using a 
sample covering all strategy and individual option trades on the FTSE-100 Index. They 
find strategy trades represent 37% of all option trades and account for 75% of the 
number of contracts traded. The authors document that the most actively traded 
combinations are strangles, straddles, bull and bear spreads, calendar spreads and 
covered calls and puts. Furthermore, the most popular strategy trades are delta 
neutral trades that have exposure to volatility. Volatility trades, with little or no delta 
exposure that consists of only option trades, are found to have information about the 
future volatility of the underlying stock. However, the authors find that volatility 
trades consisting of both options and futures, do not contain information about future 
volatility, as these trades are likely used for hedging reasons. Directional option 
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strategies, which are long or short delta with little or no vega exposure, do not contain 
information about future returns. The results suggest that informed traders use 
volatility strategies, not directional strategies.  
 
2.2.5 Market Makers and Intraday Patterns in Liquidity 
 
A number of studies examine how market makers account for inventory imbalances 
and how this affects the intraday variation in liquidity. Transaction demand at the 
opening is greater and less elastic as a result of new overnight information, changing 
the investors’ optimal portfolio. Inelastic demand at the close results from the 
imminent non-trading period leading to different optimal portfolios relative to the 
continuous trading period. On a specialist market, a specialist is designated by the 
exchange to make a market in a particular security. This allows the monopolist market 
maker to charge higher prices at these periods of heavy and inelastic demand. Brock 
and Kleidon’s (1992) show that this model predicts high volume at the open and close 
of trading, which is contemporaneously associated with wide spreads.  
McInish and Wood (1992) examine the intraday behaviour of time-weighted 
bid-ask spreads on the NYSE. Examining minute-by-minute spreads across the trading 
day, spreads are found to be highest near the open of trading, declines over the course 
of the trading day and increases near the close of trading. The authors also split the 
day into 13 half hour intervals. Using a linear regression model, spreads are found to 
be significantly related to trading activity, risk, information content and competition. 
Including time dummies into the regression, parameter estimates of the dummy 
variables for each interval reveal spreads are higher at the start and end of the trading 
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day relative to the interim period. The results support the contention of Brock and 
Kleidon (1992) that wide spreads at the open and close are driven by the inelastic 
demand of investors.  
The monopolistic power of the specialist on the NYSE allows them to widen the 
bid-ask spread in response to the inelastic demand of investors. However, when 
market markers have to compete with one another on a competitive dealer market, 
bid-ask spreads do not widen at the close despite inelastic demand. Chan et al. (1995a) 
show that spreads on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (a competitive dealer 
market) are narrow at the close of trading relative to the NYSE. The reason for this is 
that at the close of trading, inventory effects are particularly acute at the close of 
trading, as dealers face the risk of holding undesired inventory overnight. This can lead 
the market maker with long positions to decrease both their bid and ask prices 
(making ask quotes more competitive and bid quotes less competitive) to attract buy 
orders, while short positions lead to an increase in bid and ask quotes. This results in 
a narrowing of the inside spread (the highest bid price and lowest ask price) near the 
close of trading. In an analysis of intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads on the Nasdaq 
(a competitive dealer market), Chan et al. (1995b) the authors report that inside 
spreads on the Nasdaq narrow significantly near the close of trading and that this 
arises from a minority of dealers moving within the spread. 
Lee et al. (1993) posit the impossibility of making inferences about liquidity 
changes on the basis of spreads or depth alone. The authors illustrate with a simple 
pricing function of a dealer using ordered pairs of the ask-price and ask-size and bid-
price and bid-size that the combination of the spread and depth is needed to infer 
overall changes in liquidity. A simple examination of the bid-ask spread can therefore 
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be misleading in inferring patterns in liquidity without also examining changes in 
quoted depth. Lee et al. (1993) test the general relation between spreads, depth and 
volume on the NYSE as well as testing the relation between these three variables 
conditioned on an information event; quarterly earnings announcements. The authors 
find that traded volume and bid-ask spreads follow an intraday U-shaped pattern 
while quoted depth follows a reverse U-shaped pattern. Results show that bid-ask 
spreads widen and quoted depth decreases after periods of high trading volume. 
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) posit the impossibility of making inferences 
about liquidity changes on the basis of spreads or depth alone. The authors illustrate 
with a simple pricing function of a dealer using ordered pairs of the ask-price and ask-
size and bid-price and bid-size that the combination of the spread and depth is needed 
to infer overall changes in liquidity. A simple examination of the bid-ask spread can 
therefore be misleading in inferring intraday liquidity patterns without also examining 
changes in quoted depth. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) test the general relation 
between spreads, depth and volume on the NYSE as well as testing the relation 
between these three variables conditioned on an information event; quarterly 
earnings announcements. The authors find that traded volume and bid-ask spreads 
follow an intraday U-shaped pattern while quoted depth follows a reverse U-shaped 
pattern. Results show that bid-ask spreads widen and quoted depth decreases after 
periods of high trading volume. 
In a test of the inventory model of Ho and Stoll (1983), Chung and Zhao (2004a) 
analyse the quote revision behaviour of Nasdaq market makers by examining their 
inter-temporal changes in both spread and depth quotes. The authors find that the 
intraday variation in the number of quoted revisions follows a U-shaped pattern, 
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indicating liquidity management is higher around the open and close of trading 
relative to the middle of the day. They attribute the high number of quote revisions 
during the last hour of trading as consistent with inventory models such as Amihud 
and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1983), with the large number of quote 
revisions reflecting the market maker’s attempt to seek desired order flows. 
 
2.7 Summary  
 
This chapter reviews the literature concerned with order placement strategies across 
limit order driven markets and markets with a designated market maker that will be 
used to inform several hypotheses that are tested in the following chapters. The first 
essay assesses the effect of a tick size change on market quality in a futures market 
setting. The second essay examines the impact of algorithmic trading on market 
quality on the ASX. The third essay analyses the execution costs of option strategies 
and their determinants on the Australian Options Market. The fourth essay documents 
intraday patterns in liquidity on the Nasdaq.  
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Chapter 3: Market Quality Surrounding a Tick Size Increase  
3.1 Introduction 
 
The literature reviewed in Section 2.4 provides mixed conclusions with respect to the 
impact of a tick size change on market quality. The literature examining reductions in 
the minimum price increment find that bid-ask spreads decline in the post-event 
period. However, the evidence indicates that quoted depth increases after a reduction 
in the tick size. An issue with these studies therefore is determining which of the two 
changes has the greatest impact on liquidity. The literature on this issue studies the 
impact of a tick size reduction; the effect of a tick size increase is yet to be examined.  
The objective of this essay is to bridge this gap in the literature by investigating 
a tick size increase in a futures market setting. More specifically, this essay examines 
the impact of increasing the tick size on market quality using the 3-Year Treasury bond 
futures (“3Y T-bond”) on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl 
futures (“5Y Bob1”) on the Eurex. The remainder of this chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 3.2 presents the data. Section 3.3 outlines the research design and 
presents the empirical results. Section 3.4 summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses on Minimum Price Increment 
 
The tick size is the smallest increment that a trading price can move and acts as the 
lower bound of the bid-ask spread. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the relationship 
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between tick size adjustments and liquidity is a contentious issue, with disagreement 
occurring on what constitutes an optimal tick size. For instance, Cordella and Foucault 
(1999) establish that transaction costs are not minimized by setting the minimum tick 
to zero. Consider a liquidity supplier who observes the competitive price (the price 
equaling the expected asset value rounded to the nearest tick) is below the current 
best price. In the presence of a minimum tick regime, this trader has the option to 
either post at the competitive price or post one tick below the current best price. A 
larger tick size creates a bigger wedge between the competitive price and the 
expected asset value, providing a greater profit to the trader. This results in liquidity 
suppliers being more willing to post at the competitive price, leading to a quicker price 
adjustment. The larger tick size therefore does not necessarily increase transaction 
costs for liquidity demanders. Whether a change in the tick size increases or decreases 
liquidity is dependent upon its effect on both bid-ask spreads and quoted depth.  
In a competitive market, a reduction in the minimum price increment allows 
liquidity suppliers to post competitive quotes, leading to a reduction in the bid-ask 
spread. This is particularly the case if the minimum tick acts as a binding constraint, 
which occurs when the bid-ask spread is equal to one tick. Kurov and Zabotina (2005) 
argue that a binding minimum tick indicates the tick size is above its competitive level, 
which impedes price competition. In this situation, a limit order that improves the 
current price becomes a market order. A trader that wishes to earn the bid-ask spread 
must place a limit order at the current best price, which due to price-time priority 
rules, places the trader’s order at the end of the queue. The minimum tick prevents 
the trader from increasing his/her probability of execution through narrowing the 
spread, causing bid-ask spreads to be higher in the presence of a minimum tick size 
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than without. If the tick size is binding, a reduction in the tick-size will therefore lead 
to a reduction in bid-ask spreads. The evidence from prior literature suggests that bid-
ask spreads tighten after a reduction in the minimum tick (see Goldstein and Kavajecz, 
2000, Jones and Lipson 2001, Bessembinder 2003, ap Gwilym et al 2005).  
Conversely, an increase in the minimum tick may lead to an increase in the bid-
ask spread. However, this depends on whether the new tick size causes artificially wide 
bid-ask spreads. Bourghelle and Declerck (2004) report that a coarser pricing grid on 
the Paris Bourse does not result in higher bid-ask spreads as the proportion of one tick 
spreads is about 10% prior to the tick size reduction. The empirical evidence on the 
tick size in futures markets shows that a high percentage of bid-ask spreads trade at 
the minimum tick. In a study of the UK Long Gilt Futures, ap Gwilym et al. find that 
over 96% of quoted spreads under fractional pricing and 79% of bid-ask spreads under 
decimal pricing trade at the minimum tick.  
 
Hypothesis3.1: Bid-ask spreads will increase after the increase in minimum tick 
 
An increase in the minimum tick increases the premium paid to liquidity suppliers for 
providing liquidity to the market. The increase in liquidity supplier revenues may 
encourage greater participation by liquidity suppliers on the exchange. If the minimum 
tick is a binding constraint on the spread, spreads are artificially inflated making it 
profitable to submit limit orders. Grossman and Miller (1988) contend that dealers can 
more easily cover their fixed costs under a large minimum tick regime, thereby 
encouraging dealer participation on the exchange which increases liquidity.  
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An increase in the minimum tick has implication for market depth at the best 
quotes and throughout the limit order book. Liquidity suppliers who previously posted 
limit orders outside the best quotes may choose to place their order at the best bid 
and ask prices, leading to an increase in quoted depth at the best quotes. Lau and 
McInish (1995) and Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) argue that a tick size reduction 
causes liquidity providers to reduce depth at the best quotes and away from the best 
quotes. Under a tick increase, as the cost of liquidity has risen, liquidity demanders 
may now choose to place limit orders instead of market orders leading to an increase 
in cumulative depth.  
A larger tick size may also make investors more willing to expose orders. For 
instance, Harris (1991) argues a coarse pricing grid enforces time priority by acting as 
a disincentive to step ahead of the current quote, thereby encouraging traders to post 
liquidity. The following hypothesis predicts the increase in the tick size will lead to 
higher depth at the best quotes and throughout the limit order book.  
 
Hypothesis3.2: Quoted depth will be larger at the best bid and ask quotes after the 
increase in minimum tick 
 
Hypothesis3.3: Total quoted depth visible in the limit order book will larger after the 
increase in minimum tick 
 
Lee et al. (1993) note that studies examining liquidity provision need to simultaneously 
examine changes in both spreads and depth. Prior literature has consistently 
documented reduced spreads and depth after a tick size reduction. A change in tick 
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size therefore has opposing effects on liquidity, leading to difficulty in estimating the 
effect of the tick size change on market quality. Several studies have examined the 
overall impact of the tick size change on liquidity. Bacidore (1997) finds that execution 
costs on the Toronto exchange decline after the reduction in the minimum tick. 
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) report the combined effect of reduced bid-ask spreads 
and quoted depth benefited small orders but increased the transaction costs of large 
orders. In contrast, Bessembinder (2003a) report reduced transaction costs for both 
small and large traders. Using the Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) measure of 
liquidity, Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2005) find a lower tick size results in a 
significant increase in liquidity. An important determinant of the impact of a tick size 
increase on liquidity is the proportion of trades executed at the best quotes. If before 
the change a high proportion of trades are executed within the best quotes, an 
increase in market depth may not reduce transaction costs as sufficient depth to 
transact against already exists. Alampieski and Lepone (2009) report that 99 percent 
of all trades are executed against the best prevailing quotes and all trades are 
executed within the best two quotes on the SFE.  This leads to the following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis3.4: An increase in the tick size will lead to a reduction in the level of market 
liquidity.   
 
3.3 Eurex and Sydney Futures Exchange 
 
Eurex is Europe's largest futures and options exchange. The Sydney Futures Exchange 
(SFE) is the largest futures exchange in the Asia-Pacific Region. Trading on both the 
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SFE and the Eurex operates through a fully automated electronic limit order book. The 
two main trader types, local participants and full participants, enter orders directly 
into the order-book with trades taking place based on price and time precedence 
rules. 
The 3-Year Treasury bond futures (“3Y T-bond”), 10-Year Treasury bond 
futures (“10Y T-bond”) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl futures (“5Y Bob1) and the 10-Year 
Euro bund futures (“10Y Bund) follow a quarterly expiration cycle. For the 3Y T-bond 
and 10Y T-bond futures, contracts expire on the 15th of March, June, September, and 
December with settlement occurring three days before expiration. Both bonds have 
face values of AUD 100,000 and are quoted on a “100-yield” basis (yield deducted 
from an index of 100.00). The trading hours for both contracts are between 8:30 and 
16:30 hours for daytime trading and 17:10 and 7:00 hours for night time trading during 
US daylight savings time.1 The delivery date for the 5Y Bobl and 10Y Bund contracts 
falls on the tenth calendar day of the respective quarterly month. Both bonds have 
face values of EUR 100,000 and are quoted on a “100-yield” basis. Trading hours for 
both contracts are between 8:00 and 22:00 hours. 
The 3Y T-bond contracts has a minimum tick of 0.5 basis points and pre-trade 
transparency of five levels either side of the limit order-book before May 11, 2009 and 
a minimum tick of 1 basis point after that date and pre-trade transparency of three 
levels either side of the limit order-book. The 5Y Bob1 contracts have a minimum tick 
of 0.5 basis points before June 15, 2009 and a minimum tick of 1 basis points after that 
date and pre-trade transparency of ten levels either side of the limit order-book. The 
                                                 
1 Trading is between 17:10 and 7:10 hours for night time trading during US non daylight savings time. 
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10Y T-bond contracts have a minimum tick of 0.5 basis points and pre-trade 
transparency of five levels either side of the limit order-book and the 10Y Bund has a 
minimum tick of 0.5 basis points and pre-trade transparency of ten levels either side 
of the limit order-book. On both the SFE and Eurex, traders can view in real time prices 
and order volume on each side of the order book and the traded volume and price of 
each trade that occurs. Trading identity however is anonymous as broker mnemonics 
are not visible. 
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3.3 Data 
 
The data used in this study are provided by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia 
Pacific (SIRCA) and contain a record describing each transaction, including the contract 
code, date, time, price, and volume. The data also provide the prices and volumes of 
prevailing bid and ask quotes throughout the limit order-book, which are time-
stamped to the nearest second. On May 11, 2009, the SFE increased the minimum tick 
size from 0.5 to 1 basis-point for the 3Y T-bond contract.2 The increase in tick size from 
0.5 to 1 basis-point for the 5Y Bob1 contract occurred on June 15, 2009. 
To examine the impact of the increase in minimum tick on market quality, we 
examine two subsamples three months before and after the change. For the 3Y T-
bond, the pre-period is 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008 and the post-period is May 
13, 2009 to August 13, 2009. For the 5Y Bob1, the pre-event sample period extends 
from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008 and the post-event sample period extends 
from June 17, 2009 to September 17, 2009. The day of the change is excluded for both 
events. In line with Frino and McKenzie (2002) who find abnormal levels of liquidity 
motivated trading near expiry, this study excludes the five days prior to expiration. In 
line with Bortoli et al. (2006), analysis is restricted to the nearest to expiry contract 
only. 
 
  
                                                 
2 The change in tick size on May 11, 2009 coincided with a reduction in the visibility of the order book 
in the 3-Year bond futures from five to three price levels. 
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3.4 Research Design and Empirical Results 
 
Changes in liquidity before and after the increase in minimum tick may reflect changes 
in market conditions as opposed to the change in tick size. To control for this 
possibility, the 10Y T-bond and 10Y Bund contracts are used as control contracts. The 
two futures contracts on each exchange are regarded as potential substitutes as they 
trade on the same platform during the same hours, with underlying assets being risk-
free government bonds. The minimum tick size of 0.5 basis points and the level of 
transparency of 5 price levels on each side of the order-book for the 10Y T-bond 
remained constant over the sample period. The tick size and the level of transparency 
also remains constant for the 10Y Bund, with a minimum tick size of 1 basis point and 
transparency of 10 price levels either side of the order book. 
In an analysis of the Sydney Futures Markets, Alampieski and Lepone (2009) 
state that market activity, volatility, and trading in interest rate futures contracts 
follow seasonal patterns. As a result, the impact of an increase in transparency may 
be indistinguishable from seasonal trading patterns. To further ensure the change in 
liquidity results from the increase in the minimum tick and not the impact of 
seasonality in trading, a year-on-year analysis is conducted. The post period is 
compared to the period 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008 for the 3Y T-bond and 17 
June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008 for the 5Y Bob1. 
The variables used to assess changes in market quality after the transition are 
the bid-ask spread, quoted depth, traded volume, and volatility. The bid-ask spread 
is calculated using two measures. Following Frino et al. (2008), the first is the 
absolute bid-ask spread in points, measured as the ask-price minus the bid-price. 
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Following Alampieski and Lepone (2009), the second measure employed divides the 
absolute bid-ask spread by the minimum tick. The bid-ask spread is sampled over 5-
minute intervals for the day trading sessions and then averaged over each trading 
session. 
Lee et al. (1993) establish that an examination of liquidity must involve an 
analysis of both spreads and depth. Harris suggests that a tick size increase may reduce 
the with Harris (1994) arguing that changes in liquidity can only be determined by 
assessing changes in depth throughout the limit order book. Goldstein and Kavajecz 
(2000) note that an analysis of depth at the best prices omits valuable information as 
to whether the change in tick size results in a sufficient change to cumulative depth to 
change the transaction costs of large orders. Alternatively, Cao et al. (2009) find that 
order book information beyond the best quotes is moderately informative. 
Consequently, quoted depth is examined using two measures; best depth and total 
depth. Best depth is defined as the combined volume of shares available at both the 
best bid price and best ask price at the end of each interval. Total depth is the sum of 
the volume of contracts at each bid and ask price throughout the visible limit-order 
book at the end of each interval. Similar to bid-ask spreads, best and total depth are 
sampled over 5-minute intervals for the day and then averaged over each trading day.  
Traded volume is included as a measure of market quality because if 
transaction costs increase, trade volume should decrease (Harris, 1994). This is 
because a higher bid-ask spread would increase the cost associated with trading as 
the spread is a transaction cost paid by liquidity suppliers (Harris, 2003). Trading 
volume is calculated as the total number of shares traded during the trading session.  
Schwartz (1993) defines volatility as unexpected changes in prices. The tick size can 
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effect volatility as prices deviate from fundamental value. A greater tick size will 
increase this difference between price and value. Volatility is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the highest traded price divided by the lowest traded price for each 
trading session. 
 
3.3.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 3-1 provides descriptive statistics of the market quality indicators surrounding 
the structural transitions for both event (3Y T-bond and 5Y Bobl) and control (10Y T-
bond and 10Y bund) contracts. Prior literature including Ahn et al., (1996, 1998), 
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) and Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2005) indicate 
reductions in the minimum tick lead to lower bid -ask spreads. In line with these 
findings, there is a significant increase of 0.0050 (0.0046) basis points in the bid-ask 
spread for the 3Y T-bond (5Y Bob1) contracts. For the control for 3Y T-bond (i.e., 10Y 
T-bond), bid-ask spreads decline significantly at the 1% level, while those for the 
control for 5Y Bob1 (i.e., 10Y Bund) increase significantly at the 1% level. Supporting 
the prediction of hypothesis H3,1, results suggest that the increase in the bid-ask spread 
for the 3Y T-bond is due to the tick-size increase since the market for the 10Y T-bond 
contracts experiences the opposite change. This is in line with a number of These are 
in line with a number of studies showing that tick size reductions are associated with 
lower bid-ask spreads. With respect to the 5Y Bob1 contract, the increase in the bid-
ask spread could result from a market-wide change as bid-ask spreads for the 5Y Bob1 
and 10Y Bund change in the same direction, in contradiction to hypothesis H3,1. 
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Bid-ask spreads per minimum tick for the 3Y T-bond (5Y Bob1) contracts 
decrease by 0.028 (0.128) ticks, which is significant at the 1% level. For the 10Y T-bond, 
bid-ask spreads per minimum tick decline significantly at the 1% level, while those for 
the 10Y Bund increase significantly at the 1% level. As opposed to the bid-ask spread 
results, only the change in the 5Y Bob1 bid-ask spread per minimum tick can be 
attributed to the tick size increase since the change for the 10Y Bund occurs in the 
opposite direction. In regards to the bid-ask spread per minimum tick for the 3Y T-
bond, it is not possible to conclude whether the tick size increase is the cause of the 
decrease as the control contract (i.e., 10Y T-bond) experiences a qualitatively similar 
change. 
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Table 3-1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table present descriptive statistics for measures of market liquidity surrounding the increase in 
minimum tick for the 3Y T-bond and the 5Y Bob1 contracts. The tick size of the 3Y T-bond contracts was 
increased from half to a full-basis point on May 11, 2009. The pre-event sample period extends from 
13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 13 May, 2009 to 13 
August, 2009. The tick size of the 5Y Bob1 contracts was increased from half to a full-basis point on June 
15, 2009. The pre-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008. The post-
event sample period extends from 17 June, 2009 to 17 September, 2009. Bid-ask spreads and depth are 
sampled every 5 minutes (15 minutes) and then averaged for each day. Bid-Ask Spread is the best ask 
price minus the best bid price in contract points. BAS is calculated as the bid-ask spread divided by the 
minimum tick. Best Depth is the aggregate order volume at the best bid and best ask price. Total depth 
is the aggregate order volume throughout the limit-order book. Volatility is the natural logarithm of the 
highest traded price divided by the lowest traded price for each day. Volume is the average daily traded 
volume. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
Panel A: SFE 
 
3Y T-bond 
(Event Contract)  
10Y T-bond 
(Control Contract) 
 Pre Post Post - Pre  Pre Post Post - Pre 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.0052 0.0102 0.0050**  0.0053 0.0052 -0.0001** 
BAS 1.043 1.015 -0.028**  1.059 1.034 -0.025** 
Best Depth 531 1,179 648**  192 148 -44** 
Total Depth 3,471 4,686 1,215**  1,227 865 -362** 
Volatility 0.0860 0.1008 0.0148*  0.0860 0.0921 0.0061* 
Volume 48,939 51,461 2,522  19,662 15,356 -4,306** 
Panel B: Eurex 
 
5Y Bob1 
(Event Contract)  
10Y Bund 
(Control Contract) 
 Pre Post Post - Pre  Pre Post Post - Pre 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.0059 0.0105 0.0046**  0.0105 0.0107 0.0002** 
BAS 1.176 1.051 -0.125**  1.052 1.069 0.017** 
Best Depth 259 651 392**  375 335 -40** 
Total Depth 3,719 9,889 6,170**  7,128 6,029 -1,099** 
Volatility 0.4819 0.3653 -0.1166**  0.6721 0.5691 -0.1030** 
Volume 491,517 315,963 -175,554**  794,117 588,931 -205,186** 
 
Harris (1994) predicted a reduction in the tick size would decrease quoted depth as 
liquidity provision is less profitable and more risky. In line with this prediction, quoted 
depths at both the best quotes and throughout the limit order book increase for the 
3Y T-bond (an increase of 648 (1,215) contracts for best (total) depth) and 5Y Bob1 
contracts (an increase of 392 (6,170) contracts for best (total) depth), in contrast to 
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the control contracts where both best and total depth levels decline: a reduction of 
44 (362) contracts for best (total) depth in the 10Y T-bond and that of 40 (1,099) 
contracts for best (total) depth in the 10Y Bund. All changes in (both best and total) 
quoted depths reported in Table 3-1 are statistically significant at the 1% level. This is 
line with the predictions of the second hypothesis. In contrast to the results for bid-
ask spreads and bid-spreads per minimum tick, results clearly indicates that the 
increases in (both best and total) quoted depths for the two event contracts are due 
to the tick size increase rather than a market-wide event, as the changes for the 
corresponding control contracts are in the opposite direction. 
Table 3-1 also reports changes in trading volume and volatility surrounding the 
tick size increase. Trading volume is significantly higher for the 3Y T-bond, but is 
significantly lower for the 10Y T-bond, while volatility is significantly higher across both 
contracts. However, these are in line with the changes in the control contract, 
suggesting that the change in tick size has not had an impact on traded volume. For 
example, Ahn et al. (2007) finds no increase in volume on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
following the 1997 tick reduction. There is a significant decline in traded volume and 
volatility for the 5Y Bob1 and 10Y Bund contracts.  
 
3.1.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
As documented by Chordia et al. (2000), changes in market quality measures such as 
bid-ask spreads and quoted depth are associated with changes in market-wide 
liquidity factors. To better isolate the impact of the tick size increase on bid-ask 
87 
 
spreads and quoted depth, the following regressions (“market wide regressions”, 
hereafter) are estimated: 
 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                     
𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖  
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 
 
where 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned the value of one if the observation is 
taken from the post-event sample and zero otherwise. 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 is the bid-ask 
spread, 𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖  is the logarithm of the aggregate order volume at the best 
bid and best ask price, and 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 is the logarithm of the aggregate order 
volume throughout the limit-order book for the event contracts. The variables 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖, 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖), and 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖) represent 
bid-ask spreads, the logarithm of best depth, and the logarithm of total depth for the 
control contracts, respectively. In Equation (1), the bid-ask spread is used as the 
dependent variable. As a falsification test, these three regressions are re-estimated 
using the control contracts as dependent variables. 
As presented in Panel A of Table 3-2, the bid-ask spread regression results for 
the 3Y T-bond contracts indicate a significant increase in bid-ask spreads at the 1% 
level. In contrast, the results for the 10Y T-bond contracts show a negative coefficient 
on the dummy variable (at the 5% level), indicating that spreads narrow over the 
period. As reported in Panel B and C of Table 3-2, best depth and total visible depth 
for the 3Y T-bond contracts increase significantly (at the 1% level) in the post-period 
after controlling for depth in the 10Y T-bond contract. The regressions for the control 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
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contract (10Y T-bond) show a reduction in both best and total depths after the tick 
size increase, with both of these changes significant at the 1% level.  
Table 3-2 
Market Wide Regressions 
 
This table reports the regression results of spreads and depth around the move to full-basis point 
trading in the 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts. For the 3Y T-bonds, the pre-event sample period for 
extends from 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 13 May, 
2009 to 13 August, 2009. For the 5Y Bobl, the pre-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2008 to 
17 September, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2009 to 17 September, 2009. 
The regression equations (1), (2), and (3) are estimated for the event (3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1) contracts 
as the dependent variables. As a falsification test, these three regressions are re-estimated using the 
control contracts as dependent variables. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Intercept Change 
10Y T-
bond 
3Y T-bond 10Y Bund 5Y Bob1 R2 
Panel A: Bid-Ask Spread 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 0.0044** 0.0050** 0.1483    0.9974 
10Y T-
bond 
0.0044** -0.0009*  0.1655   0.184 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 0.0037** 0.0046**   0.2071*  0.9931 
10Y Bund 0.0090** -0.0010*    0.2519* 0.1693 
Panel C: Best Depth 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 3.4770** 1.0110** 0.5102**    0.7707 
10Y T-
bond 
2.8810** -0.5580** 
 
0.3591** 
  
0.3451 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 1.134 0.9810**   0.7240**  0.8921 
10Y Bund 3.0700** -0.5338**    0.4771** 0.3927 
Panel D: Total Depth 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 5.3250** 0.4616** 0.3892**    0.3559 
10Y T-
bond 
4.7560** -0.4414** 
 
0.2840** 
  
0.4468 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 2.6380** 1.0690**   0.6224**  0.9524 
10Y Bund 2.9340** -0.8574**       0.7195** 0.5531 
 
Table 3-2 also shows the market wide regression results for the 5Y Bob1 contracts. 
Bid-ask spreads for the 5Y Bob1 are significantly wider after the change at the 1% level, 
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as indicated by the positive dummy variable coefficient. In contrast, there is a 
significant decrease in bid-ask spreads for the control contract at the 5% level. Both 
best depth and total depth for the 5Y Bob1 increase significantly after the tick change. 
For the 10Y Bund contracts, the negative dummy coefficients indicate a significant 
decline (at the 1% level) in best depth and total depth in the post-period. These results 
support hypotheses H3,1 and H3,2 for both event contracts.  
Chordia et al. (2000) find that liquidity measures are dependent on factors 
specific to the particular financial instrument in addition to market-wide liquidity 
factors. Harris (1994) argues that two important determinants of the bid-ask spread 
and quoted depth are trading volume and price volatility. To control for both market-
wide and security specific factors on the bid-ask spread and quoted depth, this study 
follows Frino, Gerace, and Lepone (2008) and estimates the following equations: 
 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖) + 𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛼3 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖) + 𝛼5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 =   𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖) + 
𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖) + 𝛼5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖) + 
𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖) + 𝛼5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
where 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖, 𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖), 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖), and 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 are as described in 
Equations (1), (2), and (3). 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖) is the logarithm of the average daily 
traded volume, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖is the natural logarithm of the highest traded price 
divided by the lowest traded price for each day in the control contracts. 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖) 
(3.4) 
(3.6) 
(3.5) 
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and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖  represent daily traded volume and volatility in the event contracts, 
respectively. As a falsification test, these three regressions are also re-estimated using 
the control contracts as dependent variables. 
Panel A of Table 3-3 shows that after controlling for volatility and volume for 
the 3Y T-bond contract, bid-ask spreads experience a significant increase at the 1% 
level after the change in tick size. Supporting hypothesis H3,1, the increase in spreads 
is isolated to the 3Y T-bond contract, with bid-ask spreads for the 10Y T-bond contract 
showing a significant decrease at the 1% level after the change. In line with the 
hypothesis H3,2, the regression results in Panel B and C of Table 3-3 show a significant 
improvement in both the best and total depth levels for the 3Y T-bond contracts after 
the increase in tick size: this result is specific to the 3Y T-bond contracts, with the 
coefficients on the change dummy variables for the 10Y T-bond contracts being 
negative at the 1% level. The results of the combined regressions for the 5Y Bob1 
contracts are also presented in Table 3-3. The positive dummy coefficient for the 5Y 
Bob1 (presented in Panel A) indicate that the bid-ask spread widens in the post-period. 
Bid-ask spreads for the 10Y Bund contract are wider in the post-period, as indicated 
by the poisitive dummy coefficient (significant at the 1% level), however the economic 
size of the coefficient is much smaller than for the 5Y Bobl at 0.0002 relative to 0.0047, 
also supporting hypothesis H3,1 with regards to the 5Y Bobl contract. As shown in Panel 
B, the dummy variable coefficients for best and total depths are both highly significant 
and positive at the 1% level, indicating an increase in depth levels after the tick 
increase for the 5Y Bob1. On the contrary, the 10Y Bund contracts experience a 
significant decrease in both best and total depths at the 1% level, thus supporting 
hypothesis H3,2.  
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The results of the analysis suggest that in line with the literature, the increase 
in the tick size resulted in both higher bid-ask spreads, and greater depth. The increase 
in spreads is not surprising, as the average quoted spread was close to the minimum 
tick size prior to the increase in the tick size for both the 3Y T-bond contract and 5Y 
Bob1. Harris (1994) suggests that an increase in the tick size will improve quoted depth 
as it reduces the cost of front-running an order, as it increase the price a trader has to 
pay to obtain price-time priority. The higher tick size therefore provides protection 
against quote matchers and front-runners, reducing the cost of displaying quotes on 
the limit order book. Furthermore, the greater tick size reduces the likelihood that a 
liquidity supplier will trade with a limit order trader (Anshuman and Kalay, 1998).   
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Table 3-3 
Combined Regressions 
 
This table reports the regression results of spreads and depth around the move to full-basis point trading in the 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts. For the 3Y T-bonds, the 
pre-event sample period for extends from 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 13 May, 2009 to 13 August, 2009. For the 5Y Bobl, 
the pre-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2009 to 17 September, 2009. The 
regression equations (4), (5), and (6) are estimated for the event (3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1) contracts as the dependent variables. As a falsification test, these three regressions 
are re-estimated using the control contracts as dependent variables. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Intercept Change 
Volume  Volatility 
(10YT-
bond) 
Volume Volatility Volume Volatility Volume  Volatility 
R2 (10Y T-
bond) 
(3Y T-
bond) 
(3Y T-
bond) 
(10Y Bund) (10Y Bund) (5Y Bob1) (5Y Bob1) 
Panel A: Bid-Ask Spread 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 0.0053** 0.0049** -0.0000 -0.0012* -0.0000 0.0014*     0.9974 
10Y T-bond 0.0053** -0.0002** -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0005     0.1825 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 0.0059** 0.0047**     0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.9927 
10Y Bund 0.01038 0.0002**     -0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.1698 
Panel C: Best Depth 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 1.755 0.8727** -0.0668 -0.0002 0.4870** -2.980**     0.1804 
10Y T-bond 2.5580** -0.1040* 0.4294* 0.5729 0.4151* -1.435*     0.4046 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 3.3130* 0.9778** 
    
-0.2926 0.1774 0.4522* -0.5155 0.128 
10Y Bund 2.362 -0.0718     0.3123* -0.0488 0.1397 -0.2202 0.1875 
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Table 3, continued 
Panel D: Total Depth 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 4.3510** 0.3273** -0.044 -0.3102 0.4151** -3.147**     0.4345 
10Y T-bond 5.6300** -0.2330** 0.3562** -0.2891 -0.1888* -0.5096     0.4843 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 6.4900** 0.9915**     -0.0039 -0.1102 0.1397 -0.2165 0.9216 
10Y Bund 6.7520** -0.1711**         0.2997* -0.2032 -0.1427 -0.1254 0.2945 
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3.3.3 Execution Costs 
 
To provide a more comprehensive assessment of the change in liquidity after the 
increase in minimum tick (i.e., whether the change in bid-ask spreads dominates the 
change in quoted depth), this section tests the third hypothesis by examining the price 
impact of executing orders. The pre-trade benchmark represents the price that would 
have prevailed had the trade not executed (Domowitz et al., 2001), while the post-
trade benchmark represents the equilibrium price after all short-term price pressure 
has dissipated (Harris, 2003). A significant price impact would suggest that the 
increase in quoted depth did not offset the cost of the increase in the bid-ask spread.  
Trades are classified as buyer- and seller-initiated using the method of Ellis, 
Michaely, and O’Hara (2000). Each trade is classified into four mutually exclusive 
quartiles based on trade size. The first quartile contains the smallest 25% of trade sizes 
and the fourth quartile contains the largest 25% of trade sizes. Studies employ 
different different pre- and post-trade benchmarks. Berkman et al. (2005) use an 
intraday benchmark of mid-quotes five seconds before and five minutes after 
transactions. However, studies of intraday show patterns in liquidity in order-driven 
markets shows that traded volume follows a U-shape pattern, meaning that the 
number of trades within 5 minutes is not constant across the trading day (Ahn and 
Cheung, 1999). Therefore consistent with Gemmill (1996), the transaction price five 
trades prior to the trade is used as the pre-trade benchmark, where the price impact 
of each trade is measured as the basis point change from the pre-trade benchmark 
price to the trade price. This is averaged across each day and then across each sample 
period. 
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Results of the price impact analysis for the 3Y T-bond contracts are shown in 
Table 3-4. There is a significant increase in execution costs across all quartiles for both 
buyer and seller-initiated trades at the 1% level. For purchases, execution costs for the 
first quartile averaged 0.1109 basis points before the tick increase and 0.2105 basis 
points after, a significant change of 0.0996 basis points at the 1% level. Similar results 
are found for the other three quartiles.  
Qualitatively comparable results are obtained for sales. For the first and 
second quartiles, price impact increases significantly by 0.1000 and 0.0610 basis points 
at the 1% level respectively, while the third and fourth quartiles show a significant 
increase of 0.0600 and 0.0920 basis points (both at the 1% level). Table 3-4 also reveals 
that results for the 5Y Bob1 contracts are qualitatively similar to those for the 3Y T-
bond contracts. 
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Table 3-4 
Execution Costs 
 
Price impact results are presented before and after the change in tick size for the 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bobl contracts. For the 3Y T-bonds, the pre-event sample period extends 
from 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 13 May, 2009 to 13 August, 2009. For the 5Y Bobl, the pre-event sample period extends 
from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2009 to 17 September, 2009. Trades are classified as buyer and seller 
initiated using the methodology of Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000). The price impact of each trade is measured as the change from the transaction price five trades prior 
to the trade price. This is averaged across each day and then across each sample period. Each trade is classified into four mutually exclusive quartiles based on trade size. 
The first quartile contains the smallest 25% of trade-sizes and the fourth quartile contains the largest 25% of trade-sizes. Price impact is reported in basis points. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 All 
 Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Panel A: Pre-period 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 0.1109 -0.1140 0.1047 -0.1260 0.1099 -0.1410 0.1544 -0.1710 0.1194 -0.1380 
10Y T-bond 0.1418 -0.1260 0.1425 -0.1360 0.1460 -0.1540 0.1810 -0.1900 0.1584 -0.1610 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 0.1637 -0.1555 0.1412 -0.1421 0.1507 -0.1507 0.1437 -0.1517 0.1484 -0.1509 
10Y Bund 0.3424 -0.3367 0.3147 -0.3146 0.3108 -0.3078 0.3346 -0.3415 0.3255 -0.3245 
Panel B: Post-period 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 0.2105 -0.2140 0.2233 -0.1870 0.2424 -0.2010 0.2985 -0.2630 0.2394 -0.2160 
10Y T-bond 0.1655 -0.1700 0.1474 -0.1470 0.1461 -0.1560 0.1629 -0.1790 0.1555 -0.1630 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 0.2805 -0.2652 0.2702 -0.2575 0.2855 -0.2726 0.3197 -0.3110 0.2889 -0.2856 
10Y Bund 0.3076 -0.3177 0.2883 -0.3005 0.2973 -0.2919 0.3879 -0.3986 0.3203 -0.3292 
Panel C: Post - Pre 
SFE 
3Y T-bond 0.0996** -0.1000** 0.1186** -0.0610** 0.1325** -0.0600** 0.1441** -0.0920** 0.1200** -0.0780** 
10Y T-bond 0.0237** -0.0440** 0.0049 -0.0110 0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0181** 0.011 -0.0029* -0.0020 
Eurex 
5Y Bob1 0.1168** -.01097** 0.1290** -.01154** 0.1347** -0.1218** 0.1760** -0.1596** 0.1405** -0.1347** 
10Y Bund -0.0348** 0.0190** -0.0264** 0.0141** -0.0136** 0.0160** 0.0533** -0.0570** 0.0051 -0.0038 
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In contrast to the results for the event contracts, those for the control (10Y T-
bond and 10Y Bund) contracts are mixed. With respect to the total sample, results for 
both control contracts indicate that there is no significant change in execution costs 
for both purchases and sales at the 1% level. Results are not uniform across the four 
quartile groups for both control contracts, however when costs are seen to increase 
this is still less than for the 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts. For example, for 
purchases of the 3Y T-bond, the difference in execution costs for the first quartile 
averaged 0.1109 basis points, relative to 0.0237 basis points. This means that the 
changes in execution costs for the event contracts is likely to be attributed to the tick 
size increase, supporting hypothesis H3,3. These results suggest that increasing the 
minimum price increment has a negative impact on market quality, where the cost of 
increasing the bid-ask spread more than offset the increase in quoted depth. This is 
likely the result of there being already sufficient liquidity in futures markets prior to 
the tick increase to absorb the impact of market orders. This is in line with studies that 
find that the impact of a reduction in tick size primarily benefits small trades and liquid 
securities (Bollen and Whaley, 1998).  
 
3.5 Summary 
 
This essay investigates the impact of the increase in minimum tick size on market 
quality using the 3-Year Treasury bond futures (“3Y T-bond”) on the Sydney Futures 
Exchange (SFE) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl futures (“5Y Bob1”) on the Eurex, which is 
distinguished from prior studies that examine tick size reductions. The literature for 
both equity and futures markets provide evidence that a reduction in the tick size is 
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associated with lower spreads and quoted depth. As these changes have conflicting 
effects on liquidity, certain studies attribute the change in spreads and depth as 
indicative of an improvement in liquidity, while other studies conclude a reduction in 
overall liquidity, which warrants a re-examination of this issue. 
This essay provides evidence that a tick size increase is associated with an 
increase in depth at the best quotes and throughout the limit order-book for both 3Y 
T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts, which is consistent with results in prior studies. 
However, with respect to both bid-ask spreads, this paper finds mixed evidence. The 
results show that the change in tick size lead to wider bid-ask spreads for the 3Y T-
bond and the 5Y Bob1. This chapter suggest that the increase in the tick size lead to 
an increase in execution costs, indicating that the increase in the bid-ask spread has 
more than offset the increase in quoted depth. 
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Chapter 4: Algorithmic Trading and Market Quality 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This study investigates the relation between algorithmic trading volume and future 
market quality. Recent academic research has begun to focus on the impact of 
algorithmic trading on market quality such as liquidity and volatility (Hendershott and 
Riordan, 2011, Hasbrouck and Sarr, 2011, Brogaard, 2010, and Jones and Menkveld 
2011). Although the evidence suggests that algorithmic traders (ATs) are not 
associated with reduced market quality, there are concerns that ATs can exacerbate 
market instability by increasing (decreasing) their demand (supply) of liquidity when 
liquidity is scarce. Despite these concerns, none of them examines how the impact of 
algorithmic trading on market quality during market declines differs from that during 
market upturns. The aim of this study is to bridge this gap in the literature by 
examining whether the relation between algorithmic trading and market quality 
differs across up and down markets. Furthermore, it examines whether market 
conditions affect the behaviour of ATs, which differentially impacts the market.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the 
hypotheses on the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality. Section 3 gives an 
overview of the institutional details of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) provides 
an overview of the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 describes the 
research design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 summarises. 
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4.2 Hypotheses on Algorithmic Trading 
 
Algorithmic trading involves automating order executions according to a set of pre-
specified conditions such as prices, volatility etc. This enables algorithmic trading 
programs to be more efficient at processing and utilizing trading information relative 
to human market makers (Gerig and Michayluk, 2010). One of the other distinguishing 
features of algorithmic trading is its speed of execution, with latency speeds measured 
in milliseconds. ATs can thus transact on the information they acquire 
instantaneously. Hendershott and Riordan (2011) suggest that the AT’s superior ability 
to process trade data and their fast execution speed enable efficient monitoring and 
adjustment of limit orders in response to new public information. This reduces the 
cost of the option provided by limit orders, leading to an improvement in liquidity. 
Furthermore, the ability of algorithms to continuously monitor the market can allow 
ATs to supply liquidity when it is cheap and take liquidity when it is expensive, thereby 
moderating short-term volatility. The empirical literature for equity and foreign 
exchange markets document that ATs improve market quality. Higher algorithmic 
trading leads to a narrowing of bid-ask spreads and effective spreads, price discovery 
increases and short-term volatility either reduces or does not increase (see Brograad, 
2010; Chaboud  et al., 2011; Hendershott et al., 2011; Hendershott and Riordan, 
2011). The following hypothesis predicts that algorithmic trading has either no impact 
or leads to an improvement in market quality. 
 
Hypothesis4.1: An increase in algorithmic trading will either have no impact or lead to 
an improvement in market quality. 
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Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) model ATs as a new form of market maker on limit 
order markets. If a trader places a limit order, a common value innovation occurring 
after the placement can leave the order stale and provides a trading option that can 
be picked off by other traders. This increases the adverse selection costs faced by the 
limit order trader, resulting in higher execution costs. The superior information 
processing speed of ATs creates an edge in quickly updating limit orders as public 
information arrives. ATs may therefore act as middlemen in limit order markets for 
other limit order traders, as their limit orders are continuously refreshed, which 
inhibits informed traders from taking advantage of this trading option.  
Kirilenko et al. (2011) however find that during periods of market stress, 
algorithmic traders display behaviour inconsistent with traditional market makers. A 
designated market maker differs from a strategic trader as they have an affirmative 
obligation to maintain two-sided markets during exchange hours and to buy and sell 
at their displayed bids and offers. An analysis of the behaviour of HFTs during the flash 
crash of 6 May, 2010 reveals that HFTs trade aggressively in the direction of price 
changes and comprise a large percentage of total trading activity, but do not 
accumulate significant inventory positions. They are not willing to either accumulate 
large positions or sustain large losses and in rebalancing their positions, they may also 
compete for liquidity, thus amplifying price volatility. An implication of this result is 
that algorithmic traders may have a negative impact on market quality during intraday 
price falls. The following hypothesis predicts that algorithmic trading leads to a decline 
in market quality during intraday periods of negative returns.  
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Hypothesis4.2: During intraday periods of negative returns, an increase in algorithmic 
trading will lead to a reduction in market quality. 
 
 
There is also the possibility that algorithmic trading may differentially impact market 
quality during different market environments. However, the empirical evidence 
suggests that this is not the case. Hasbrouck and Saar (2012) find that the impact of 
low latency activity (a proxy for algorithmic trading) enhances market quality over 
periods dominated by flat or rising prices and during periods dominated by falling 
prices and economic uncertainty. Brogaard (2012) examines the effect of HFTs on 
volatility over the 2008-09 period, which is a time period characterized by heightened 
volatility. Examining the short sale ban in 2008 that removed a fraction of HFT 
participants, the author finds HFTs reduce volatility. The following hypothesis predicts 
that the effect of algorithmic trading on market quality should be similar across 
different market conditions.  
 
Hypothesis4.3: There is no difference in the effect of algorithmic trading on market 
quality during bull and bear markets. 
 
Contrarian traders are traders that increase their buying when prices fall and increase 
their selling when prices are rising. Kaniel et al. (2008) argue that contrarian traders 
act as liquidity providers. Institutional investors requiring immediacy offer price 
concessions to encourage other investors to take the other side of the trade. 
Momentum traders conversely act as liquidity demanders. The results of Kirilenko et 
al. (2011) show that during the Flash Crash HFTs acted as momentum traders, 
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aggressively selling to keep inventories near a target inventory level. Herding and 
positive-feedback trading by ATs may result in a reduction in market quality (Culter et 
al., 1990). The following hypothesis predicts that ATs engage in momentum trading 
during intraday periods of negative returns.  
 
Hypothesis4.4: Algorithmic traders act as liquidity demanders during price falls. 
 
4.3 Australian Securities Exchange 
 
The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) was formed in July 2006 through the merger 
of the Australian Stock Exchange and the Sydney Futures Exchange. The ASX operates 
as a fully automated continuous order-driven market. Orders are submitted 
electronically by buyers and sellers through the ASX Trade, an electronic order book 
for securities listed on the ASX. ASX Trade replaced the Integrated Trading System (ITS) 
in November 2010, which earlier replaced the Stock Exchange Automated Trading 
System (SEATS) in October 2006. The system facilitates the trading of equities, debt 
securities and warrants on ASX’s markets. Orders are automatically matched based on 
price and time priority. Submitted orders are filled by crossing with either the best bid 
(if it is a sell order) or the best ask (in the case of a buy order). Unfilled orders become 
standing limit orders which fill the bid-ask schedule. The information available to all 
market participants on the bid-ask schedule include any standing limit orders, its order 
type, volume and price. A short series of the most recent executions are also visible.  
The ASX facilitates trades during exchange-open hours between 10:00 am to 
4:00 pm. Brokers can submit orders in the pre-open from 7:00-10:00 am in 
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preparation for the market opening. A single price call auction takes place for each 
stock between 10:00-10:09:15 am using a specific algorithm. To prevent brokers from 
distorting prices, the actual opening time is generated randomly and occurs within 15 
seconds of the prescribed opening time.  Normal trading takes place between 10:00 
am and 4:00 pm under a continuous double-sided auction where price and time 
priority rules apply. Trading ceases at 4:00 pm and the market is placed in pre-close 
until 4:10 pm. Brokers enter, amend and cancel orders in preparation for the closing 
single price auction which takes place between 4:10 pm and 4:12 pm. 
 
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
An internal database is directly sourced from the ASX. The dataset consists of trade by 
trade data for the top 100 capitalised stocks listed on the ASX from July 2, 2007 to 
October 26, 2009. The unique feature of this dataset is that it consists of a field that 
identifies the source of each trade. Using this identifier, this study determines which 
trades are associated with human traders or computer based systems. This field, which 
is a five character user code, consists of two types of user code. The first group of user 
code is five letter user code that consists of a username of a market participant 
associated with each submitted order indicate the actions of a human trader.3 The 
second group of user code is five alphanumeric characters which indicate that the 
order is submitted through a computer based system gateway. 
                                                 
3 User code consists of four characters of the participant’s surname, followed by a single character of 
his/her first name. For example, the participant whose name is Anthony Flint is identified as “FLINA”. 
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Note that the first (second) group is a proxy for human (computer) based 
trading; it is possible that human traders submit their orders through the computer 
based system gateway, and that a computer based trading strategy is executed 
through a terminal classified as human based.45 This study further classifies the group 
of computer based system as either ATs or other computer based trading platform, 
referred to as Broker Engines (BEs), based on the average trade size and trading 
frequency from the relevant gateway, with BE’s trading in both larger size and lower 
frequency than algorithmic trading gateways.6 
This study combines the ASX internal dataset with ten levels of order book data 
sourced from Thompson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) provided by the Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA). The combined dataset provides a 
reconstruction of the full order book for each trade. For each trade, the following 
information is provided in the dataset: (i) the direction of the trade (i.e., buy/sell), (ii) 
the share volume, (iii) stock code, (iv) date, (v) time stamp to the nearest hundredth 
of a second, (vi) initiator indication (indicating which participant initiated the trade), 
(vii) market participant identifier (ASX internal field described above), and (viii) bid and 
ask quotes and share volume at each of the ten depth levels. Information from the 
liquidity suppliers includes trade price, volume, and user code. 
                                                 
4 Further information about each user code is contained in the “ASX source file”. This file indicates that 
each participant can be associated with multiple user codes through which they can process orders. 
5 This classification scheme originally identifies retail brokers (such as Commonwealth Securities 
Limited (“CommSec”) and ETRADE Australia Securities Ltd (“E*TRADE Australia”)) as computer 
based traders; however, these brokers are predominantly retail-based, and are subsequently classified as 
human traders. 
6 To further test the robustness of the computerised user code classifications, the sample is cross tested 
by applying a filter based on the frequency of trades and average dollar volume across each six month 
sub-sample. 
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Table 6-1 reports summary statistics for the 100 sample stocks by trader type. 
The average dollar traded volume per 15-minute interval is $2,787,462, suggesting a 
high level of trading activity in our sample stocks. A significant proportion of trading 
volume is conducted by ATs, averaging $996,473 in dollar traded volume over each 
15-minute interval. Algorithmic trading dollar volumes are split evenly between buys 
and sells, with average dollar buy volumes accounting for about 51% of algorithmic 
trading dollar volumes. 
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Table 4-1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for average trading activity per 15-minute interval over the 
period from 2 July, 2007 to 26 October, 2009 for 100 sample stocks. Algorithmic Trades are trades 
classified as originating from a computer algorithm. All Trades include all trades for the entire sample 
period. Total Ratio, Buy Ratio, and Sell Ratio are the trading activity ratios. Each ratio is calculated by 
dividing the trading value contributed by the AT by order type by total dollar volume transacted in the 
interval. 
 
  Algorithmic Trades All Trades 
  Total Buy Sell Total 
Panel A: Average trading activity in a 15-minute interval as measured by dollar volume transacted 
Mean 996,473 507,264 489,209 2,787,462 
Median 387,253 189,545 183,542 880,095 
Max 114,105,434 109,810,983 42,726,422 2,390,425,843 
Min 0 0 0 1 
Standard Deviation 1,013,692 970,294 927,707 6,616,942 
Panel B: Average trading activity in a 15-minute interval as measured by share volume transacted 
Mean 84,291 42,751 41,238 263,255 
Median 40,432 19,433 18,635 92,526 
Max 25,523,166 24,564,580 8,904,090 148,207,452 
Min 0 0 0 1 
Standard Deviation 186,482 104,276 97,569 842,649 
Panel C: Average trading activity in a 15-minute interval as measured by number of trades 
Mean 61 32 29 107 
Median 40 20 18 70 
Max 1,573 1,125 1,077 2,709 
Min 0 0 0 1 
Standard Deviation 67 37 35 118 
Panel D: Average trading activity in a 15-minute interval as measured by trading ratios 
  Total Ratio Buy Ratio Sell Ratio   
Mean 0.4954 0.2519 0.2435  
Median 0.4956 0.2239 0.2148  
Max 1 1 1  
Min 0 0 0  
Standard Deviation 0.2133 0.1640 0.1614  
 
4.3 Research Design 
 
To analyze the relation between algorithmic trading and subsequent market quality, 
the trading day is partitioned into multiple time intervals. However, the length of the 
time interval depends on two contradicting factors. First, as ATs can react fast to 
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changing market conditions, the time interval should not be too long to ensure the 
effects of algorithmic trading on market quality are captured. However, the time 
interval should not be too short to limit the number of transactions within each 
interval. Hendershott et al. (2014) examine liquidity measures in 5 and 30 minute 
intervals. In this study, each trading day is divided into 15-minute intervals. Trading 
hours on the ASX are between 10:00 and 16:00. A single price call auction takes place 
between 10:00-10:10 through the use of a specific algorithm. This time period is 
removed from the sample, as the nature of the orders submitted during this period is 
fundamentally different from the continuous double sided auction that takes place on 
the ASX limit order book. 
Hendershott (2011) state that algorithmic trading should be normalised by 
trading volume, otherwise it would proxy for overall changes in trading volume. 
Following Lakanishok et al. (1992), Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), and Li and 
Wang (2010), algorithmic trading volume is measured as: 
 
   𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝐴𝑇_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
                        (4.1) 
 
where 𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 (𝐴𝑇_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) is the total dollar value of 
market and limit order purchases (sales) made by ATs for stock 𝑖 in interval 𝑡. This 
consists of trades undertaken by an AT, and does not include broker engine trades. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the total dollar value of all market and limit order buys 
and sells for stock 𝑖 in interval 𝑡. This includes algorithmic, broker engine and human 
trades. Trading volume ratios for buys and sells are also calculated separately, where 
algorithmic trading buy volume is measured as: 
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   𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
                                           (4.2) 
 
and algorithmic trading sell volume is measured as: 
 
   𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑇_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
                                        (4.3) 
 
where algorithmic trading buying, selling, and total trading volume is calculated as 
before. 
Following Harris (1994), liquidity indicators analysed include the bid-ask 
spread, market depth, and short-term volatility. The bid-ask spread is defined as: 
 
                                       𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 =
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑡−𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑡
(
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑡+𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑡
2
)
                                           (4.4) 
 
where 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 is the percentage bid-ask spread for stock 𝑖 at time period 𝑡, the inside 
ask is the lowest ask price at time period t, and the inside bid is the highest bid price 
at period 𝑡. The mid-point is used to avoid problems associated with bid-ask bounce. 
It is computed for every trade for each stock, and is averaged over all trades in each 
interval. As a robustness test, the percentage effective spread is also employed, and 
is defined as twice the difference between the actual execution price and the market 
quote at the time of each trade. Market depth is calculated using two measures. Best 
depth is defined as the logarithm of the total number of shares available at the best 
bid and the best ask (Harris, 1994). It is computed for every trade for each stock and 
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is averaged across all trades for each 15-minute interval. The second measure is 
defined as the sum of the volume of shares at each bid and ask price throughout the 
limit-order book. Volatility is measured using the intraday high-low price range 
estimator proposed by Parkinson (1980). The volatility measure is given as follows: 
 
     𝜎 = √
(lnℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ−ln𝑙𝑜𝑤)2
4𝑙𝑛2
, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇.                    (4.5) 
 
where volatility is calculated for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ stock in the 𝑡𝑡ℎ  time interval; ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ and 𝑙𝑜𝑤 
refers to the highest traded price and lowest traded price in each 15-minute interval. 
To avoid the effect of bid-ask bounce, the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask spread is 
used as the traded price. 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Multiple Regressions of Market Quality on Lagged Algorithmic Volume 
 
To determine the impact of algorithmic trading volume on market quality, 
Hendershott et al. (2014) use an instrumental variable regression to determine causal 
impacts. They argue that the decision to engage in algorithmic trading may depend on 
liquidity. To account for this potential endogeneity issue, the lagged ratio of 
algorithmic trading volume to total volume is used as an instrument. The intuition 
behind this is that lagged algorithmic trading precedes changes in market quality 
indicators. This may not overcome all endogeneity issues however if the liquidity 
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variables are serially correlated. Consequently, when submitting an order using an 
algorithm, traders may form expectations about future bid-ask spreads and depth. In 
estimating the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality, Hendershott et al. 
(2011) include trading volument and volatility as control variables in their regression. 
Hendershott et al. (2011) note that the quoted bid-ask spread is problematic as 
traders may be willing to trade inside the bid-ask quote. Consequently, both the 
quoted bid-ask spread and effective spread are included. To examine the relation 
between algorithmic trading volume and subsequent market quality, the following 
regressions are estimated for each individual stock: 
 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝜎𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽4𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽6𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡, 
𝑄𝐷𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝜎𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽4𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽6𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡, 
𝜎𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜎𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽4𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑡   + 𝛽6𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡, 
𝜎𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝜎𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽4𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  + 𝛽5𝑀𝑡   + 𝛽6𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡, 
 
where 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 represents the percentage bid-ask spread and effective spread for time 
interval 𝑡, respectively; 𝑄𝐷𝑡 represents the natural logarithm of the best and total 
depth  at time interval 𝑡; 𝜎𝑡 is the intraday high-low price range estimator; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 
is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1) and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) ratios; and 𝑁𝑇𝑡 
is the number of trades executed during time interval 𝑡. 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1, 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1, and 𝜎𝑡−1 are 
(4.6)
1) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
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to control for serial-autocorrelation in the dependent variables. 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day, and 
zero otherwise; and 𝐴𝑡  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from 15:00 to 
16:00 hours, and zero otherwise. The inclusion of intraday time dummy variables 
controls for intraday variation. The volatility regression is estimated four times, with 
each liquidity variable (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1,𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1,𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1, and 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) used as an 
explanatory variable in the regression. Each equation is estimated separately for each 
stock using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); the resulting t-statistics are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). 
The regression results for percentage spreads are reported in Table 4-2, which 
are estimated using the total number of algorithmic trades in the interval, as well as 
algorithmic buy and sell trades. Table 4-2 reports the cross-sectional means of the 
coefficients and associated t-statistics. Results show that for total algorithmic trades, 
both bid-ask spread measures are positively associated with lagged algorithmic 
trading volume; the average t-statistic for the bid-ask spread (effective spread) is 2.36 
(2.36). In contrast, examining buy and sell trades individually, the coefficients on the 
ratios are not distinguishable from zero. This is different to Hendershott et al. (2014) 
who show that algorithmic trading resulted in a reduction in bid-ask spreads.  
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Table 4-2 
Percentage Spreads and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks 
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The 
regression model is specified as follows: 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝜎𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽6𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
where 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡  represents the percentage bid-ask spread (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1) and effective spread (𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1) during 
time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) ratio, 
respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the intraday high-low 
price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from 
10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random error term. Regression 
coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-statistics are in parentheses. 
The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units for presentation, the 
coefficients for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1, 𝑁𝑇𝑡, 𝑀𝑡, and 𝐴𝑡are multiplied by 10
5, and those for Constant, 𝜎𝑡−1, 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1, 
and 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 are multiplied by 10
2. 
 
  Total Buy Sell 
  𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  
Constant 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (12.08) (12.00) (12.90) (12.82) (12.74) (12.66) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 
 (2.36) (2.36) (1.06) (1.06) (1.84) (1.84) 
𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 
 (-1.91) (-1.90) (-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.90) (-1.90) 
𝜎𝑡−1 1.03 1.55 1.02 0.015 0.010 0.015 
 (6.07) (6.06) (6.02) (6.01) (6.03) (6.02) 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 85.33  85.42  85.41  
 (162.43)  (163.69)  (163.98)  
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1  85.29  85.38  85.37 
  (161.58)  (162.83)  (163.13) 
𝑀𝑡 -0.20 -0.30 -0.20 -0.30 -0.20 -0.30 
 (-2.57) (-2.56) (-2.61) (-2.61) (-2.61) (-2.60) 
𝐴𝑡 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 (0.80) (0.79) (0.70) (0.69) (0.74) (0.73) 
R2  0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 
 
An important determinant of market quality is the available size to trade at both the 
bid and ask side of the market. For larger market participants, a reduction in depth at 
or near the best quotes may result in worse execution prices as traders consume 
liquidity to fill the order. Harris (1990) argues that liquidity has both a price dimension 
(i.e., bid-ask spread) and a quantity dimension (i.e., depth). For instance, if an AT 
efficiently picks off stale limit orders, limit order traders may reduce their order size 
114 
 
in response. Hendershott et al. (2011) show that higher algorithmic trading volume is 
negatively associated with market depth.  
 
Table 4-3 
Quoted Depths and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks 
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The 
regression model is specified as follows: 
𝑄𝐷𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝜎𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽6𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑄𝐷𝑡  represents the natural logarithm of the best quoted depth (𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) and total quoted depth 
(𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) during time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1), and sell 
(𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the 
intraday high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random 
error term. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-
statistics are in parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units 
for presentation, the coefficient for 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is multiplied by 10
4, and the coefficients for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1, 𝑀𝑡, 
and 𝐴𝑡 are multiplied by 10
2. 
 
 Total Buy Sell 
  𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 
Constant 1.08 0.53 1.06 0.52 1.07 0.52 
 (28.26) (19.81) (28.73) (19.93) (28.92) (20.02) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 -1.23 -0.76 -0.13 -0.38 -1.69 -0.86 
 (-1.16) (-1.70) (-0.20) (-0.76) (-1.23) (-1.40) 
𝑁𝑇𝑡 2.30 -0.30 2.30 -0.30 2.30 -0.30 
 (2.60) (-0.58) (2.53) (-0.64) (2.54) (-0.64) 
𝜎𝑡−1 -6.64 -2.29 -6.58 -2.26 -6.59 -2.27 
 (-7.73) (-4.98) (-7.68) (-4.94) (-7.70) (-4.95) 
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 0.89  0.89  0.89  
 (282.44)  (285.08)  (284.79)  
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  0.95  0.95  0.95 
  (561.90)  (566.76)  (565.89) 
𝑀𝑡 1.01 1.08 1.04 1.09 1.02 1.09 
 (1.57) (3.52) (1.62) (3.56) (1.59) (3.55) 
𝐴𝑡 2.05 0.76 2.07 0.78 2.05 0.77 
 (4.64) (3.07) (4.68) (3.13) (4.66) (3.12) 
R2 0.81 0.92 0.81 0.92 0.81 0.92 
 
Table 4-3 shows the regression results for both best and total depth. In contrast to 
Hendershott et al. (2011), the relationship between algorithmic trading volume and 
subsequent market depth is insignificant for both depth measures. 
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Table 4-4 
Volatility and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks 
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The 
regression models are specified as follows: 
𝜎𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜎𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1  + 𝛽5𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽6𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
𝜎𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝜎𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  + 𝛽5𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽6𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
where 𝜎𝑡 is the intraday high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic 
total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) ratio, respectively; 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 represents the percentage 
bid-ask spread (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1) and effective spread (𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1) during time interval 𝑡; 𝑄𝐷𝑡 represents the 
natural logarithm of the best quoted depth (𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) and total quoted depth (𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) during time 
interval 𝑡; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a 
random error term. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the 
units for presentation, the coefficient for Constant, 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1, 𝑁𝑇𝑡, 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1, 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1, 𝑀𝑡, and 𝐴𝑡 are 
multiplied by 104. 
 
  Total Buy Sell 
 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 
Constant -1.60 -1.60 17.60 32.00 -1.40 -1.40 17.90 32.20 -1.40 -1.40 17.80 32.10 
 (-1.06) (-1.05) (5.14) (5.72) (-0.69) (-0.68) (5.43) (5.92) (-0.79) (-0.78) (5.41) (5.87) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.04 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.20 
 (0.84) (0.84) (0.73) (0.56) (0.32) (0.32) (0.17) (0.06) (0.64) (0.64) (0.53) (0.40) 
𝑁𝑇𝑡 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 (8.77) (8.77) (8.35) (8.45) (8.78) (8.78) (8.36) (8.45) (8.78) (8.78) (8.37) (8.46) 
𝜎𝑡−1 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 
 (43.74) (43.74) (47.32) (46.20) (43.74) (43.75) (47.38) (46.28) (43.78) (43.78) (47.44) (46.33) 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 0.56    0.58    0.58    
 (6.22)    (6.29)    (6.28)    
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1  -1.40    -1.40    -1.40   
  (-4.45)    (-4.54)    (-4.52)   
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1   0.38    0.38    0.38  
   (6.22)    (6.28)    (6.27)  
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1    -2.40    -2.40    -2.40 
    (-5.34)    (-5.40)    (-5.37) 
𝑀𝑡 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.10 
 (-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.34) (-0.31) (-0.58) (-0.57) (-0.34) (-0.30) 
𝐴𝑡 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 
 (2.30) (2.30) (2.47) (2.42) (2.29) (2.29) (2.46) (2.41) (2.29) (2.29) (2.47) (2.42) 
R2 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
 
The last market quality variable examined is volatility. The literature examining 
algorithmic and high frequency trading find that the presence of algorithmic trading 
does not contribute to higher volatility, and may actually lower it (Hendershott and 
Riordan, 2011). Hendershott and Riordan (2011) suggest that algorithmic trading is 
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more likely to dampen volatility than to increase it, as ATs can monitor the market and 
demand liquidity when it is cheap and supply liquidity when it is expensive, thereby 
moderating changes in liquidity. Table 4-4 shows the relation between algorithmic 
trading volume on subsequent volatility. In line with Hendershott and Riordan (2011), 
algorithmic trading does not contribute to higher volatility. Across all regression 
specifications, the coefficients on algorithmic trading variables are not distinguishable 
from zero, consistent with the first hypothesis (H4,1). 
 
4.4.2 Algorithmic Trading Volume during Periods of Market Stress 
 
The results in the previous section show that market quality is not associated with 
lagged algorithmic trading volume (except for the total ratio). This is similar to other 
studies finding that algorithmic trading does not result in a deterioration in market 
quality. However, Kirilenko et al. (2011) document that algorithmic trading had a 
negative impact on the market during one period of extreme market stress. Examining 
the flash crash of May 6, 2010, the authors find that HFT was not responsible for the 
crash, though their responses exacerbated market volatility during the period. 
Kirilenko et al. (2011) find that HFTs exhibit trading patterns inconsistent with 
traditional market makers, through trading aggressively in the direction of price 
changes and not accumulating significant inventory positions. Thus, HFTs do not 
supply liquidity when prices move against their trading position. Further, they can 
exacerbate price movements by competing for liquidity as they try to rebalance their 
inventory positions. The results of Kirilenko et al. (2011), however, apply to one 
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extreme event. It is unknown whether such behaviour is representative of algorithmic 
trading during less extreme market episodes. 
 
To test this, each time interval is classified into up and down intervals for each stock, 
based on whether the return is positive or non-positive. This is defined as: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑈𝑝 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖𝑡 < 0
  
and 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 ≡ 1 −   𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑈𝑝  
 
The following regression models are then estimated for each stock: 
 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ +  𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− + 𝛽3𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
𝑄𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ +  𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− + 𝛽3𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽5𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  + 𝛽6𝑀𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
𝜎𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− + 𝛽3𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1  + 𝛽6𝑀𝑡   + 𝛽7𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
𝜎𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− + 𝛽3𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽5𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  + 𝛽6𝑀𝑡   + 𝛽7𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼0𝑡−1
+  ≡  𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 ×  𝐷𝑡−1
𝑈𝑝  and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
−  ≡ 𝐷𝑡−1
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛. The findings of 
Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2011) suggest that algorithmic trading can have a 
negative impact on trading during market downturns if algorithmic trading increase 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
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their demand for liquidity, or reduce their supply of liquidity, as total liquidity 
contracts, or both. 
Table 4-5 shows the results for bid-ask spreads and effective spreads. Panel A 
of Table 4-5 shows that lagged algorithmic trading volume is positively related to bid-
ask spreads and effective spreads only for down intervals. This positive relation is 
significant during down intervals with an average t-statistic of 2.97 for both bid-ask 
spreads and effective spreads, and insignificant for up intervals with an average t-
statistic of 1.64 and 1.63, respectively. These results are consistent across buy and sell 
trades, with the coefficients in the regressions for both spread measures positive and 
significant for down intervals, and insignificant for up intervals. These results show 
that the relation between market quality and lagged algorithmic trading volume is not 
independent of market conditions, suggesting that the findings of Kirilenko et al. 
(2011) can be extended to less extreme market falls. 
The results for market depth are shown in Table 4-6. After controlling for 
lagged depth and volatility, intraday variation and trading activity, total depth is 
significantly and negatively related to lagged algorithmic trading volume. Examining 
all trades, the average coefficient on the lagged algorithmic trading volume during 
down intervals is significantly negative with an average t-statistic of -2.97. The 
relationship between lagged algorithmic trading volume and market depth is, 
however, insignificant when 𝑄𝐷𝑡 is computed using the best quotes (average t-
statistic of -1.96), suggesting that the main impact of lagged algorithmic trading 
volume is on depth throughout the limit order book. Similar to the spread results, 𝛽1 
is insignificant for both best and total depth. The results are similar for buys and sells, 
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with 𝛽1 being insignificant across both best and total depth, while 𝛽2 is significantly 
negative for total depth, not best depth. 
Table 4-5 
Percentage Spreads and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume during Up and Down 
Markets 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks 
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The 
regression model is specified as follows: 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− +  𝛽3𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽7𝐴𝑡  
+  𝜀𝑡 
where 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡  represents the percentage bid-ask spread (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1) and effective spread (𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1) during 
time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
+ and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
− denote the algorithmic trading variables on up and down 
intervals, respectively; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) 
ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the intraday 
high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random error term. 
Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units for 
presentation, the coefficients for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ , 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− , 𝑁𝑇𝑡, 𝑀𝑡, and 𝐴𝑡are multiplied by 10
5, and those 
for Constant, 𝜎𝑡−1, 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1, and 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 are multiplied by 10
2. 
 
  Total Buy Sell 
  𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  
Constant 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (11.82) (11.74) (12.64) (12.56) (12.47) (12.39) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
+ 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
 (1.64) (1.63) (0.46) (0.46) (0.94) (0.93) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
− 3.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 
 (2.97) (2.97) (2.04) (2.04) (2.71) (2.71) 
𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 
 (-2.16) (-2.16) (-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.15) 
𝜎𝑡−1 1.07 1.62 1.07 1.61 1.07 1.61 
 (6.27) (6.26) (6.23) (6.22) (6.23) (6.23) 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 84.71  84.80  84.79  
 (134.93)  (136.15)  (136.04)  
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1  84.68  84.77  84.76 
  (134.16)  (135.37)  (135.26) 
𝑀𝑡 -2.00 -3.00 -2.00 -3.00 -2.00 -3.00 
 (-2.45) (-2.44) (-2.49) (-2.48) (-2.48) (-2.47) 
𝐴𝑡 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.77) (0.77) (0.68) (0.67) (0.73) (0.73) 
R2 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.78 
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Table 4-6 
Quoted Depths and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume during Up and Down 
Markets 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks 
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The 
regression model is specified as follows: 
𝑄𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− +  𝛽3𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽7𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡   
where 𝑄𝐷𝑡  represents the natural logarithm of the best quoted depth (𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) and total quoted depth 
(𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) during time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
+ and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
− denote the algorithmic trading variables on up 
and down intervals, respectively; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1), and sell 
(𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the 
intraday high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random 
error term. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-
statistics are in parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units 
for presentation, the coefficient for 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is multiplied by 10
4, and the coefficients for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ , 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− , 𝑀𝑡, and 𝐴𝑡 are multiplied by 10
2. 
 
 Total Buy Sell 
  𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 
Constant 1.18 0.56 1.16 0.55 1.17 0.55 
 (27.77) (19.41) (28.20) (19.54) (28.41) (19.61) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
+ -1.46 -0.48 -0.05 0.12 -1.81 -0.32 
 (-1.01) (-0.87) (-0.02) (0.04) (-0.82) (-0.35) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
− -2.10 -1.48 -1.58 -1.65 -2.50 -1.89 
 (-1.96) (-2.97) (-1.36) (-2.54) (-1.88) (-2.94) 
𝑁𝑇𝑡 3.30 -0.20 3.30 -0.20 3.20 -0.20 
 (3.49) (-0.15) (3.42) (-0.19) (3.42) (-0.20) 
𝜎𝑡−1 -7.02 -2.47 -6.97 -2.44 -6.96 -2.44 
 (-7.75) (-5.11) (-7.71) (-5.05) (-7.72) (-5.06) 
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 0.88  0.88  0.88  
 (244.37)  (246.75)  (246.39)  
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  0.95  0.95  0.95 
  (485.73)  (489.58)  (489.45) 
𝑀𝑡 1.24 1.16 1.27 1.17 1.26 1.17 
 (1.67) (3.48) (1.71) (3.51) (1.69) (3.50) 
𝐴𝑡 2.12 2.12 2.15 2.12 2.13 2.12 
 (4.61) (3.09) (4.65) (3.16) (4.62) (3.12) 
R2 0.79 0.91 0.79 0.91 0.79 0.91 
 
The results for volatility presented in Table 4-7 are similar, with a rise in lagged 
algorithmic trading volume generally being related to an increase in volatility during 
periods of decreasing prices, though not during periods of increasing prices. Focusing 
on 𝛽1 for all trades using 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 as a regressor, the average coefficient is negative 
with an average t-statistic of -0.44. The average coefficient estimate for 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡
− , 
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however, is positive with an average t-statistic of 2.30. Similar results are found using 
effective spreads and both depth measures as control variables. These results hold for 
both buys and sells. 
In line with previous literature, the results in Section 4.4.1 indicate that higher 
algorithmic trading volume in the market is not associated with a deterioration in 
market quality. In contrast, this section suggests that such results could be biased as 
they fail to take into account the direction of prices. Dividing the sample into periods 
of increasing and decreasing prices, results reveal that lagged algorithmic trading 
volume is related to a reduction in liquidity and an increase in volatility during periods 
when the market is falling, and has no association with market quality during periods 
when the market is increasing. This is consistent with the second hypothesis (H4,2). 
This aligns with the findings such as Kirilenko et al. (2011) that document that 
algorithmic trading had a negative impact on the market during periods of market 
stress. 
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Table 4-7 
Volatility on Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume during Up and Down Markets 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 stocks ASX 
stocks based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. 
The regression models are specified as follows: 
𝜎𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ +  𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− +  𝛽3𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑡   +  𝛽7𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
𝜎𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ +  𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
− + 𝛽3𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝑄𝐷𝑡−1  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑡   + 𝛽7𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
where 𝜎𝑡 is the intraday high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡; 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡  represents the 
percentage bid-ask spread (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1) and effective spread (𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1) during time interval 𝑡; 𝑄𝐷𝑡  
represents the natural logarithm of the best quoted depth (𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) and total quoted depth (𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) 
during time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
+ and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
− denote the algorithmic trading variables on up and down 
intervals, respectively; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) 
ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the intraday 
high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random error term. 
Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units for 
presentation, the coefficients for Constant, 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
+, 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
−, 𝑁𝑇𝑡, BQDt−1, 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1, 𝑀𝑡, and 𝐴𝑡 are 
multiplied by 104, and those for 𝜎𝑡−1, 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1, and 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 are multiplied by 10
2. 
 
  Total Buy Sell 
 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡  𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡  𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡  𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡  𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 
Constant -2.10 -2.10 25.10 41.60 -2.00 -1.90 24.90 41.20 -2.00 -1.90 41.50 41.50 
 (-1.24) (-1.23) (6.02) (6.41) (-0.94) (-0.93) (6.22) (6.56) (-1.00) (-0.99) (6.56) (6.56) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
+ -0.80 -0.80 -1.30 -1.40 -1.30 -1.30 -1.90 -2.00 -2.20 -2.20 -2.70 -2.70 
 (-0.44) (-0.44) (-1.04) (-1.10) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-1.35) (-1.39) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.70) (-1.70) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
− 2.20 2.30 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.70 2.70 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 (2.30) (2.31) (2.06) (2.04) (2.13) (2.13) (2.03) (2.04) (2.74) (2.74) (2.70) (2.70) 
𝑁𝑇𝑡 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 (8.77) (8.77) (8.44) (8.51) (8.77) (8.77) (8.43) (8.49) (8.78) (8.78) (8.51) (8.51) 
𝜎𝑡−1 70.25 71.80 70.26 71.38 70.19 71.76 70.19 71.33 70.24 71.39 70.24 71.39 
 (42.80) (46.54) (42.81) (45.45) (42.76) (46.55) (42.77) (45.47) (42.82) (45.54) (42.82) (45.54) 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 59.75    59.94    59.96    
 (5.93)    (6.00)    (5.99)    
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1  39.66    39.78    39.79   
  (5.93)    (5.99)    (5.98)   
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1   -2.10    -2.10    -3.20  
   (-5.50)    (-5.51)    (-6.15)  
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1    -3.20    -3.20    -3.20 
    (-6.18)    (-6.13)    (-6.15) 
𝑀𝑡 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.40 
 (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.17) (-0.10) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.09) (-0.09) 
𝐴𝑡 1.80 1.80 2.00 1.90 1.80 1.80 2.00 1.90 1.80 1.80 1.90 1.90 
 (2.30) (2.30) (2.57) (2.47) (2.29) (2.29) (2.56) (2.46) (2.31) (2.31) (2.50) (2.50) 
R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
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4.4.4 Feedback Trading and Market Quality 
 
The findings of Kirilenko et al.(2011) imply that algorithmic trading could harm market 
quality during price declines if they increase their demand for liquidity during these 
periods. Kaniel et al. (2008) argue that contrarian traders act as liquidity providers. 
Institutional investors requiring immediacy offer price concessions to encourage other 
investors to take the other side of the trade. Momentum traders conversely act as 
liquidity demanders. Herding and positive-feedback trading may result in a reduction 
in market quality (Culter et al., 1990). 
 
To test whether ATs systematically engage in herding and positive-feedback trading, 
the following regression is estimated: 
 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽4𝑀𝑡   + 𝛽5𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
 
where the algorithmic trading buy and sell ratios are examined separately to 
determine whether ATs systematically reduce their buying, and increase their selling, 
during price declines. Table 6-14 shows that 𝛽1 is significantly negative for buys and 
significantly positive for sells; t-statistics are very large, being -12.98 for buys and 
12.59 for sells. These results indicate a certain degree of herding by ATs. ATs reduce 
their buying in stocks with falling prices, while increasing their selling. This lends 
support to the conjecture that ATs increase their demand for liquidity during price 
falls, and that this reduces market quality, which is consistent with previous studies 
(6.16) 
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examining the trading strategies of ATs (Anand and Venkataraman, 2013; ASIC 2012; 
Korajczyk and Murphy 2014; Hu, 2013; Golub et al., 2012). 
 
Table 6-14 
Momentum Trading During Down Markets 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks 
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to March 6, 2009. The 
regression model is specified as follows: 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑡  +  𝛽5𝐴𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 
is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random error term. 
Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-statistics are in 
parentheses. To adjust the units for presentation, the coefficients for 𝐷𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛, 𝑁𝑇𝑡, 𝑀𝑡, and 𝐴𝑡 are 
multiplied by 102. 
  Buy Ratio Sell Ratio 
Constant 0.10 0.09 
 (42.44) (37.53) 
𝐷𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 -2.61 2.41 
 (-12.98) (12.59) 
𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-1.16) (-1.06) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 0.65 0.65 
 (114.69) (112.91) 
𝑀𝑡 -0.39 -0.25 
 (-2.09) (-1.45) 
𝐴𝑡 -0.40 -0.56 
 (-2.13) (-2.85) 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
As a consequence of advances in technology, order execution in financial markets has 
changed dramatically. Instead of trades being entered manually by brokers, orders are 
increasingly being conducted by computer algorithms that either seek to minimise 
market impact or to profit from proprietary trading opportunities. The growth in this 
new form of trading, with its high speed and sophistication, has generated concern on 
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the part of regulators, exchanges, investors and journalists on the impact of ATs on 
market integrity and quality. As data on ATs has become available, a number of studies 
have begun to examine the effect of algorithmic trading on market quality. Despite 
this, few studies examine the impact of algorithmic trading during adverse market 
environments.  
In this chapter, the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality is assessed 
over different market conditions. Over the whole sample period, results provide no 
evidence that AT volume has an impact on market quality. However, when the sample 
is split into increasing and decreasing stock returns, results show that AT is negatively 
associated with future market quality when prices are falling and has no relation when 
prices are rising. The negative impact of AT on market quality is explained by 
algorithmic traders engaging in positive-feedback trading, in which they reduce their 
buying and increase their selling of securities during periods of falling prices. 
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Chapter 5: Execution Costs of Option Strategy Trades 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The literature reviewed in Section 2.2 provide a number of insights into how option 
market makers set the bid-ask spread. Specifically, market makers adjust prices in 
response to information asymmetry and hedging costs (including the costs of hedging 
delta, vega and gamma risks). The implication is that transaction costs in option 
markets will be greater when hedging and adverse selection costs increase. The 
literature on this issue examines outright option trades; the execution costs of option 
strategies and its determinants are yet to be investigated. This is a result of data being 
unavailable to conduct this line of research. Option strategies (such as straddles and 
butterfly spreads) allow market participants to combine options to either speculate 
on future volatility, or to speculate on directional movements with greater flexibility. 
Despite the prominence of option strategies documented in recent empirical studies 
(e.g., Lakonishok et al., 2007), literature on the transaction costs of option strategies 
is sparse. 
The objective of this essay is to bridge the gap in the literature by examining 
the execution costs of option strategies. More specifically, it documents the size of 
execution costs of option strategies relative to outright options on the Australian 
Options Market (AOM) and examines whether any differences can be attributed to 
differences in market making and adverse selection costs. The remainder of this 
chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides institutional details of the AOM. 
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Section 5.2 outlines the hypotheses on option strategies. Section 5.3 presents the data 
and descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 outlines the research design and presents the 
results. Section 5.5 summarises the chapter. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses on Option Strategies 
 
The two principal approaches to modeling market maker behaviour are inventory 
control models and adverse selection models. The level of inventory holding costs and 
adverse selection costs differ across financial markets. Options market makers face 
unique risks in managing inventory and adverse selection costs. Relative to equity 
market makers, they have less control over their inventory positions (Lakonishock et 
al., 2007). As a result of this, hedging is an integral part of the mechanics of market 
making in options markets (Battalio and Schulz, 2011). The literature suggests that 
options market makers face the following three types of hedging costs; delta cost is 
the cost of setting up a hedging portfolio; vega (gamma) cost is the cost incurred in 
maintaining a hedged portfolio as the underlying stock volatility (delta) changes over 
time. The presence of these dimensions of risk increases the difficulty of the market 
maker’s hedging in options markets.  
Empirical findings show that option market makers adjust prices to account for 
these hedging costs (Jameson and Wilhelm, 1992, Cho and Engle, 1999, Kaul et al., 
2004, Patrella, 2006, Landsiedl, 2005, and Engle and Neri, 2010). For example, Wei 
and Zheng (2010) show that bid-ask spreads adjust to changes in a number of liquidity 
determinants affecting a market maker’s inventory-holding costs. The authors show 
that over half the time series variation in the bid-ask spread is explained by changes 
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in an option’s time-to-maturity, moneyness, stock return volatility, option return 
volatility, option trading volume and option price.  
The particular features of option markets may also attract informed investors. 
Options offer greater leverage relative to equity markets (Black, 1975). This greater 
leverage may induce investors with short-lived information to favour the use of 
options (Charkravarty et al. 2004). The literature shows option market makers adjust 
prices to account for changes in information asymmetry (Bartram et al., 2008; Ahn et 
al., 2008).  
Option trades do not necessarily have to involve a trade in a single option 
series but can simultaneously involve a number of different options with different 
strike prices, exercise dates etc. For instance, a trader who seeks to profit from 
changes to the security’s volatility can engage in option strategies such as straddles or 
strangles, which involve the simultaneous buying of a put and call option in the same 
option series. These present risks to the market maker that are different to trading 
outright options. Relative to outright option trades, the greater complexity of strategy 
trades means that options market makers will incur higher hedging costs for option 
strategy trades. This is because the market maker takes into account the cost of 
hedging a newly created position by trading component options separately. For 
example, consider a market maker who has received a quote request for a straddle. 
Setting the quotes, the market maker takes into account the cost of hedging a newly 
created position by trading component options separately. It follows that the market 
maker requires higher liquidity premiums for strategy-linked options than outright 
options. Further, a likely consequence is that strategy-linked options trade at less 
advantageous prices than outright options, unless option strategy traders are 
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consistently (and considerably) superior at timing the market to traders who trade 
outright options. 
Furthermore, the diversity of option strategies allows traders to combine 
options to either speculate on future volatility while eliminating exposure to 
directional risks, or to speculate on directional movements while eliminating the 
volatility of the underlying, thereby reducing risk. Informed traders may take 
advantage of this by engaging in option strategies over outright options. Fahlenbrach 
and Sandås (2010) demonstrate that volatility-based option strategies predict future 
realised volatility. It is therefore hypothesised that the market maker requires higher 
liquidity premiums for strategy trades.  
 
Hypothesis5.1: Execution costs for option strategy trades are higher relative to outright 
option trades. 
 
Option strategies have different levels of complexity. For example, a straddle consists 
of simultaneously purchasing or selling a put and call option at the same strike price, 
whereas a butterfly trade consists of selling four put or call options at three different 
strike prices. As the market maker takes into account the cost of hedging a newly 
created position by trading component options separately, hedging costs for strategy 
trades will be higher for option strategies with greater complexity due to the greater 
number of option components.  
 
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis5.2: The execution costs of option strategies increase as a function of their 
complexity. 
 
As discussed, market makers’ quote setting strategies are affected by information 
asymmetry and inventory-holding costs (e.g., Ho and Stoll, 1981, Easley and O’Hara, 
1987). Furthermore, option strategies generate higher hedging costs for market 
makers and may contain information about future returns and volatility. This suggest 
that the differences in transaction costs between option strategies and outright 
options can be explained by differences in the level of information asymmetry and 
hedging costs of option strategies relative to outright options. This leads to the 
following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis5.3: Market makers face higher levels of information asymmetry trading 
option strategies relative to outright options. 
 
Hypothesis5.4: Market makers face higher hedging costs trading option strategies 
relative to outright options. 
 
5.3 Australian Options Market 
 
The Australian Options Market (AOM) is a quasi-limit order book market where 
liquidity is supplied by public limit orders and designated market makers. Limit orders 
and market maker quotes are ranked on a price/time priority basis. The amount of 
liquidity supplied by limit orders is minimal relative to market makers, meaning that 
131 
 
the AOM can be considered to be a dealer market. The AOM offers market makers fee 
incentives for meeting certain benchmark quoting requirements. Each market maker, 
assigned two or more underlying assets, can choose to make a market on a continuous 
basis, in response to quote requests, or both. Market makers who choose to make a 
market on a continuous basis are obliged to provide orders continuously for certain 
percentages of time, in 18 series per underlying security, encompassing three calls and 
three puts in any three of the next six expiry months. Market makers who choose to 
make a market in response to quote requests are monitored on their provision of 
orders on request for certain percentages of the time for all series up to nine months 
maturity. Liquidity is assisted when there are multiple market makers in a class; 
however, as market makers are not required to provide quotes in all series, or at all 
times, there is no guarantee that all series will have prices displayed.  
Option strategies on the AOM are referred to as combination trades. Trading 
of option strategies on the AOM takes place through the central limit order book using 
a special trade facility. Use of this facility has important advantages over the central 
order book for strategy trades. First, execution risk is reduced by trading all legs of the 
strategy simultaneously, particularly if the option legs include highly illiquid options. 
Second, the risk of adverse price movements, while executing each leg of the strategy, 
is removed. 
There are two main types of combination orders (“strategy orders”, hereafter) 
executed on the AOM; standard and tailor-made strategies. Standard strategies are 
limited to common strategies prescribed by the AOM. Tailor-made strategies provide 
the flexibility to define particular single series components of the strategy, having 
greater complexity than standard strategies. For each type of strategy, a trader 
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executes a trade by entering a quote in the special trade facility for each leg of the 
strategy. When a particular strategy is created, it is assigned a unique strategy series 
identifier. The order is then assigned with all other orders with the same unique 
identifier, based on price/time priority against the other strategies. For a trade to 
occur, another trader may trade against the strategy order, matching all legs included 
in the strategy or the AOM matches the strategy with orders that are currently in the 
market for each option. 
 
5.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data are obtained from an internal database from the AOM. The sample consists 
of trade by trade data for all equity options listed on the AOM. For each transaction, 
data include the underlying stock, date, time (to the nearest millisecond), price, and 
volume. The sample period extends from January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2007. The 
sample is restricted to normal trading hours for the options market (9:30a.m. - 
4:20p.m. during the sample period), and includes all options traded on a sample of 20 
stocks displaying the highest option volume (including both puts and calls) over the 
sample period. The trade record includes a flag for trades that are part of strategies, 
and this is further segregated into either standard or tailor-made combinations. 
The internal AOM data are combined with order book data sourced from 
Reuters Data Scope Tick History provided by Securities Industry Research Centre of 
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The data provide the prices of the best bid and ask quotes, time 
stamped to the nearest millisecond. To determine the direction of each strategy trade, 
Sackickas and Wilson’s (2003) quote rule is used: trades are determined as buyer- or 
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seller-initiated according to whether the trade price is above or below the bid-ask 
midpoint. As the quotes for strategy trades are unavailable, this study implies quotes 
based on the quotes given on the limit order book for the individual components. 
Trades that have no corresponding quotes (which may occur for strategy trades), or 
trade at the bid-ask mid-point, are removed. 
Table 5-1 reports the average price, the average daily number of contracts 
traded, average moneyness, and time to maturity (TTM) for strategy-linked trades and 
outright trades, separately. The sample consists of a total of 775,390 transactions, of 
which 287,042 are strategy-linked trades: 259,134 tailor-made strategy-linked trades 
and 27,908 standard strategy-linked trades. This suggests that option strategies 
constitute a considerable proportion of option trading volume on the AOM. The 
moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) price divided by the 
strike (spot) price for call (put) options. TTM is calculated as the difference between 
the current date of the option and the expiry date. Underlying volatility is calculated 
as the natural logarithm of the difference between the daily high and low prices of the 
underlying stock. 
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Table 5-1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for tailor-made strategy-linked (TM), standard strategy-linked 
(SS), and outright options. Panel A describes the full sample. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics 
across three moneyness categories. The moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) 
price divided by the strike (spot) price for call (put) options. Moneyness is defined as at-the-money 
(ATM) if it is between 0.9 and 1.1, in-the-money (ITM) if greater than 1.1, and out-of-the money (OTM) 
if less than 0.9. Panel C splits the sample into three time-to-maturity (TTM) categories. In Panel D, the 
sample is divided into volume categories: each trading day, each option series is partitioned into one 
of three categories based on the number of trades. Number of Trades is the daily average number of 
trades. Trade Premium is the average of the options premiums ($). Moneyness is the average 
moneyness. Time to Maturity is the average time to maturity (days). Trade Size is the average trade size 
(contracts). 
 
 
Number of 
Trades 
Trade Premium 
($) 
Moneyness 
Time to Maturity 
(days) 
Trade Size 
(contracts) 
Panel A – Overall           
TM Options 259,134 1.38 1.00 61.81 22.06 
SS Options 27,908 0.69 0.99 30.76 41.15 
Outright Options 488,348 0.97 0.98 51.74 19.12 
Panel B – Moneyness           
TM Options      
ATM 225,539 1.13 1.00 52.94 24.38 
ITM 15,753 5.87 1.21 89.82 6.30 
OTM 17,842 0.52 0.85 149.30 6.68 
SS Options      
ATM 26,105 0.66 0.99 28.87 43.13 
ITM 510 3.49 1.17 46.08 11.08 
OTM 1,293 0.23 0.87 62.85 12.91 
Outright options      
ATM 437,198 0.88 0.99 44.07 20.69 
ITM 12,395 5.77 1.21 117.16 6.53 
OTM 38,755 0.47 0.86 117.31 6.70 
Panel C – Time to Maturity         
TM Options      
> 90 days 39,890 2.57 0.99 239.18 5.31 
30 - 90 days 99,677 1.24 0.99 48.17 16.88 
< 30 days 119,567 1.09 1.01 14.00 31.97 
SS Options      
> 90 days 1,023 1.78 0.98 199.39 6.67 
30 - 90 days 9,322 0.77 0.98 44.14 26.23 
< 30 days 17,563 0.59 0.99 13.84 51.08 
Outright options      
> 90 days 58,527 2.02 0.97 205.00 5.22 
30 - 90 days 196,370 0.96 0.97 49.36 14.07 
< 30 days 233,451 0.72 0.99 15.35 27.07 
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Table 1, continued 
 
Panel D – Volume         
TM Options      
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) 22,298 2.67 1.03 135.00 1.00 
Volume Group 2 38,144 2.07 1.00 102.00 2.61 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) 198,692 1.10 1.00 45.85 28.16 
SS Options      
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) 483 1.73 1.00 96.45 1.00 
Volume Group 2 1,599 1.16 0.98 66.02 2.76 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) 25,826 0.64 0.99 27.35 44.28 
Outright options      
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) 35,842 1.76 0.98 125.00 1.00 
Volume Group 2 67,347 1.38 0.97 89.60 2.59 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) 385,159 0.83 0.98 38.30 23.82 
 
Panel B of Table 5-1 reports the descriptive statistics along three moneyness 
categories: in-the-money options (ITM) where moneyness is greater than 1.1; at-the-
money options (ATM) where moneyness is between 0.9 and 1.1; and out-of-the-
money options (OTM) where moneyness is less than 0.9. The majority of trades are 
concentrated in ATM options (89% of all trades). Average moneyness ranges from 
0.853 for OTM options to 1.212 for ITM options. Panel C of Table 5-1 reports summary 
statistics divided into three TTM categories; greater than 90 days, between 30 and 90 
days, and less than 30 days to maturity. Trades that are less than 30 days to maturity 
make up the greatest proportion of the sample. There is a significant range in 
maturities between option series, with TTM for long-term options averaging over 200 
days, while short-term options average less than 15 days. Panel D of Table 5-1 reports 
summary statistics according to volume categories based on the number of trades 
during a trading day. 
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Panel B of Table 5-1 reports the descriptive statistics along three moneyness 
categories: in-the-money options (ITM) where moneyness is greater than 1.1; at-the-
money options (ATM) where moneyness is between 0.9 and 1.1; and out-of-the-
money options (OTM) where moneyness is less than 0.9. The majority of trades are 
concentrated in ATM options (89% of all trades). Average moneyness ranges from 
0.853 for OTM options to 1.212 for ITM options. Panel C of Table 5-1 reports summary 
statistics divided into three TTM categories; greater than 90 days, between 30 and 90 
days, and less than 30 days to maturity. Trades that are less than 30 days to maturity 
make up the greatest proportion of the sample. There is a significant range in 
maturities between option series, with TTM for long-term options averaging over 200 
days, while short-term options average less than 15 days. Panel D of Table 5-1 reports 
summary statistics according to volume categories based on the number of trades 
during a trading day. 
 
5.5 Research Design and Empirical Results 
 
5.5.1 Transaction Costs 
 
This section investigates whether outright options and options that constitute 
strategies (“strategy-linked options”, hereafter) differ in execution costs using the 
percentage effective spread. A standard measure of liquidity used in the literature is 
the bid-ask spread. The quoted bid-ask spread, which is simply the difference between 
the bid and ask prices, captures the ex-ante costs transaction costs of undertaking a 
transaction (O’Hara, 1995). Christie and Huang (1994) suggest that using the relative 
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quoted spread is more appropriate as it takes into account the value of the security. 
Finally, Peterson and Fialkowski (1994) suggest that the quoted spread is not a true 
reflection of execution costs as a trader could place an order inside the quoted bid-
ask spread, resulting in a lower execution cost. In line with Bessembinder (2003), the 
percentage effective spread is calculated as: 
 
                              𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 200% × 𝐷𝑖 ×
(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖−𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑖)
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑖
                         (5.1) 
 
where 𝐷𝑖  is a trade direction indicator variable (𝐷𝑖  =  1 for a buy order, 𝐷𝑖  = − 1 for 
a sell order), 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖  is the price of the trade,  and 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑖 is the mid-quote prior to the 
trade. Table 4-2 reports percentage effective spreads for outright options, tailor-made 
strategy-linked (“TM”, hereafter), and standard strategy-linked (“SS”, hereafter) 
options by option type. The average percentage effective spread for outright options 
over the entire sample is 8.31%. Percentage Effective spreads for both TM (13.69%) 
options and SS options (10.72%) are significantly greater than those for outright 
options at the 1% level. Results also reveal that percentage effective spreads for TM 
options are significantly greater than those for SS options at the 1% level. 
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Table 5-2 
Percentage Effective Spreads 
 
This table reports percentage effective spreads for tailor-made strategy-linked (TM), standard strategy-
linked (SS), and outright options across call and put option trades. TM – Outright is the difference in 
effective spreads between TM and outright options. SS – Outright is the difference in effective spreads 
between SS and outright options. TM – SS is the difference in effective spreads between TM and SS 
options. The t-test is used to test the deviation of the mean values from zero. ** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
  Call Put All 
Panel A - Option Types 
TM Options 11.30 15.40 13.69 
SS Options 8.81 12.23 10.72 
Outright Options 7.61 9.17 8.31 
Panel B - Difference in Percentage Effective Spreads 
TM – Outright 3.69** 6.23** 5.38** 
SS – Outright 1.21** 3.06** 2.40** 
TM – SS  2.49** 3.18** 2.98** 
 
 
To examine whether option characteristics drive percentage effective spreads to be 
higher for strategy-linked options relative to outright options, the sample is 
partitioned into moneyness categories. Within each moneyness category, it is further 
separated into TTM categories. Finally, within each TTM category, the sample is 
categorized into three groups by trading volume. Volume categories are based on the 
number of trades during the day. Volume group 1 (3) includes option series with the 
lowest (greatest) number of trades each day. 
Table 5-3 reveals that percentage effective spreads for TM options are 
significantly higher than those for outright options at the 1% level across all 
moneyness, TTM, and volume categories. Table 5-4 shows that for the majority of 
trades (97 per cent), SS options have higher execution costs than outright options at 
the 1% level. Percentage effective spreads for SS options are significantly higher for 
all ATM options at the 1% level, except for options in the lowest volume group with a 
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TTM between 30-90 days and greater than 90 days. SS options cost significantly higher 
for one of the ITM option categories and significantly higher for the majority of OTM 
options at the 1% level. Table 5-5 reveals that TM options are significantly more costly 
to trade than SS options at the 1% level only for a few subsets of the sample. In the 
ATM sample, for the majority of trades, TM options are significantly more expense to 
trade than SS options at the 1% level. However, differences in percentage effective 
spreads between the two groups are not significantly different for six of the nine ITM 
categories. Also, the OTM sample shows that percentage effective spreads for TM 
options are significantly wider than SS options at the 1% level only for a few trades. 
Supporting hypotheses H5,1 the results overall reveal that execution costs for 
(both TM and SS) strategy-linked options are greater than those for outright options. 
On the contrary to hypothesis H5,2, between the two strategy-linked options option 
categories, this study does not provide strong evidence that TM options are more 
costly to trade than SS options. This implies that market makers require higher 
liquidity premiums for (both TM and SS) strategy-linked options relative to outright 
options regardless of option characteristics, but they do not strongly discriminate 
between TM and SS options in setting quotes. 
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Table 5-3 
Percentage Effective Spreads by Volume, Moneyness, and Time to Maturity for TM and Outright Options 
 
This table reports percentage effective spreads for tailor-made strategy-linked (TM) and outright options for volume categories within each of the moneyness and time-to-
maturity categories. Volume categories are partitioned into three categories from the lowest to the highest based on the number of trades during a trading day. The 
moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) price divided by the strike (spot) price for call (put) options. Moneyness is defined as (at-the-money) ATM if it 
is between 0.9 and 1.1, in-the-money (ITM) if greater than 1.1, and out-of-the-money (OTM) if less than 0.9. Time to Maturity is the number of days to expiry. Number of 
Trades is the average number of trades. Difference is the difference in percentage effective spreads between TM and outright options. The t-test is used to test the deviation 
of the mean values from zero. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
      TM Options Outright Options  
 Moneyness 
Time to Maturity 
(days) 
Percentage 
Effective Spreads 
(%) 
Number of 
Trades 
Percentage 
Effective Spreads 
(%) 
Number of 
Trades 
Difference 
(TM - Outright) 
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ATM > 90 8.25 7090 4.30 10,458 3.95** 
Volume Group 2 ATM > 90 8.25 8410 4.22 13,032 4.03** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM > 90 7.89 12,175 3.75 16,452 4.14** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ATM 30 – 90 11.77 5,588 6.60 10,865 5.17** 
Volume Group 2 ATM 30 – 90 11.46 12,906 6.21 26,540 5.25** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM 30 – 90 10.03 69,405 5.30 138,451 4.73** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ATM < 30 21.55 2,364 18.49 4,018 3.06** 
Volume Group 2 ATM < 30 19.95 7,257 15.28 13,106 4.67** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM < 30 15.33 98,811 9.29 204,276 6.04** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM > 90 4.77 1,512 2.15 1,493 2.62** 
Volume Group 2 ITM > 90 5.32 1,330 2.64 1,362 2.68** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM > 90 4.74 1,304 1.96 1,255 2.78** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM 30 – 90 4.59 1,167 2.65 890 1.94** 
Volume Group 2 ITM 30 – 90 4.95 1,395 2.53 1,077 2.42** 
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Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM 30 – 90 5.82 1,985 3.09 1,646 2.73** 
Table 3, continued 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM < 30 3.60 1,042 2.47 676 1.13** 
Volume Group 2 ITM < 30 4.58 1,760 2.73 1,108 1.85** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM < 30 6.79 4,160 2.97 2,888 3.82** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM > 90 24.91 1,989 11.66 3,879 13.25** 
Volume Group 2 OTM > 90 25.44 2,292 11.62 4,756 13.82** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM > 90 26.08 3,495 9.49 5,840 16.59** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM 30 – 90 46.23 1,106 23.93 1,106 22.30** 
Volume Group 2 OTM 30 – 90 40.79 1,810 20.82 4,821 19.97** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM 30 – 90 33.62 3,761 16.18 9,377 17.44** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM < 30 69.85 201 46.73 860 23.12** 
Volume Group 2 OTM < 30 63.84 486 42.63 1,545 21.21** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM < 30 48.35 1,873 30.24 4,974 18.11** 
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Table 5-4 
Percentage Effective Spreads by Volume, Moneyness, and Time to Maturity for SS and Outright Options 
 
This table reports percentage effective spreads for standard strategy-linked (SS) and outright options for volume categories within each of the moneyness and time-to-
maturity categories. Volume categories are partitioned into three categories from the lowest to the highest based on the number of trades during a trading day. The 
moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) price divided by the strike (spot) price for call (put) options. Moneyness is defined as (at-the-money) ATM if it 
is between 0.9 and 1.1, in-the-money (ITM) if greater than 1.1, and out-of-the-money (OTM) if less than 0.9. Time to Maturity is the number of days to expiry. Number of 
Trades is the average number of trades. Difference is the difference in percentage effective spreads between TM and outright options. The t-test is used to test the deviation 
of the mean values from zero. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
      SS Options Outright Options  
 Moneyness 
Time to Maturity 
(days) 
Percentage 
Effective Spreads 
(%) 
Number of 
Trades 
Percentage 
Effective Spreads 
(%) 
Number of 
Trades 
Difference 
(SS – Outright) 
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ATM > 90 4.92 120 4.30 10,458 0.60 
Volume Group 2 ATM > 90 4.91 221 4.22 13,032 0.69* 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM > 90 5.12 417 3.75 16,452 1.37** 
        
Volume Group1 (Lowest) ATM 30 – 90 7.05 142 6.60 10,865 0.45 
Volume Group 2 ATM 30 – 90 8.26 573 6.21 26,540 2.05** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM 30 – 90 5.92 7,924 5.30 138,451 0.62** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ATM < 30 27.97 96 18.49 4,018 9.48** 
Volume Group 2 ATM < 30 21.63 468 15.28 13,106 6.35** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM < 30 11.91 16,060 9.29 204,276 2.62** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM > 90 2.97 17 2.15 1,493 0.82 
Volume Group 2 ITM > 90 4.26 20 2.64 1,362 1.62 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM > 90 2.87 19 1.96 1,255 0.91 
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Table 4, continued 
 
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM 30 – 90 2.45 19 2.65 890 -0.20 
Volume Group 2 ITM 30 – 90 5.10 33 2.53 1,077 2.57** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM 30 – 90 4.45 81 3.09 1,646 1.36 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM < 30 2.01 20 2.47 676 -0.46 
Volume Group 2 ITM < 30 3.01 44 2.73 1,108 0.28 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM < 30 3.54 257 2.97 2,888 0.57 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM > 90 15.28 25 11.66 3,879 3.62 
Volume Group 2 OTM > 90 11.17 55 11.61 4,756 -0.44 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM > 90 15.72 126 9.49 5,840 6.23** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM 30 – 90 35.44 24 23.93 24 11.51** 
Volume Group 2 OTM 30 – 90 35.21 102 20.82 4,821 14.39** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM 30 – 90 20.37 413 16.18 9,377 4.19** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM < 30 52.55 14 46.73 860 5.82 
Volume Group 2 OTM < 30 48.79 70 42.63 1,545 6.16 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM < 30 34.55 455 30.24 4,974 4.31** 
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Table 5-5 
Effective Spreads by Volume, Moneyness, and Time to Maturity for TM and SS Options 
 
This table reports percentage effective spreads for tailor-made strategy-linked (TM) and standard strategy-linked (SS) options for volume categories within each of the 
moneyness and time-to-maturity categories. Volume categories are partitioned into three categories from the lowest to the highest based on the number of trades during a 
trading day. The moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) price divided by the strike (spot) price for call (put) options. Moneyness is defined as (at-the-
money) ATM if it is between 0.9 and 1.1, in-the-money (ITM) if greater than 1.1, and out-of-the-money (OTM) if less than 0.9. Time to Maturity is the number of days to 
expiry. Number of Trades is the average number of trades. Difference is the difference in percentage effective spreads between TM and outright options. The t-test is used 
to test the deviation of the mean values from zero. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
      TM Options SS Options  
 Moneyness 
Time to Maturity 
(days) 
Percentage 
Effective Spreads 
(%) 
Number of 
Trades 
Percentage 
Effective Spreads 
(%) 
Number of 
Trades 
Difference 
(TM- SS) 
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ATM > 90 8.25 7,090 4.92 10,458 3.33** 
Volume Group 2 ATM > 90 8.25 8,410 4.91 13,032 3.34** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM > 90 7.89 12,175 5.12 417 2.77** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ATM 30 – 90 11.77 5,588 7.05 142 4.72** 
Volume Group 2 ATM 30 – 90 11.46 12,906 8.26 573 3.20** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM 30 – 90 10.03 69,405 5.92 7,924 4.11** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ATM < 30 21.55 2,364 27.97 96 -6.42 
Volume Group 2 ATM < 30 19.95 7,257 21.63 468 -1.63 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ATM < 30 15.33 98,811 11.91 16,060 3.42** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM > 90 4.77 1,512 2.97 17 1.80 
Volume Group 2 ITM > 90 5.32 1,330 4.26 20 1.06 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM > 90 4.74 1,304 2.87 19 1.87 
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Table 5, continued 
 
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM 30 – 90 4.60 1,167 2.45 19 2.15 
Volume Group 2 ITM 30 – 90 4.95 1,395 5.10 33 -0.15 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM 30 – 90 5.82 1,985 4.45 81 1.37 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) ITM < 30 3.60 1,042 2.01 20 1.59 
Volume Group 2 ITM < 30 4.58 1,760 3.01 44 1.57 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) ITM < 30 6.79 4,160 3.54 257 3.25** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM > 90 24.91 1,989 15.28 25 9.63 
Volume Group 2 OTM > 90 25.44 2,292 11.17 55 14.27** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM > 90 26.08 3,495 15.72 126 10.36** 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM 30 – 90 46.23 1,106 35.44 1,106 10.79 
Volume Group 2 OTM 30 – 90 40.79 1,810 35.21 102 5.58 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM 30 – 90 33.62 3,761 20.37 413 13.25 
        
Volume Group 1 (Lowest) OTM < 30 69.85 201 52.55 14 17.30 
Volume Group 2 OTM < 30 63.84 486 48.79 70 15.05** 
Volume Group 3 (Highest) OTM < 30 48.35 1,873 34.55 455 13.80** 
146 
 
5.5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
The literature on option bid-ask spreads suggests a number of liquidity determinants, 
including time to maturity, moneyness, trading volume, option volatility, and 
underlying stock volatility (e.g., Neal, 1987, George and Longstaff, 1993, Chong et al., 
2003, Cao and Wei, 2010, and Wei and Zheng, 2010). In line with this research, the 
univariate analysis shows that TM and SS options have higher effective spreads 
relative to outright options across the following option characteristics: time to 
maturity, moneyness, and trading volume.  
To determine if proportional effective spreads for strategy trades are higher 
after controlling for other option characteristics including option volatility and 
underlying stock volatility, the following regression is estimated for each underlying 
stock: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽5𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝜎𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the daily average proportional effective spread of all trades for option 
𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) is the SS (TM) traded volume as a proportion of total traded 
volume for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; time-to-maturity (𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) is the difference between the 
current date of the option and the expiry date; moneyness (𝑀𝑖𝑡) is the ratio of closing 
spot (strike) price to strike (closing spot) price of call (put) options for option 𝑖 on day 
𝑡; 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of the total daily option volume for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; following 
Wei and Zheng (2010), option volatility (𝜎𝑜𝑖𝑡) is calculated as the absolute value of the 
(5.2) 
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option price elasticity times the underlying stock volatility for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡. The 
stock volatility measure is given as follows: 
 
𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑡 = √
(lnℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡−ln𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡)
2
4𝑙𝑛2
, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇  
 
where volatility is calculated for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡; ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 refers to the highest 
traded price and lowest traded price of underlying stock for each day. Each equation 
is estimated separately for each stock using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM); the resulting t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Newey and West, 1987). 
Table 4-6 reports the cross-sectional averages of the coefficients and 
associated t-statistics of the estimated regressions. Consistent with prior literature, 
proportional effective spreads are affected by a number of option liquidity 
determinants. Results show that an increase in the standard strategy volume relative 
to total trading volume does not have an impact on proportional effective spreads, 
implying that market makers do not require higher compensation for providing 
liquidity for standard strategy-linked trades. These results hold across both put and 
call options. On the contrary, an increase in tailor-made strategy volume as a 
proportion of total trading volume is significantly associated with an increase in 
effective spreads at the 1% level. These results suggest that execution costs for tailor-
made strategy-linked options are higher relative to outright options in line with the 
results of the univariate analysis. In contrast to H5,1, execution costs are not higher for 
(5.3) 
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standard strategy-linked trades after option volatility and underlying stock volatility 
are taken into account.  
Option market makers also face adverse selection costs, as the greater 
leverage of options and the higher investment returns they offer attract informed 
traders to the options market (Black, 1975, Charkravarty et al., 2004) The evidence 
shows that option market makers adjust prices to account for hedging and adverse 
selection costs. Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) report that discrete hedge rebalancing 
(gamma risks) and stochastic stock return volatility (vega risks) are not fully 
diversifiable and account for 8% and 4.5% of the option bid-ask spread, respectively. 
Kaul et al. (2004) report that a significant proportion of the bid-ask spread is 
attributable to inventory management costs; 50% attributable to setting up a delta 
neutral position and 6.93% associated with discrete rebalancing. Ahn et al. (2008) 
report that the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread on the KOPSI 200 
Index options traded on the Korean Exchange account for 34.99% of the bid-ask 
spread for call options and 39.14% of the bid-ask spread for put options. 
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Table 5-6 
Multiple Regressions of Percentage Effective Spreads on Option Characteristics 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 20 underlying 
stocks. The regression model is specified as follows: 
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝜎𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the daily average proportional effective spread of all trades for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) is the SS (TM) traded volume as a proportion of total traded volume for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 
time-to-maturity (𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) is the difference between the current date of the option and the expiry date; 
moneyness (𝑀𝑖𝑡) is the ratio of closing spot (strike) price to strike (closing spot) price of call (put) options 
for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of the total daily option volume for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; option 
volatility (σo𝑖𝑡) is calculated as the absolute value of the option price elasticity times the underlying 
stock volatility for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; stock volatility (σs𝑖𝑡) is defined in Equation (3). The regression is 
estimated for each underlying stock, separately for calls and puts. Regression coefficients are cross-
sectional averages from the 20 stocks. Average t-statistics are in parentheses. The first (second) 
component in each bracket is the percentage of significantly positive (negative) coefficients at the 10% 
level. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. 
 
  Call Put 
Intercept 18.210 31.500 
 (7.806) (11.801) 
 [100,0] [100,0] 
𝑆𝑆 1.337 1.337 
 (0.279) (1.137) 
 [11,6] [39,0] 
𝑇𝑀 5.189 6.437 
 (8.641) (9.902) 
 [100,0] [100,0] 
𝑇𝑇𝑀 0.008 -0.059 
 (1.884) (-7.746) 
 [44,0] [0,100] 
𝑀 -5.020 -7.326 
 (-6.934) (-10.041) 
 [0,100] [0,100] 
𝑉 -0.515 -0.119 
 (-3.347) (-0.790) 
 [0,89] [6,22] 
𝜎𝑜 0.443 0.032 
 (14.209) (7.540) 
 [100,0] [100,0] 
𝜎𝑠 -5.241 -1.081 
 (-7.483) (-2.697) 
 [0,100] [6,72] 
   
R2 (%)  41.63 44.40 
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5.5.2 Hedging and Adverse Selection 
 
The previous section shows that tailor-made strategy-linked options are at a 
disadvantage relative to outright options in terms of transaction costs. This section 
examines whether option hedging and adverse selection costs faced by market makers 
can explain this disadvantage using multivariate regression. The literature suggests 
that options market makers face two types of hedging costs: the initial cost of creating 
a delta hedged position and the cost of rebalancing the portfolio at discrete times to 
maintain a delta neutral portfolio (Kaul et al., 2004). Engle and Neri (2010) specify 
hedging costs in the option market as the percentage delta multiplied by the 
underlying bid-ask spread. Consequently, initial hedging costs are modeled as follows: 
 
𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 = |
𝜕𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑡
 ×  
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡
 | × 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 
 
where |
𝜕𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑡
 ×  
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡
 | is the average percentage delta for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡 and 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 is the average underlying percentage bid-ask spread for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡. 
Following Patrella (2006) and Engle and Neri (2010), rebalancing costs are calculated 
as: 
 
𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛤𝑖𝑡 × 𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝛤𝑖𝑡 refers to the average gamma for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡 and 𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑡 is measured each 
day using the intraday high-low price range estimator proposed by Parkinson (1980). 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
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The degree of adverse selection is measured by the probability of informed trading 
(PIN) developed in Easley et al. (2006). The PIN is a measure which uses inferred order 
flow to quantify the extent information asymmetry. There are two exogenous 
variables in this model. One is the occurrence of an information event. The other is 
the value of the asset. Prior to every trading session, the occurrence of an information 
event is determined with probability α. If no information event occurs, the value of 
the asset is 𝑉∗. Otherwise, the asset value is determined to be 𝑉𝐻 > 𝑉∗ with 
probability δ or 𝑉𝐻 < 𝑉∗ with probability 1-δ. The value of the asset becomes public 
at the end of the trading session. 
There are three types of traders: (1) informed traders, (2) uninformed traders, 
and (3) market makers. Informed traders observe the true value of the asset, and they 
know whether an information event has occurred prior to each trading session. In 
contrast, uninformed traders are purely liquidity motivated. Uninformed traders 
arrive at the trading platform according to the Poisson process at the rate ε (per 
minute per trading session). If an event occurs, informed traders also arrive at the 
rate μ. These arrival processes are independent of each other. Informed traders buy 
(sell) assets when the asset value is 𝑉𝐻(𝑉𝐿). Market makers set quotes such that their 
expected profit is zero each time. Using the model of Easley et al. (2006), the 
unconditional probability of informed trading is defined as follows: 
 
𝑃𝐼𝑁 =
𝛼𝜇
𝛼𝜇+2𝜀
  
 
(5.6) 
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This provides a PIN for each stock but constant over time. Following Engle and Neri 
(2010), buy and sell orders are aggregated over each minute of the trading day to 
provide a daily PIN measure. In order to ensure a sufficient number of trades in each 
minute interval, PIN is estimated for each stock for each day using transaction data in 
the equities market, employed as a proxy for the level of informed trading in the 
options market. Though the PIN is a proxy Engle and Neri (2010) point out that there 
is evidence that informed traders prefer trading in the options market (Arnold et al., 
2000).    
The methodology of Engle and Neri (2010) is used here to examine whether 
option hedging and adverse selection costs faced by market makers can explain the 
results in the previous section, the following regression is estimated for each 
underlying stock: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐻𝐶it + 𝛽5𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝜎𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the daily average difference in percentage effective spreads of 
TM (SS) trades and outright trades; initial hedging cost (𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡) is defined in Equation 
(3); rebalancing cost (𝐻𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡) is defined in Equation (4); 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 is defined in Equation 
(4), stock volatility (σs𝑖𝑡) is defined in Equation (2); 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for call options and zero for put options. The other explanatory 
variables are as described for Equation (1). Each equation is estimated separately for 
each stock using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); the resulting t-statistics 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). 
(5.7) 
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Table 4-7 reports the results of the regression estimates. The results indicate 
that (both initial and rebalancing) hedging and adverse selection costs do not lead to 
wider proportional effective spreads for SS trades relative to outright option trades as 
indicated by the insignificant coefficients on the variables 𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡, and 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡. All 
control variables included in the regressions are statistically insignificant at the 5% 
level. In contrast, results indicate that initial hedging costs significantly affect the 
difference in proportional effective spreads for TM trades relative to outright options 
trades, with the coefficient on 𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 statistically significant at the 1% level. On the 
contrary, rebalancing hedging costs do no significantly affect the difference in 
proportional effective spreads. This is in contrast to Engle and Neri (2010) who show 
that both hedging and rebalancing costs are an important component of the bid-ask 
spread. Rebalancing costs may still be an important component of the bid-ask spread 
in the options market. However, the results suggest that market makers do not require 
compensation for rebalancing costs of strategy trades relative to outright options after 
the hedge has already been set up.   
In contrast to H5,3, results show that market makers are not sensitive to adverse 
selection costs in setting quotes for tailor-made options relative to outright options. 
This is in line with other studies that show that the adverse selection component of 
the bid-ask spread is small (Vijh, 1990; Neal, 1992). However, given that option 
strategy trades in particular are likely to contain information about future realized 
volatility, this finding is somewhat surprising. It may be that informed traders only 
engage in specific types of option strategies (Fahlenbrach and Sandas, 2010). 
Supporting hypothesis H5,4, overall results indicate that the difference in proportional 
effective spreads for tailor-made options is affected by market making costs, which is 
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in line with a number of studies examining the components of the bid-ask spread in 
the options market . The implication is that market makers require higher premiums 
for tailor-made options relative to outright options when initial hedging is more costly, 
suggesting that that informed trading is not a key component of the bid-ask spread.   
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Table 5-7 
Percentage Effective Spreads, Hedging Costs and Probability of Informed Trading 
 
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 20 underlying 
stocks. The regression model is specified as follows: 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐶it + 𝛽5𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝜎𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the daily average difference in percentage effective spreads of TM (SS) trades and 
outright trades; initial hedging cost (𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡) is defined in Equation (1); rebalancing cost (𝐻𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡) is defined 
in Equation (2); time-to-maturity (𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) is the difference between the current date of the option and 
the expiry date; moneyness (𝑀𝑖𝑡) is the ratio of closing spot (strike) price to strike (closing spot) price 
of call (put) options for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of the total daily option volume for option 
𝑖 on day 𝑡; option volatility (σo𝑖𝑡) is calculated as the absolute value of the option price elasticity times 
the underlying stock volatility for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; stock volatility (σs𝑖𝑡) is defined in Equation (3); 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for call options and zero for put options. The 
regression is estimated for each underlying stock. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages 
from the 20 stocks. Average t-statistics are in parentheses. The first (second) component in each 
bracket is the percentage of significantly positive (negative) coefficients at the 10% level. The R2 is the 
cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. 
 
  S - O TM - O 
Intercept 5.071 18.452 
 (0.551) (3.032) 
 [28, 0] [78, 0] 
𝐼𝐻𝐶 0.226 0.270 
 (0.925) (3.351) 
 [28, 0] [78, 0] 
𝑅𝐻𝐶 0.996 3.179 
 (0.273) (0.961) 
 [17, 17] [28, 0] 
PIN -0.349 0.508 
 (0.042) (0.142) 
 [22, 6] [11, 6] 
𝑇𝑇𝑀 -0.013 -0.010 
 (-0.401) (-0.943) 
 [11,22] [0, 22] 
𝑀 -0.938 -4.956 
 (-0.372) (-2.491) 
 [17, 22] [6, 55] 
𝑉 -0.067 -0.168 
 (-0.237) (-0.539) 
 [11, 17] [11, 25] 
𝜎𝑜 -2.933 0.246 
 (-0.360) (-0.004) 
 [0, 11] [6, 11] 
𝜎𝑠 -0.451 0.349 
 (-0.424) (0.421) 
 [0, 17] [17, 0] 
Type 0.601 0.761 
 (0.276) (0.677) 
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 [0, 0] [33, 6] 
   
R2 (%) 6.026 7.547 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
This study measures the magnitude of execution costs of outright options and options 
which constitute strategies (“strategy-linked options”) and examines if any differences 
in trade prices between these two groups is attributable to differences in market 
making costs. The literature suggests that options market makers face the following 
three types of hedging costs; delta cost is the cost of setting up a hedging portfolio; 
vega (gamma) cost is the cost incurred in maintaining a hedged portfolio as the 
underlying stock volatility (delta) changes over time. Market makers may also face 
adverse selection costs. This study investigates whether differences in transaction 
costs between strategy-linked options and outright options are due to hedging cost or 
adverse selection costs using a proprietary data set provided by the Australian Options 
Market (AOM). 
Results of the univariate analysis indicate that strategy-linked options exhibit 
wider spreads than outright options across both put and call options, and across 
options with different characteristics (moneyness, time to maturity, and trading 
activity), which are shown to be related to the liquidity of options (Wei and Zheng, 
2010). Multivariate analysis shows that after directly controlling for a number of 
liquidity determinants, tailor-made strategy-linked trades incur higher execution costs 
than outright options trades. Results also indicate that the difference in execution 
costs between tailor-made strategy-linked options and outright options is driven by 
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the initial costs in delta hedging the option position and not a result of higher adverse 
selection costs. 
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Chapter 6: Intraday Patterns in Quoted Depth  
6.1 Introduction 
 
A large body of empirical research has been undertaken documenting systematic 
patterns in bid-ask spreads different types of market exchanges, including order-
driven, specialists and competitive dealer markets. However, these patterns have not 
yielded similar results across these market types. As a result of this, several competing 
theories have arisen to explain the intraday behaviour in liquidity across these 
markets, such as inventory, market power and information models. Furthermore, the 
literature reviewed in Section 2.2 reveals a number of studies examining intraday 
patterns in quoted depth on specialist and order-driven markets. However, no study 
has examined intraday patterns in quoted depth on competitive dealer markets. This 
essay fills the gap in the literature by investigating the intraday patterns in quoted 
depth on the Nasdaq.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes 
the data and research design employed. Section 6.3 provides the empirical results on 
the intraday variation in the bid-ask spread, quoted depth, volume and volatility. 
Section 6.4 presents additional tests. Section 6.5 summarises the chapter. 
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6.2 Hypotheses on Intraday Patterns in Liquidity 
 
Prior studies examining the inventory component of bid-ask spreads on a competitive 
dealer market suggest that inventory effects could dominate near the close of trading. 
In the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1982), the dealer has a preferred or target 
inventory position, and adjusts his/her prices to return to his/her target inventory 
level. If the dealer is too long, he/she lowers both the bid and ask prices to induce 
other traders to buy to reduce inventory towards the target level. If the market maker 
is below the target inventory level, he/she raises both the bid and ask prices. Chordia 
et al. (2002) and Bessembinder (2003b) suggest that if market makers perceive that 
competitive quotations will attract orders, then reductions (increases) in inventory 
should lead to posting of more aggressive quotations at the bid (ask) to attract sell 
(buy) orders and restore inventory. Inventory effects are likely to be acute at the close 
of trading as dealers attempt to reduce their market exposure, resulting in bid-ask 
spreads narrowing significantly at the market close.  
The literature examining competitive dealer markets document this pattern in 
bid-ask spreads over the course of the trading day (see Chan et al. 1995a, Chan, Chung 
and Johnson, 1995, Kliedon and Werner, 1996, and Cai, Hudson and Keasey, 2004). 
The narrowing of spreads at the close is attributed to inventory management, with 
individual dealers who want to ‘go home flat’ post quotes that improve the inside 
spread in order to attract order flow away from other dealers. In addition, the dealer 
may remove order imbalances by increasing the depth of the quote to attract orders 
away from other dealers. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis6.1: Quoted depth (bid-ask spreads) will be relatively large (narrow) near 
the close of trading.   
 
The Nasdaq operates as a competitive dealer market, where each individual dealer 
competes for investor orders by displaying quotations that represent their buy and 
sell interest in Nasdaq securities. In displaying their quotes, market makers post both 
the price (i.e., the bid and ask price) and the quantity (i.e., the bid and ask depth) of 
shares that they are willing to trade. In 1997, major changes were made to the way 
Nasdaq dealers handled customer orders following the Chrisitie and Shultz (1994) 
debate about price fixing by market makers on the Nasdaq. The SEC instituted new 
Order Handling Rules (OHR) that were designed to make the Nasdaq market more 
competitive and reduce dealer participation in Nasdaq trades by ensuring the dealers 
took public limit orders into account. The Limit Order Display Rule (LODR) requires 
dealers to publicly display limit orders they receive from customers, unless an 
exception applies. If the limit order is priced better than his or her quote or that adds 
size to his or her quote, the market maker must publicly display it. For example, 
assume a dealer is currently quoting 10,000 shares at a bid price of $10. If the dealer 
receives a limit order to buy 11,000 shares at a bid price of $10.50, the dealer is 
required to revise the quote to reflect the higher bid price and larger bid size. This rule 
applies to all individual dealer quotes, regardless of their quote position relative to the 
market inside.  
The introduction of the LODR has important implications for the 
interrelationship between bid-ask spreads and market depth at the best quotes. 
Assume the dealer is currently quoting 10,000 shares at a bid price of $10 and receives 
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a limit order to buy 10,000 shares at a bid price of $10. In this situation, the dealer 
does not have to change the quote as the bid price and bid size have not been 
improved. If the best bid happens to be at $10.50, the dealer may not wish to update 
the quote from 1,000 shares to 2,000 shares (which is optional), due either to the 
quote being too far from the inside market or decides it is in his or her interest to let 
the limit order replace their market making in this particular security. However, if the 
best bid is currently at $10, the dealer is currently quoting at the best bid, possibly 
wanting to buy as a result of managing his or her inventory position. In this situation, 
the dealer is likely to change the quote to 2,000 shares otherwise he or she may miss 
the opportunity to execute their order. Dealers therefore are likely to post larger 
depths when their quotes are at the best bid and ask prices. It follows that quoted 
spreads and depth are inversely related because of dealers changing their quote sizes 
as the move from the non-inside market to the inside market. This leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis6.2: Quoted depth and bid-ask spreads are inversely related.   
 
6.3 Nasdaq 
 
Created by the NASD in 1971, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (Nasdaq) was set up to enhance the efficiency of the over-the-
counter (OTC) markets for stock securities, through the use of a telecommunication 
network linking thousands of geographically diverse participants. The Nasdaq was 
designed as a competitive dealer market. Within this particular market structure, 
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prices are set by dealer quotes, where each individual dealer competes for investor 
orders by displaying quotations that represent their buy and sell interest in Nasdaq 
securities. Market makers registered to trade in listed Nasdaq securities are required 
to do three things. They must display their buying and selling interest by posting a two-
sided quote in all stocks they choose to make a market in. They must display all quotes 
and orders to the Nasdaq and finally they are obligated to honour their quotes. 
Companies that choose to list on the Nasdaq must have at least 3 market makers 
(excluding ECNs).  
In 1997, major changes were made to the way Nasdaq dealers handled 
customer orders, following the Chrisitie and Shultz (1994) debate about price fixing by 
market makers on the Nasdaq. The SEC instituted new Order Handling Rules (OHR) 
that were designed to make the Nasdaq market more competitive and reduce dealer 
participation in Nasdaq trades by ensuring the dealers took public limit orders into 
account. The new rules required dealers to handle a marketable limit order in one of 
three ways: (1) execute the limit order against the dealers inventory; (2) the limit order 
must be reflected in the dealers quote; (3) send the limit order to another dealer; (4) 
send the order to an Exchange Communication Network (ECN). Another important 
change by the SEC was to enable public access to superior prices posted by market 
makers in ECNs. An ECN is an electronic trading system separate to the exchange that 
allows investors to execute trades through an open limit order book (Fink, Fink and 
Weston, 2006). This enabled traders to bypass the placement of orders with dealers 
and instead submit orders and trade with each other directly. Prior to 1997, dealers 
could provide alternative pricing systems by quoting one set of prices in the public 
market and another better price placed on the ECN. The rule change forced dealers to 
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publicly display their most competitive quotes, regardless of where it is placed. The 
effect of these reforms has been: (1) growth in limit order trades as even the small 
retail customers could become temporary market makers and; (2) spurred the 
development of ECN’s, whose liquidity is based primarily on limit-order flow 
(McAndrews and Stefanadis, 2000). 
 
6.4 Data and Research Design 
 
The data is obtained from a Reuters intraday database managed by SIRCA.7 The sample 
contains stocks listed on the Nasdaq-100 index and covers the period November 30, 
2008 to April 23, 2009. The data is derived from one-minute intervals and consists of 
the best bid and ask prices and volumes at the end of each interval, the interval high 
and low prices, and the volume traded during the interval. Consistent with previous 
research (including Chung and Zhoa, 2003; Cai et al., 2004; Vo, 2007) the trading day 
is partitioned into 30-minute intervals, these one-minute intervals are averaged into 
14 separate 30-minute trading intervals, from 09:30 hours to 16:00 hours (i.e. from 
the open to the close of trading). 
The variables examined include the bid-ask spread, quoted depth, volume and 
volatility. Following Chan et al. (1995b), the bid-ask spread is defined as: 
 
     
2
t t
t
t t
inside ask inside bid
PBAS
inside ask inside bid


 
 
 
    (1) 
                                                 
7 Securities Institute Research Centre of Asia-Pacific. 
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where tPBAS  is the percentage bid-ask spread at time period t, the inside ask is the 
lowest ask price at time period t, and the inside bid is the highest bid price at period t. 
The midpoint is used to avoid problems associated with bid-ask bounce.  Following 
Huang and Stoll (1996) and Chung and Zhao (2003), the following filters are applied in 
the calculation of the bid-ask spread: (1) bid-ask spread quotes are excluded if the 
spread is greater than $5 or less than zero; (2) exclude ask quote at if [(at – at-1)/at-1] is 
greater than 10%; (3) exclude bid-quote if [(bt-bt-1)/bt-1] is greater than 10%.  
Quoted depth is defined as the average volume of shares available at the best 
bid and the best ask at the end of each interval for each stock (Harris, 1994). Volume 
is measured as the number of shares traded across each 30-minute interval. Volatility 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the difference between the interval high and 
interval low for each one-minute interval. To prevent cross-sectional differences 
across securities biasing results, all variables are standardized by subtracting the daily 
mean and dividing by the daily standard deviation for each stock. 
In Section 6.3, it is hypothesised that bid-ask spreads and market depth are 
inversely related and that bid-ask spreads (quoted depth) are wide (small) at the open 
and tight (large) at the close of trading. To formally test for intraday patterns in bid-
ask spreads, quoted depth, volume and volatility, we regress the variables upon a set 
of intraday dummy variables using Hansen’s (1982) Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) procedure. The GMM technique is applied in prior research examining 
intraday patterns in liquidity, such as Foster and Viswanathan (1993), Abhyankar et al. 
(1997), Cai et al. (2004). GMM estimates the coefficients through the use of 
orthogonality conditions and provides results that are robust to the presence of 
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autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Many of the microstructure studies using the 
GMM technique employ the procedure of Newey and West (1987) to adjust for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are 
controlled for using the Parzen Kernel (Gallant, 1987). Andrews (1991) shows that the 
Bartlett Kernel used by Newey and West (1987) exhibits greater bias and is 100 
percent less efficient asymptotically than the Parzen Kernel. The lag truncation period 
is calculated using the formula n^(1/5) (Andrews, 1991).  For each variable, the 
following model is estimated: 
 
    
, 0
1
( )
n
i t k k t
k
st V D  

        (2) 
 
where 
,( )i tst V  is the standardized variable in interval t  for firm i, n  is the number of 
intervals in the day, kD  a time-of-day dummy variable equal to 1 if observation t falls 
in interval k, otherwise zero. The 30-minute interval 12:30 to 13:00 is excluded from 
the regression.  
 
6.3 Empirical Results 
 
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Harris (1994) document that volume and volatility 
are significant determinants of both bid-ask spreads and quoted depth. As illustrated 
in Figure 6-1, volume on the Nasdaq follows a U-shaped pattern, being highest at the 
open and close of trading, and lowest during the middle of the trading day. Price 
volatility is highest at the start of trading, falls consistently to the middle of the trading 
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day, and then increases for the remainder of the trading day. Regression results in 
Table 6-1 confirm that both volume and volatility in the first and last thirty-minute 
intervals of the trading day are higher than during the middle of the day. The intraday 
variation in trading volume and volatility is consistent with the results documented by 
Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) for the Nasdaq, and is similar to the patterns in 
trading volume and volatility for other markets (e.g., McInish and Wood, 1992; Chan, 
Chung and Johnson, 1995; Ahn and Cheung, 1999). 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1 
Standardized Trading Volume and Volatility 
 
This figure depicts the intraday pattern in standardized trading volume and volatility in 5-minute 
intervals. The sample extends from November 30, 2008 to April 23, 2009. Traded volume is measured 
as the number of shares traded across each 5-minute interval. Volatility is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the difference between the interval high and interval low during each 1-minute interval. 
The two variables are then averaged across 78 equal 5-minute intervals. 
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Table 6-1 
Mean Value of the Standardized Quoted Depth, Bid-Ask Spread, Trading Volume and 
Volatility 
 
The GMM technique is used to estimate the following model: 
 
, 0
1
( )
n
i t k k t
k
st V D  

    
 
where 
,( )i tst V  is the standardized variable occurring in interval t  for firm i, n  is the number of intervals 
in the day, kD  a time-of-day dummy variable equal to 1 if observation t falls in interval k, otherwise zero. 
The 30 minute interval of 12:30 to 13:00 is excluded.  
 
Time SPREAD DEPTH VOLUME VOLATILITY 
9:30 - 10:00 1.0261** -0.4451** 1.6567** 1.3851** 
10:00 - 10:30 0.2542** -0.2494** 0.7967** 0.6537** 
10:30 - 11:00 0.1428** -0.1793** 0.5042** 0.3836** 
11:00 - 11:30 0.0865** -0.1446** 0.2286** 0.1964** 
11:30 - 12:00 0.0503** -0.0946** 0.0582** 0.0806** 
12:00 - 12:30 0.0163** -0.0346** 0.0341** 0.0307** 
13:00 - 13:30 0.0221** -0.0010 -0.0770** -0.0326** 
13:30 - 14:00 -0.0052 0.0020 -0.0557** -0.0317** 
14:00 - 14:30 -0.0326** 0.0544** 0.2554** 0.1166** 
14:30 - 15:00 -0.0556** 0.1230** 0.3949** 0.1573** 
15:00 - 15:30 -0.1370** 0.3138** 0.8248** 0.2637** 
15:30 - 16:00 -0.2664** 0.8638** 2.3065** 0.4297** 
Intercept -0.0904** -0.0141** -0.5329** -0.2791** 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
  * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
Figure 6-2 plots the intraday variation of bid-ask spreads during successive 5-minute 
intervals. Consistent with the prediction of hypothesis H6,1, bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq 
stocks are highest at the open, decline quickly over the first hour of trading, remain 
relatively stable until 15:00 hours, and narrow sharply towards the close. The results 
of the GMM estimation presented in Table 6-1 confirm this result. The coefficient of 
the dummy variable for the 9:30-10:00 time interval is positive and significant at the 
1% level, indicating spreads in the first 30-minute interval are higher than during the 
middle of the day. The coefficient for the last 30-minute interval is significantly 
negative, indicating that spreads are narrower at the close relative to spreads in the 
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middle of the day. The narrowing of spreads on the Nasdaq is consistent with 
inventory management where dealers (in the absence of market power) post 
competitive prices to attract orders away from competing dealers to offset inventory 
imbalances, thereby lowering the inside spread.   
 
 
 
Figure 6-2 
Standardized Bid-Ask Spreads and Quoted Depth 
 
This figure depicts the intraday pattern in standardized bid-ask spreads and quoted depth in 5-minute 
intervals. The sample extends from November 30, 2008 to April 23, 2009. The bid-ask spread is 
measured as the ask quote minus the bid quote divided by the bid-ask midpoint. Quoted depth is 
measured as the average of the volume at the best bid and ask quotes. Both variables are calculated at 
the end of each 1-minute interval and then averaged across 78 equal 5-minute time-intervals. 
  
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
9
:3
5
:0
0
1
0
:0
5
:0
0
1
0
:3
5
:0
0
1
1
:0
5
:0
0
1
1
:3
5
:0
0
1
2
:0
5
:0
0
1
2
:3
5
:0
0
1
3
:0
5
:0
0
1
3
:3
5
:0
0
1
4
:0
5
:0
0
1
4
:3
5
:0
0
1
5
:0
5
:0
0
1
5
:3
5
:0
0
Time of Day
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
e
d
 Q
u
o
te
d
 D
e
p
th
 a
n
d
 B
id
-A
s
k
 S
p
re
a
d
Standardized Quoted Depth
Standardized Bid-Ask Spread
169 
 
In a study of dealer quotation behavior on the Nasdaq, Chung and Zhao (2004b) 
discuss how the institutional features of the Nasdaq lead to a negative correlation 
between the dealer’s posted spread and depth. Figure 6-2 reveals the intraday 
variation in quoted depth is opposite to the pattern in bid-ask spreads, consistent with 
the second hypothesis H6,2. Quoted depth is lowest at the open, increases over the 
early hours of trading and remains relatively stable until approximately 15:00 hours, 
when quoted depth begins to increase significantly. The results of the GMM regression 
in Table 6-1 document a similar pattern. The coefficient for the first 30-minute interval 
is significantly negative, while the coefficient for the 15:30-16:00 interval shows 
quoted depth reaches its highest level. This pattern in quoted depth at the close of 
trading differs sharply to the results of Lee et al. (1993) on the NYSE, who document 
significantly lower depth. However, these findings are consistent with Chung and Zhao 
(2004b), supporting the view that both the price and quantity of dealer’s quotes are 
inter-dependent, and that spreads and depth are negatively correlated. The narrowing 
of the bid-ask spread and increase in quoted depth at the close of trading suggests 
that inventory management on the part of market makers results in improved liquidity 
at the close of trading.  
 
6.4 Additional Tests   
 
As a robustness test of the results presented in Table 6-2, Equation 2 is estimated using 
the procedure of Meulbroek (1992). Equation 2 is estimated for each stock in the 
sample using the GMM procedure as stated, with the dummy variable for each time 
interval being the average coefficient from the individual regressions. To test whether 
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each coefficient differs statistically from zero, we calculate a Z-statistic for each 
coefficient. The Z-statistic is calculated as: 
 
1
1
(0,1),
N
i
i
Z t N
N 
       (3) 
 
where N  is the number of stocks in the sample and it  is the t-statistic for stock i. Table 
6-2 shows that these results are robust to the estimation technique used, with the 
regression coefficients qualitatively similar to the results presented in Table 6-1. 
Trading volume and price volatility are highest at the start and end of the trading day. 
Bid-ask spreads (quoted depth) are highest at the opening and are lowest (highest) at 
the close of the trading day. 
To further ensure that the intraday patterns in spreads and depth on the 
Nasdaq are not caused by variation in volume and volatility, we directly control for 
trading volume and price volatility using the method of Heflin et al. (2007). Under this 
approach, firm i’s bid-ask spreads, quoted depth, trading volume and volatility are 
expressed as percent deviations from firm i’s mean level for that variable computed 
using the 12:30 to 13:00 interval. The GMM regression is estimated separately for 
each time interval, with the percent deviations of volume and volatility used as 
‘instruments’.  
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Table 6-2 
Regression Estimates in Variation in Standardized Bid-Ask Spread, Quoted 
Depth, Trading Volume and Volatility  
 
The GMM technique is used to estimate the following model: 
, 0
1
( )
n
i t k k t
k
st V D  

    
where 
,( )i tst V  is the standardized variable occurring in interval t  for firm i, n  is the number of 
intervals in the day, kD  a time-of-day dummy variable equal to 1 if observation t falls in interval k, 
otherwise zero. The 30 minute interval of 12.30 to 1.00 is excluded. The coefficients are the average 
of the coefficients from the regression of each individual stock. Positive Coefficient (%) is the 
percentage of stocks in the regression with a positive coefficient. The Z-statistic to test whether the 
mean coefficient for each dummy variable differs from zero is given by the formula 
1
1
(0,1),
N
i
i
Z t N
N 
   where N  is the number of stocks in the sample and it  is the t-statistic 
for stock i.  
 
Time SPREAD DEPTH VOLUME VOLATILITY 
9:30 - 10:00 1.0267 -0.4533 1.7291 1.4195 
Positive Coefficient (%) 93.75 5.21 100 100 
Z-statistics 181.855 -88.925 157.193 282.444 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
10:00 - 10:30 0.2514 -0.2554 0.8704 0.6844 
Positive Coefficient (%) 83.33 6.25 100 100 
Z-statistics 55.03 -49.13 96.72 154.43 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
10:30 - 11:00 0.1410 -0.1822 0.5773 0.4142 
Positive Coefficient (%) 80.21 7.29 100 100 
Z-statistics 32.60 -35.95 67.94 105.59 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
11:00 - 11:30 0.0859 -0.1505 0.3047 0.2296 
Positive Coefficient (%) 80.21 6.25 100 100 
Z-statistics 21.20 -28.90 38.31 63.19 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
11:30 - 12:00 0.0498 -0.1000 0.1361 0.1131 
Positive Coefficient (%) 83.33 8.33 90.72 100 
Z-statistics 13.00 -18.99 17.42 32.21 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
12:00 - 12:30 0.0164 -0.0392 0.1091 0.0628 
Positive Coefficient (%) 67.71 22.92 94.85 98.97 
Z-statistics 4.51 -8.18 14.90 19.85 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13:00 - 13:30 0.0221 -0.0064 0.0245 0.0018 
Positive Coefficient (%) 80.21 47.92 61.86 52.58 
Z-statistics 6.25 -0.25 3.31 0.50 
p-value 0.0000 0.8034 0.0008 0.6202 
13:30 -14:00 -0.0045 -0.0010 0.0783 0.0320 
Positive Coefficient (%) 48.96 51.04 89.69 86.60 
Z-statistics 0.66 -0.36 10.30 9.96 
p-value 0.5090 0.7117 0.0000 0.0000 
14:00 - 14:30 -0.0318 0.0510 0.3314 0.1482 
172 
 
Positive Coefficient (%) 22.92 71.88 100.00 98.97 
Z-statistics 7.60 8.94 39.71 36.82 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
14:30 - 15:00 -0.0554 0.1175 0.4734 0.1892 
Positive Coefficient (%) 18.75 87.5 100 100 
Z-statistics 13.96 22.25 57.00 48.84 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
15:00 - 15:30 -0.1348 0.3109 0.9080 0.2973 
Positive Coefficient (%) 8.33 92.71 100 100 
Z-statistics 35.40 54.91 102.72 78.62 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
15:30 - 16:00 -0.2628 0.8595 2.3863 0.4637 
Positive Coefficient (%) 5.21 100 100 100 
Z-statistics 67.36 125.46 228.42 112.16 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
  * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
For each half hour interval, the following equation is estimated: 
 
                           , 0 1 , 2 , ,
( )i t i t i t i tdst V DVOLATILITY DVOLUME e         (4) 
 
where 
,( )i tdst V , ,i tDVOLATILITY  and ,i tDVOLUME  are per cent deviations of 
,( )i tst V  (spread and depth), ,i tVOLATILITY , ,i tVOLUME  for interval t from firm i’s 
mean of each of these variables computed from the 12:30-13:00 interval. 
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Table 6-3 
Regression Estimates of Variations in the Standardized Bid-Ask Spread 
 
The GMM method is used to estimate the following model: 
, 0 1 , 2 , ,( )i t i t i t i tdst V DVOLATILITY DVOLUME e       
where 
,( )i tdst V , ,i tDVOLATILITY  and ,i tDVOLUME  are per cent deviations of ,( )i tst V , 
,i tVOLATILITY , ,i tVOLUME  for interval t from firm i’s mean of each of these variables computed from 
the 12:30-1:00 interval. The model is estimated separately for each 30-minute trading interval.  
 
Time a0 t-statistic a1 t-statistic a2 t-statistic 
9:30 - 10:00 0.4898 27.23** -0.0353 -7.91** 0.0817 10.85** 
10:00 - 10:30 0.1577 15.84** -0.0758 -5.7** 0.0822 10.75** 
10:30 - 11:00 0.1108 19.78** -0.0775 -15.68** 0.0829 11.47** 
11:00 - 11:30 0.0709 15.97** -0.0896 -15.27** 0.1001 10.12** 
11:30 - 12:00 0.0555 11.92** -0.0655 -4.64** 0.0608 2.47** 
12:00 - 12:30 0.0244 10.63** -0.0775 -8.82** 0.0819 5.19** 
13:00 - 13:30 0.0129 5.26** -0.0753 -6.37** 0.1152 7.89** 
13:30 -14:00 0.0014 0.56 -0.0815 -13.8** 0.0973 8.88** 
14:00 - 14:30 -0.0174 -5.72** -0.0351 -3.82** 0.0408 2.43* 
14:30 - 15:00 -0.0258 -8.05** -0.0438 -5.22** 0.0581 3.98** 
15:00 - 15:30 -0.0649 9.90** -0.0427 -12.76** 0.0627 -18.84** 
15:30 - 16:00 -0.0881 -19.84** -0.0170 -12.03** 0.0257 5.64** 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
  * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
The GMM regression results are presented in Tables 6-3 and 6-4, with the coefficients 
on the control variables consistent with Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Harris 
(1994). An increase in the deviation of trading volume and price volatility from their 
midday mean levels are negatively related to bid-ask spreads and positively related to 
quoted depth. Controlling for these variables, the trend in bid-ask spreads and quoted 
depth are qualitatively similar to the results presented in Table 6-1.  
174 
 
Table 6-4 
Regression Estimates of Variations in Standardized Quoted Depth  
 
The GMM is used to estimate the following model: 
, 0 1 , 2 , ,( )i t i t i t i tdst V DVOLATILITY DVOLUME e       
where 
,( )i tdst V , ,i tDVOLATILITY  and ,i tDVOLUME  are per cent deviations of  ,( )i tst V  (depth), 
,i tVOLATILITY , ,i tVOLUME  for interval t from firm i’s mean of each of these variables computed from 
the 12:30-1:00 interval. The model is estimated separately for each 30-minute trading interval.  
 
Time a0 t-statistic a1 t-statistic a2 t-statistic 
9:30 - 10:00 -0.2106 -22.23** 0.0148 5.8** -0.0286 -9.96** 
10:00 - 10:30 -0.0899 -10.07** 0.0716 7.43** -0.0830 -10.15** 
10:30 - 11:00 -0.0497 -6.56** 0.1096 14.28** -0.1252 -12.3** 
11:00 - 11:30 -0.0331 -5.19** 0.1537 13.2** -0.1608 -11.62** 
11:30 - 12:00 -0.0050 -0.58 0.1029 3.91** -0.0965 -2.07* 
12:00 - 12:30 0.0224 4.84** 0.1278 7.48** -0.1456 -5.04** 
13:00 - 13:30 0.0498 13.35** 0.1246 9.11** -0.1798 -9.90** 
13:30 -14:00 0.0687 14.07** 0.1680 11.11** -0.2265 -9.00** 
14:00 - 14:30 0.1272 20.24** 0.0537 3.16** -0.0713 -2.51* 
14:30 - 15:00 0.1917 23.85** 0.0689 2.92** -0.1020 -2.58** 
15:00 - 15:30 0.3548 31.86** 0.1194 11.19** -0.2342 -9.00** 
15:30 - 16:00 0.7655 34.02** 0.0988 9.06** -0.1739 -3.88** 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
  * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
Re-estimating equation (4) using the procedure of Meulbroek (1992), as shown in 
Tables 6-5 and 6-6 reveal no qualitative difference in the results. Traded volume and 
volatility cannot explain differences in the variation in spreads and depth between the 
competitive dealer market and other market structures. 
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Table 6-5 
Regression Estimates of Variations in the Standardized Bid-Ask Spread  
The GMM method is used to estimate the following model: 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , ,( )i t i t i t i tdst V DVOLATILITY DVOLUME e       
 
where 
,( )i tdst V , ,i tDVOLATILITY  and ,i tDVOLUME  are per cent deviations of  ,( )i tst V (spread), 
,i tVOLATILITY , ,i tVOLUME  for interval t from firm i’s mean of each of these variables computed from 
the 12:30-1:00 interval. The model is estimated separately for each stock for each 30-minute trading interval. 
The coefficients are an average of the coefficients from the regression of each individual stock. Positive 
Coefficient (%) is the percentage of stocks in the regression with a positive coefficient. The Z-statistic to test 
whether the mean coefficient for each time interval differs from zero is given by the formula 
1
1
(0,1),
N
i
i
Z t N
N 
   where N  is the number of stocks in the sample and it  is the t-statistic for stock 
i.  
 
Time a0 a1 a2 
9:30 - 10:00 0.0689 -0.0402 0.5292 
Positive Coefficient % 95.79 4.21 86.32 
Z-statistics 55.71 -19.41 17.81 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
10:00 - 10:30 0.1562 -0.0885 0.0902 
Positive Coefficient % 91.58 4.21 84.21 
Z-statistics 27.52 -25.82 23.52 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
10:30 - 11:00 0.1044 -0.0815 0.0962 
Positive Coefficient % 85.26 14.74 88.42 
Z-statistics 21.50 -20.45 19.58 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
11:00 - 11:30 0.0678 -0.0939 0.1115 
Positive Coefficient % 83.16 16.84 88.42 
Z-statistics 17.92 -19.83 18.36 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
11:30 - 12:00 0.0486 -0.0981 0.1144 
Positive Coefficient % 96.84 10.53 81.05 
Z-statistics 15.76 -20.58 19.73 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
12:00 - 12:30 0.0231 -0.0914 0.1078 
Positive Coefficient % 81.05 11.58 83.16 
Z-statistics 10.30 -22.97 20.54 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
13:00 - 13:30 0.0142 -0.0969 0.1266 
Positive Coefficient % 72.63 11.58 84.21 
Z-statistics 6.32 -19.36 19.18 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
13:30 -14:00 0.0009 -0.0949 0.1187 
Positive Coefficient % 49.47 11.58 87.37 
Z-statistics 0.1142 -24.8195 21.1243 
p-value 0.9091 0.0000 0.0000 
14:00 - 14:30 -0.0244 -0.0713 0.1067 
Positive Coefficient % 25.26 17.90 84.21 
Z-statistics -11.04 -21.89 31.21 
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p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
14:30 - 15:00 -0.0314 -0.0684 0.1044 
Positive Coefficient % 22.11 17.90 84.21 
Z-statistics -13.49 -24.59 30.12 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
15:00 - 15:30 -0.0727 -0.0507 0.0861 
Positive Coefficient % 5.26 16.84 83.16 
Z-statistics -29.16 -24.01 26.62 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
15:30 - 16:00 -0.1005 -0.0236 0.0580 
Positive Coefficient % 23.16 11.58 86.32 
Z-statistics -27.98 -21.88 22.95 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 6-6 
Regression Estimates of Variations in Standardized Quoted Depth  
 
The GMM method is used to estimate the following model: 
, 0 1 , 2 , ,( )i t i t i t i tdst V DVOLATILITY DVOLUME e       
where 
,( )i tdst V , ,i tDVOLATILITY  and ,i tDVOLUME  are per cent deviations of  ,( )i tst V (depth), 
,i tVOLATILITY , ,i tVOLUME  for interval t from firm i’s mean of each of these variables computed from 
the 12:30-1:00 interval. The coefficients are an average of the coefficients from the regression of each 
individual stock. Positive Coefficient (%) is the percentage of stocks in the regression with a positive 
coefficient. The Z-statistic to test whether the mean coefficient for each time interval differs from zero is 
given by the formula 
1
1
(0,1),
N
i
i
Z t N
N 
   where N  is the number of stocks in the sample and it  is 
the t-statistic for stock i.  
 
Time a0 a1 a2 
9:30 - 10:00 -0.1680 0.0184 -0.0556 
Positive Coefficient % 15.79 88.42 4.21 
Z-statistics -40.05 18.00 -25.68 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
10:00 - 10:30 -0.0575 0.1008 -0.1421 
Positive Coefficient % 29.47 96.84 4.21 
Z-statistics -13.08 23.44 -31.55 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
10:30 - 11:00 -0.0192 0.1238 -0.1912 
Positive Coefficient % 42.11 98.95 2.11 
Z-statistics -6.14 23.94 -33.50 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
11:00 - 11:30 -0.0086 0.1688 -0.2414 
Positive Coefficient % 40.00 97.90 1.05 
Z-statistics -5.16 23.20 -31.15 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
11:30 - 12:00 0.0204 0.1909 -0.2859 
Positive Coefficient % 56.84 96.84 3.16 
Z-statistics 1.24 22.75 -30.75 
p-value 0.2166 0.0000 0.0000 
12:00 - 12:30 0.0285 0.1707 -0.2648 
Positive Coefficient % 73.68 90.53 2.11 
Z-statistics 6.06 19.18 -25.75 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
13:00 - 13:30 0.0500 0.1680 -0.2712 
Positive Coefficient % 72.63 11.58 84.21 
Z-statistics 14.17 19.12 -25.01 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
13:30 -14:00 0.072 0.198 -0.332 
Positive Coefficient % 91.58 94.74 2.11 
Z-statistics 16.27 24.36 -30.20 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
14:00 - 14:30 0.1313 0.1514 -0.2492 
Positive Coefficient % 90.53 95.79 2.11 
Z-statistics 26.09 20.53 -30.85 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
14:30 - 15:00 -0.2721 0.1572 0.1924 
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Positive Coefficient % 98.95 95.79 2.11 
Z-statistics 32.08 23.72 -34.90 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
15:00 - 15:30 0.3553 0.1536 -0.3533 
Positive Coefficient % 1.05 97.90 100 
Z-statistics 44.81 27.67 -36.21 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15:30 - 16:00 0.8339 0.1294 -0.4500 
Positive Coefficient % 100 96.84 2.11 
Z-statistics 58.14 26.42 -35.61 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
This chapter analyses the behavior of quoted depth in addition to the bid-ask spread 
on the Nasdaq, a competitive dealer market. Results show that the intraday pattern 
in quoted depth is negatively associated with the bid-ask spread. Nasdaq stocks 
experience wide spreads at the open and narrow spreads at the close, while depth is 
low at the open and high at the close. The general pattern in quoted depth on the 
Nasdaq differs to that observed on the NYSE, where depth declines at the close of 
trading.  
The negative correlation between spreads and depth for Nasdaq stocks 
supports the contention of Chung and Zhao (2004b) that both the price and quantity 
of dealer quotes are inter-dependent, with both used by dealers to manage their 
inventory. As patterns in the determinants of spreads and depth, namely trading 
volume and volatility, are similar across dealer, specialist and order-driven markets, it 
is concluded that the higher depth at the end of the trading day results from inventory 
management by Nasdaq dealers and that this results in improved liquidity.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
This dissertation examines order submission strategies across different trading 
platforms. Liquidity and transaction costs depend upon both the characteristics of 
individual securities and the structure of the market and subsequent order submission 
strategies of market participants. The market structure of an exchange is 
multidimensional, consisting of various factors affecting the trading behaviour of 
market participants. As market design affects trading strategies and hence liquidity, 
exchanges are continually adjusting their trading platforms in order to maximise 
liquidity and cater to market participants. It is therefore important for exchanges, 
regulators, market participants and academics to understand how market design 
affects investors order submission strategies in order to further understanding of what 
constitutes optimal market structure.  
This dissertation focusing on two areas, namely order submission strategies in 
(1) limit order markets where market makers are not present and (2) markets that 
employ designated market makers. Limit order markets depend on endogenous 
liquidity creation based on investors agreeing to trade with each other. It examines a 
number of issues yet to be investigated in the literature in relation to order submission 
strategies across limit order markets and markets with designated market makers. 
This includes the impact of a tick increase on market quality in a futures market 
setting, the relation between algorithmic trading volume and future market quality 
the execution costs of option strategies and their determinants and, intraday patterns 
in quoted depth on the Nasdaq, a competitive dealer market.  
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7.1 Summary of Findings 
 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of a tick size increase on market quality in a 
futures market setting. Exchanges worldwide have lowered the minimum price 
increment with the aim of improving liquidity and lowering transaction costs. A 
number of studies analyse the impact of tick size reductions on market quality, with 
results showing that the tick size reduction is associated with lower bid-ask spreads 
and quoted depth. This literature provides conflicting evidence on whether the change 
is indicative of an overall improvement or reduction in liquidity. In 2009, the Sydney 
Futures Exchange (SFE) and the Eurex increased the minimum tick size for the 3-Year 
Treasury Bond Futures (“3Y T-bond”) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl Futures (“5Y Bob1”) to 
facilitate increased liquidity during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This natural 
experiment provides an opportunity to re-examine this issue.  
Consistent with prior studies, results show that an increase in the tick size is 
associated with an improvement in depth at the best quotes and depth throughout 
the limit order-book for both contracts. The evidence also suggests that the increase 
in the tick size resulted in an increase in the bid-ask spread. The price impact analysis, 
used as a comprehensive measure of the change in liquidity after the increase in 
minimum tick, suggests that the tick size resulted in an increase in execution costs for 
the event contracts. These results indicate that the increase in the bid-ask spread 
more than offset the increase in quoted depth. 
Chapter 4 examines the relation between algorithmic trading volume and 
future market quality. Although prior literature examines the effect of algorithmic 
trading on market quality, few papers assess the impact of algorithmic trading over 
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different market conditions. Using a proprietary data set provided by the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX), the results over the whole sample provide no evidence that 
market quality is associated with algorithmic trading volume. This conclusion changes 
however, when the sample is split into intraday intervals of increasing and decreasing 
stock returns. Results show that algorithmic trading volume is significantly associated 
with future spreads, depth and volatility when prices are falling, and has no relation 
when prices are rising. This may imply that during price declines, ATs increase their 
demand for liquidity. Finally, results reveal that algorithmic trading’s negative 
association with market quality can be explained by ATs engaging in positive feedback 
trading, where they systematically decrease their purchases of stocks during periods 
of falling prices, while increasing their level of selling. 
Chapter 5 examines the execution costs of option strategies and outright 
options on the Australian Options Market. This essay builds on prior studies examining 
transaction costs in the options market, which do not distinguish between outright 
options and options that constitute strategies. This is a significant omission, as option 
strategies may have higher transaction costs given their greater complexity. This 
chapter adds to the literature by being the first study to measure the execution costs 
of option strategies relative to outright options and investigates if any differences in 
the execution costs of strategy-linked options and outright options are attributable to 
differences in market making costs.  
The analysis reveals three key findings. First, execution costs for strategy-
linked options are greater relative to outright options. Second, the execution costs of 
option strategies are dependent upon the complexity of option strategies, with tailor-
made strategy-linked options being more costly to trade than standard strategy-linked 
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options. These findings are supported by a range of empirical measures. Strategy-
linked options display wider effective spreads across put and call options and across a 
number of different option characteristics. Multivariate analysis shows that after 
directly controlling for a number of liquidity determinants, tailor-made strategy-linked 
trades incur higher execution costs than outright options trades. The third key finding 
is that the greater execution costs of option strategies are caused by the higher 
inventory-holding costs of the market maker and not higher adverse selection costs. 
Results indicate that the difference in execution costs between tailor-made strategy-
linked options and outright options is driven by the initial costs in delta hedging the 
option position. 
Chapter 6 examines the intraday pattern in quoted depth on the Nasdaq, a 
competitive dealer market. The empirical evidence from prior literature suggests that 
market design plays an important role in the observed pattern in bid-ask spreads and 
quoted depth over the course of the trading day. The literature examining markets 
with designated market makers shows that bid-ask spreads tighten near the close of 
trading, as market makers improve their prices to attract order flow from other 
liquidity suppliers in order to manage their inventory levels. Using similar arguments, 
it is hypothesised that quoted depth increases near the close of trading. 
Consistent with prior studies on competitive dealer markets, results show bid-
ask spreads are widest at the open of trading and tightest near the close of trading. 
Furthermore, quoted depth is shown to be inversely related to bid-ask spreads, 
increasing over the trading day and increasing most significantly near the close of 
trading. Results show that the pattern in quoted depth is a result of the market 
structure of the Nasdaq and not a result of patterns in the determinants of spreads 
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and depth. Controlling for two important determinants of bid-ask spreads and quoted 
depth, trading volume and price volatility, results show that the patterns in quote 
depth and bid-ask spreads are unaffected. The results support the hypothesis that the 
price and quantity quotes of dealers are interdependent and that dealers use both 
spreads and depth to manage their inventory near the close of trading.  
 
7.2 Contributions to the Literature, Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
   
The findings from this dissertation provide a number of insights into the factors 
affecting liquidity in limit order markets and markets with designated market makers 
and their impact on market quality.  
The results in Chapter 3 suggest that increasing the tick size encourages more 
limit orders to be posted throughout the limit order book. Despite this, it still leads to 
a higher execution costs, as futures markets already have sufficient depth to meet 
traded volume (Alampieski and Lepone, 2009). This confirms the results of other 
studies that show a reduction in tick size primarily benefits small trades and liquid 
securities (Bollen and Whaley, 1998).  One avenue to explore is whether there are 
other benefits to a tick size increase is to examine its impact on the resiliency of the 
order book, which is a key aspect of liquidity (Kyle, 1985). Resiliency is a temporal 
dimension of liquidity and reflects the speed at which the limit order book is 
replenished after being subject to a liquidity shock, such as a market order. The 
increase in the tick size may have led to an improvement in the resiliency of the limit 
order book, resulting in an improvement in overall market liquidity.  
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The results in Chapter 4 indicate algorithmic trading destablises markets during 
all price declines, rather than during extreme market movements (Kirilenko et al, 
2011). Analysis suggests that it results from algorithmic traders withdrawing liquidity 
from the market, in line with studies examining the behaviour of algorithmic traders 
(ASIC, 2012).  An issue of concern however is the accuracy of classifying trades as 
algorithmic trades. The algorithmic trading measure will encompass both liquidity 
supply likely comes both from high frequency traders that are making markets 
algorithmically and from buy-side institutions that are submitting limit orders as part 
of “slice and dice” algorithms. As the concern with algorithmic trading rests with the 
potential behavior of high frequency traders, being able to specifically identify high 
frequency traders in the data would provide a more robust analysis of the impact of 
HFTs on market quality during price declines. A further issue is the use of lagged 
algorithmic trading as an instrumental variable when assessing the impact of 
algorithmic trading on market quality. This may not overcome all endogeneity issues 
however if the liquidity variables are serially correlated. A more robust approach is to 
identify a structural change that resulted in higher algorithmic trading for a sample of 
stocks on an exchange. This natural experiment can be used to provide more robust 
causal estimates of the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality during price 
declines.  
Chapter 5 provide the first empirical evidence measuring the transaction costs 
of option strategies and its determinants. It indicates that market makers do not adjust 
bid-ask spreads in response to adverse selection costs. Further evidence is needed to 
validate and extend these findings. Two approaches could be used. Partitioning option 
strategy trades according to institutional and retails investors could be used to test 
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whether certain option strategy trades are informative and whether these trades are 
driving the higher observed transaction costs, under the assumption that institutional 
investors are proxies for informed traders. An alternative is to examine whether there 
are certain types of strategy trades that are predictive of future returns and assess 
whether market makers are likely to adjust the bid-ask spread in response to these 
strategy trades.   
Chapter 6 shows that market makers narrow bid-ask spreads and increase 
quoted depth in response to inventory imbalances, in order to end the day ‘flat’. This 
indicates that market makers improve liquidity at the end of the trading day. As a 
further test of whether market makers adjust for inventory imbalances, the behaviour 
of market makers can be compared for liquid and illiquid stocks. Under the inventory-
based model, the decrease (increase) in spreads (depth) should be greater for illiquid 
stocks, as it is more difficult to unwind inventory positions in illiquid securities.  
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